JUDGMENT 1. On the 28th April 1904 the Petitioners prayed the District Magistrate of Dacca to bind down 24 persons (21 of whom constitute the opposite party) to keep the peace towards the Petitioners and the District Magistrate thereupon directed an enquiry to be held by a Deputy Magistrate. As the result of such local enquiry and report thereon the District Magistrate on the 13th May drew up proceedings under sec. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the opposite party and made over the case for trial to another Deputy Magistrate. The latter after taking the evidence adduced by both parties bound down the opposite party to keep the peace directing that the respective parties should execute the bonds mentioned in his order. Before the bonds were actually executed as directed by the Deputy Magistrate the opposite party, on the 14th September 1904, obtained an order from the District Magistrate calling for the record and staying the execution of the bonds. Eventually the District Magistrate by an order, dated 23rd December 1904, purporting to act under sec. 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code set aside the order of the Deputy Magistrate. Against this order this Court granted a rule upon the District Magistrate to show cause why his order of the 23rd December should not be set aside on the ground that it was made without jurisdiction. We have heard learned Counsel for both parties and are of opinion that the rule must be made absolute. 2. It is obvious that assuming that the District Magistrate had power to exercise jurisdiction of the nature which he exercised the provisions of the section did not warrant the action taken by him. The power given is to cancel any bond executed. No bonds were in fact executed as their execution was stayed by the District Magistrate. If this however were the only objection to the Magistrate's order it would as pointed out by learned Counsel for the opposite party have been of a very technical character. The substantial objection to the District Magistrate's order consists not in the fact that he prematurely exercised a jurisdiction which upon the execution of the bonds was vested in him but that he has no such jurisdiction. The substantial objection to the District Magistrate's order consists not in the fact that he prematurely exercised a jurisdiction which upon the execution of the bonds was vested in him but that he has no such jurisdiction. Sec. 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not confer either an appellate or revisional jurisdiction upon the District Magistrate in respect of order binding down persons to keep the peace made by Courts subordinate to his own. An appeal is given from orders requiring security for good behavior by sec. 406. There is no such appeal in the case of orders to keep the peace. The District Magistrate might if he considered the case a proper one have made a reference to this Court under the provisions of sec. 438 of the Code. The jurisdiction conferred by sec. 125 is not au appellate or revisional but an original jurisdiction. That is if after a bond has been executed it is made to appear that by reason of the circumstances as they exist at the date of the application, that is circumstances subsequent to the date of the execution of the bond, the continuance of the latter is no longer necessary the District Magistrate may cancel it. In other words while a District Magistrate may in the case of au executed bond hold for sufficient reasons that it is no longer necessary and accordingly cancel it he has no power to declare that it was never necessary. In the former case the order of the Subordinate Court is not touched except so far as the District Magistrate may consider that the circumstances existing subsequent to such order require that it should cease to be given effect to. In the latter case the District Magistrate reviews and differs from an authority over which in the particular matter in question he has been given no appellate or revisional control other them that conferred by sec. 438. We are of opinion therefore that the District Magistrate's order was without jurisdiction. We accordingly set it aside and restore that of the Deputy Magistrate.