JUDGMENT Woodroffe, J. - In this case in which we have taken time to consider, we have come to the conclusion that the judgment and conviction should stand. The complainant is an illiterate cultivator, who some 7 or 8 years ago executed a zuripeshgi mortgage for a period of five years of his paddy land in favour of the accused to secure a sum of Rs. 60. 2. On 16th January this year the complainant, in company with the Municipal Sub Overseer of Ranchi, whom he had the good sense to ask to go with him to witness the payment, went to the accused. The complainant handed to the Overseer Rs. 59 stating that Rs. 1 (one rupee) was due to him by the accused as zuripeshgi rent and that, the payment of Rs. 59 would thus discharge the mortgage debt. On arrival at the accused's house, the Overseer asked the accused whether what the complainant had told him was true, namely, that the accused owed the complainant one rupee for rent on account of the zuripeshgi mortgage and whether Rs. 59 would, therefore make up the debt. The accused said that he owed one rupee as rent for the zuripeshgi land. The accused admits saying this in his statement to the Magistrate, It may here be observed that there is no question but that there was only one zuripeshgi mortgage executed by the complainant, namely, that concerning which the Overseer asked on his behalf and to which the accused referred. After this, the Overseer made over Rs. 59 In cash to the accused saying at the time that that amount and one rupee due for rent were paid to the accused in discharge of the debt secured by the zuripeshgi mortgage. The accused in his statement says that the Overseer said "take the money and give back the document." The accused took the money but did not make over the zuripeshgi deed but a simple unregistered bond for Rs. 32 said to have been executed by the complainant and several other persons. The Overseer on looking at it said that it was not the document. The complainant also denied that he had executed the document. The accused was then pressed for the return of the zuripeshgi deed but he refused to hand it back. 32 said to have been executed by the complainant and several other persons. The Overseer on looking at it said that it was not the document. The complainant also denied that he had executed the document. The accused was then pressed for the return of the zuripeshgi deed but he refused to hand it back. The complainant threw himself at his feet but on the accused still refusing to make over the document, he was asked at any rate to return the money, this he also refused to do. 3. The case for the defence, and evidence has been given to that effect, is that the complainant and 8 others did execute the document which was returned to him, that he went with the Overseer for the purpose of paying off that document, that both the Overseer and the complain ant are quite satisfied with the transaction and that the story that the complainant fell at the feet of the accused is an invention. 4. We may say at once that we entirely disbelieve the case for the defence that there was any other debt due by the complainant than that on the zuripeshgi mortgage and that the payment was made in respect of the alleged unregistered bond which was stated to have been executed on the 30th October 1900 for a sum of Rs. 32 carrying interest at the rate of 75 per cent. The case is therefore to be decided upon the basis that there was but one debt, namely, that on the zuripeshgi mortgage, that that debt was paid by the complainant and that the accused has not on such payment made over the mortgage deed or possession of the lands secured thereby. 5. As to the dishonesty of the part taken by the accused, we have no manner of doubt. The question is whether his conduct amounted to an offence, and in particular to the offence with which he has been charged, namely, cheating. 6. A rule was granted to show cause why the conviction and sentence should not be set aside on the ground that neither on the facts proved nor on the facts found, was any offence committed. In addition to these grounds, the learned counsel for the accused has taken objection to the charge. 7. 6. A rule was granted to show cause why the conviction and sentence should not be set aside on the ground that neither on the facts proved nor on the facts found, was any offence committed. In addition to these grounds, the learned counsel for the accused has taken objection to the charge. 7. There is, we think, no doubt that it is open to such objection, but inasmuch as it sufficiently gives notice of the transaction in respect of which the offence is charged and no objection was at any time taken to it during the trial and no rule was applied for or granted on this ground, we do not think it necessary to further consider it. 8. The main question which has been argued is that no offence of cheating has been proved, and that point has narrowed itself to this, namely, that there was no deception within the meaning of sec. 415, I. P. C. As to this we have in the first place to observe that the section does not in any manner and for obvious reasons limit the mode in which the deception may take place, nor is it necessary that the deception should be by express words but it may be by conduct or implied in the nature of the transaction itself. 9. In the present case what we find is this. The debt which the complainant wished to pay off was the zuripeshgi debt, the discharge of which would free his land which was encumbered with it. Even if the bond debt existed, which we find is not the case, there is not the least, reason for supposing that the complainant had any intention to pay off the debt which was a simple debt and for which, according to the accused, he was only liable together with 8 other persons. The accused knew perfectly well having been expressly so informed that the money was offered to him in payment of the zuripeshgi debt. It is remarkable that though he suggests that the money was tendered in respect of the alleged simple bond debt, no evidence was given as to the amount due on that debt and no conversation of any kind is alleged to have taken place on that point. It is remarkable that though he suggests that the money was tendered in respect of the alleged simple bond debt, no evidence was given as to the amount due on that debt and no conversation of any kind is alleged to have taken place on that point. As we have said, he knew that the money had been offered in payment of the zuripeshgi debt and that the money would not have been paid to him except on the understanding that it was to go in discharge of such debt and that the document which secured it was to be returned. Knowing these, he by his conduct led the complainant to believe that he was prepared to accept the money upon the terms on which it was offered, namely, that it should go to the discharge of the mortgage debt and that on such payment the document would be returned. In the belief induced by the accused's conduct, the money was paid. The accused then refused to acknowledge it as a payment or to return the mortgage deed and set up a pretended debt of the complainant to which he said the payment was assigned. The accused was careful not to say anything about this bond debt before they paid the money, for the reasons as it appears to us that he knew that if he did say anything the money would not have been paid. On the contrary, his answer to the Overseer's questions, his silence as to the alleged bond debt, his acceptance of the money paid as it was with the statement that it was given for the mortgage debt amounted in our opinion to a representation by the accused -- a representation which his subsequent conduct shows that he did not intend to give effect to, viz., that he would accept the money in payment of the mortgage debt for which it was offered and that he would return the document which he had been asked to return. 10. We are clearly of opinion that it was in the belief that the accused would return the mortgage deed -- a belief induced by the accused's conduct, that the money was paid by the complainant. That such conduct was dishonest we have no doubt. 10. We are clearly of opinion that it was in the belief that the accused would return the mortgage deed -- a belief induced by the accused's conduct, that the money was paid by the complainant. That such conduct was dishonest we have no doubt. As a result, the accused now has the complainant's money and land and has refused to return the mortgage deed in respect of which, as he well knew, the money was paid and refused to return either the money or the land on colour of a false claim which he avoided to put forward before the payment by the complainant for the reason that he knew if he had done so, the money would not have been paid. In our opinion the accused intended to, and did, cheat the complainant. 11. In the case The Queen v. Sheodurshun Dass 3 N.W.P. Rep. 17(1871) to which we have been referred by the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer there appears to have been, as pointed out by the learned counsel, an express statement that the accused would return the note which they claimed subsequently to retain for another debt which, as here, they alleged due to them by the complainant. By reason of such express statement the offence was the more obvious. As we have however held it is not necessary to the commission of the offence that the false representation should be expressly stated in so many words. It is sufficient if, as here, the representation made may be inferred and was intended by the accused to be inferred from his words and conduct. The rule will accordingly be discharged and the accused who is on bail will surrender himself to the Magistrate to undergo the sentence that has been passed upon him.