JUDGMENT 1. The Plaintiff and the Defendant No. 2, Madhu Sudan Chowdhury, are members of a joint undivided Hindu family governed by the law of Dayabhaga. The Defendant No. 2 has been the kurta or the managing member of this joint family. He borrowed a certain sum of money from the Defendant No. 1 upon a bond, and this bond was afterwards renewed by a kistbundi bond which was executed by the said Defendant No. 2. The Defendant No. 1 then brought a suit against the Defendant No. 2 for recovery of the money covered by this transaction, and recovered judgment. In execution of the decree which was thus obtained, he (the Defendant No. 1) attached certain moveable properties as if they belonged to Defendant No. 2 exclusively. Thereupon, the Plaintiffs intervened, and, their intervention having failed, they brought the present suit to have it declared that they were joint owners of the properties in question, and that, in execution of the decree obtained by the Defendant No. 1 against Defendant No. 2, their share in the said properties could not be seized. The Munsif gave the Plaintiffs a decree, but that decree has been set aside in appeal by the District Judge. That officer has found that the debt which was contracted by Defendant No. 2 was incurred for the purpose of paying up the land revenue due upon the family estate, and for other necessary expenses, and, having come to this finding, he has held that the only question for decision in the case being whether the debt incurred by the Defendant No. 2 was incurred for the benefit of the joint estate, the decree obtained by the Defendant No. 1 against Defendant No. 2 is binding upon the family, and that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief in the case. The learned Judge of the Court below has, in support of the view that he has expressed, proceeded upon certain authorities, and upon certain passages in Mayne's Hindu Law. The learned Judge of the Court below has, in support of the view that he has expressed, proceeded upon certain authorities, and upon certain passages in Mayne's Hindu Law. The correctness of the decision that he has come to has, however, been impugned by the learned vakil for the Appellants on the ground that most of the cases upon which the learned Judge has relied are cases under the Mitakshara School of Law, and cases in which debts were contracted for the purpose of joint family business and that, therefore, they can have no application to a case such as this is. In page 419 of Mayne's Hindu Law (6th Edition), the law upon the subject has been stated thus : --" On the other hand, all the members of the family, and therefore all their property, divided or undivided, will be liable for debts which have been contracted on behalf of the family by one who was authorized to contract them. The most common case is that of debts created by the manager of the family. He is, ex-officio, the accredited agent of the family, and authorised to bind them for all proper and necessary purposes, within the scope of his agency. If a decree is passed against him in respect of a liability properly contracted for the necessities of the family, the binding character of this decree upon the interests of the other members depends, not upon their having or not having been parties to the suit, but upon the authority of the manager to contract the liability." The law thus stated by Mr. Mayne is amply supported by the authorities that he quotes; and we may here refer to Dayatattwa of Raghunundun translated by Babu Golap Chandra Sarkar, pp. 36 and 37, where the following verses occur :-- In verse 31, reference is made to the special rule in the Mitakshara School of Law as regards immoveable properties, and so forth." The next verse 32 says :--" To this an exception (is mentioned), even a single (coparcener) may make a gift, bailment, or sale of immoveable estate at a time of danger, for the sake of the family, and specially for a religious purpose." "Bailment" signifies mortgage. Verse 33 is as follows :--"Manu declares that gift, mortgage or sale for the purpose of the family is valid even when made by a slave,--Even the most dependant may make any transaction for the sake of the family, the master (remaining) either in his own country or a different one should not refuse his sanction." Kulluka Bhatta writes the following gloss on this text:--"While the; muster is in that place or in a different one, even a slave may contract debts and the like for the use of the family; the master should sanction the same." Verse 34 says: -- " Vrihaspati clearly ordains, the master of the house is liable to pay for what is taken for the sake of the family, by an uncle, a brother, a son, a wife, a disciple, and a dependant," And there are other verses in that book to the same effect. We think there can be no doubt upon the law on the subject, and there is really no difference between the Mitakshara School of Law and the Bengal School of Law so far as this particular matter is concerned, namely, the liability of a joint family when the debt is contracted by the managing member thereof for joint family purpose. 