JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. This is a reference under section 17 of Act No. IV of 1869 for confirmation of the decree for dissolution of marriage, solemnised between the petitioner and the respondent, passed by the learned District Judge of Meerut on the 4th of June, 1904. The grounds of the petition for divorce are, the alleged commission of adultery by the respondent with several women and also such acts of cruelty, as without adultery would have entitled the petitioner to a divorce a mensa et thoro. The learned District Judge who heard the evidence was satisfied of the truth of the allegations made by the petitioner, namely, that the respondent had committed adultery and that he had been guilty-of such acts of cruelty as we have stated. When the case was last before us, we, for the reasons set forth in our order, dated the 13th of February, 1905, deemed it necessary to direct the learned District Judge to hold a further inquiry in regard to certain allegations of misconduct made by the respondent against the petitioner. The result of the inquiry has been submitted to us, and we have considered it and the additional evidence placed upon the record. The learned District Judge finds that the petitioner committed adultery with one John Trapand at Rangoon in July, 1900. We are of opinion that this adultery on her part is fully established by the evidence on the record. 2. There is also a circumstance which was brought to our notice at the previous hearing. The decree nisi was passed on the 4th of June, 1904, and notwithstanding the prohibition contained in Act No. IV of 1869 against the re-marriage of a divorced person at any time within six months after the decree nisi has been made absolute by the High Court, we find that the petitioner went through the form of marriage at Lucknow with a man of the name of Whaley, on the 18th June, 1904, that is, exactly one fortnight after the decree nisi had been passed. Explanation as to this has been given by affidavits by both the petitioner and the man Whaley, with whom she went through the form of marriage. In those affidavits they depose that they went through the form of marriage in entire ignorance of the law, which prohibits a formal marriage within the period which we have stated. Explanation as to this has been given by affidavits by both the petitioner and the man Whaley, with whom she went through the form of marriage. In those affidavits they depose that they went through the form of marriage in entire ignorance of the law, which prohibits a formal marriage within the period which we have stated. The petitioner states that she believed that she had been relieved by the decree nisi from her former marriage and was entitled to re-marry. Looking at the publicity of the fact of the marriage, as to which we have-no doubt, we give credence to the statements of the petitioner and Whaley, that they acted bona fide, believing that the petitioner had been released by law from her previous husband. 3. We might have overlooked the conduct of the petitioner in going through this form of marriage at Lucknow, but in our opinion we ought not to overlook the fact that the petitioner herself had been previously guilty of adultery. It is true that the learned District Judga finds, that after the adultery committed by the petitioner in 1890, she and the respondent lived as man and wife in 1900 and 1903. Notwithstanding this, we are of opinion that this is a case in which we should, in the exercise, of our discretionary power, refuse to confirm the decree for dissolution of marriage, on the ground that the petitioner herself has been guilty of adultery, specially as from a perusal of letters of the petitioner which are on the record, we feel little doubt that the parties are in collusion in wishing to be divorced. 4. There is a matter to which we feel bound here, to call attention. As we have said, the second marriage was solemnised one fortnight after the decree nisi had been passed, contrary to the provisions of the Act to which we have referred, This marriage was solemnised by a Wesleyan Minister who is licensed to solemnise marriages under Act No. XV of 1872. He was aware that the petitioner was a divorced woman, and therefore, as it seems to us, it was incumbent upon him to make proper inquiry and ascertain when she had obtained her divorce, so as to ensure that he was nut solemnising a marriage contrary to the provisions of law. He was aware that the petitioner was a divorced woman, and therefore, as it seems to us, it was incumbent upon him to make proper inquiry and ascertain when she had obtained her divorce, so as to ensure that he was nut solemnising a marriage contrary to the provisions of law. Had he made any inquiry, presuming as we do, that he is acquainted with the law, he would not have ventured to solemnise the marriage. The provisions of the Act are perfectly clear. Section 57 provides that not sooner than six months after the date of the order of the High Court confirming the decree for dissolution of marriage made by a District Judge have expired, may the parties re-marry. In this case it follows that the form of marriage which has been gone through by the petitioner and Whaley is a mere nullity. 5. We refuse to confirm the decree nisi and dismiss the petition of Aileen Crawson. Having regard to the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.