2. In the case of Miller v. Runga Nath Moulik (1), which was a case under the Bengal School of Law and where several of the previous oases upon the print were referred to and discussed, the learned Judges, after reviewing the authorities, made the following observations :--" The result of these cases, in our opinion, is that an alienation made by a managing member of a joint family cannot be binding upon his adult co-sharers unless it is shown that it is made with their consent, either express or implied. In cases of implied consent, it is not necessary to prove Its existence with reference to a particular instance of alienation. A general consent of this nature may be deducible in cases of urgent necessity, from the very fact of the manager being entrusted with the management of the family estate by the other members of the family. In cases of implied consent, it is not necessary to prove Its existence with reference to a particular instance of alienation. A general consent of this nature may be deducible in cases of urgent necessity, from the very fact of the manager being entrusted with the management of the family estate by the other members of the family. The latter, in entrusting the management: of the family affairs in the hands of the manager, must be presumed to have delegated to the said manager the power of pledging the family credit or estate where it is impossible or extremely inconvenient for the purpose of an efficient management of the estate to consult (1) ILR 12 Cal. 389 (1885). them and obtain their consent before pledging such credit or estate." And having regard to the facts of the particular case before them, they held that the charge created by the managing member of the family upon a portion of the family property was binding upon the rest of the family. In the case of Sakharam v. Devji ILR 23 Bom. 372 (1898), where the debt was incurred by a managing member of a Hindu family for family purposes, and a suit was brought against the managing member for recovery of the said debt, it was held that, though the other members of the family were not parties to the suit, they would be bound by the decree passed against the manager in respect of that debt, and that, in execution of the decree, the joint property belonging to the family was liable to be sold, as it was sold in that particular case. And it was also held that the sale had passed the entire joint estate. Several of the cases as bearing upon the point were referred to in the course of the judgment that was delivered, one of the cases being decided by this Court, and reported in ILR 20 Cal. 453 Sheo Pershad v. Sahib Lal. This last-mentioned case, no doubt, was a case under the Mitakshara School of Law, a case whore the debt was incurred for the purpose of the joint family business, and it may well be said, as it has been said by the learned vakil for the Appellant, that that case has no direct application to his case. This last-mentioned case, no doubt, was a case under the Mitakshara School of Law, a case whore the debt was incurred for the purpose of the joint family business, and it may well be said, as it has been said by the learned vakil for the Appellant, that that case has no direct application to his case. But it is of importance in this wise: The learned Judges affirmed the proposition of law as is stated by Mr. Mayne in p. 419 of his work on Hindu Law, to which we have already referred. Then in a later case, Baldeo Sonar v. Mobarak Ali ILR 29 Cal. 583 (1902), it was held that a member of a joint Hindu family, though not a son of the debtor, would be bound by a decree and sale of the family property under the decree although be was no party to it, if the creditor or the purchaser, as the case might be, could prove that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the family, or for the purpose of the trading business in which they were interested, and if the decree was substantially one against them, although, in form, it might be against the head member or members of the family who contracted the debt. And it was further observed that this would be so if the other co-partners were minors at the time the debt was contracted, and the suit was brought. 3. In the present case, however, the other members of the family (the Plaintiffs) were not minors at the time when the suit was brought, and the decree obtained. They were majors, and the Court of first instance found that there was nothing to snow upon the record that the decree was passed against the Defendant No. 2 in his representative capacity as the managing member of the family; and it further stated in the judgment that it was admitted by the Defendant No. 1 that, at the time of the institution of the suit, he was aware that the Plaintiff and the Defendant No. 2 were joint owners of the zamindari the revenue of winch was, according to the Defendant No. 1, paid by the Defendant No. 2 out of the money borrowed. No doubt, if the suit was not brought against the Defendant No. 2 in his representative capacity, but only against him in his personal capacity, the other members of the family would not, be bound by that decree. The learned Judge of the Court below has not addressed himself to this particular question; but finding that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the joint estate, he has held that the Plaintiff is bound by the decree obtained by the Defendant No. 1, for such debt. As already observed, if the Defendant No. 1 sued the Defendant No. 2 in his personal capacity only, and not as representing the family, it could not rightly be said that the decree obtained by the Defendant No. 1, would be binding upon the other members of the family, so that, in execution of that decree, the shares of the members other than the judgment-debtor would be liable to be seized, In this view of the matter, we think it necessary to send back the case for a proper determination of the question whether the suit that was brought against the Defendant No. 2 was brought against him in his representative capacity If it was brought against him in such capacity there can be no doubt that the decree obtained in that suit, though in form only against the Defendant No. 2, should be taken to be a decree against the whole family, and, as such, the decree-holder would be entitled to seize the whole family property in execution thereof. In this connection, we desire to call the attention of the Judge to the fact, as stated in the judgment of the Court of first instance, namely, that, in execution of the decree obtained by the Defendant No. 1, the properties in suit was not attached as a property belonging to the whole family, but as properties of defendants No. 2, alone. This matter, as it seems to us, bears upon the question whether the suit was brought against the Defendant No. 2 in his representative capacity or in his personal capacity. Costs will abide the result.