JUDGMENT Harington, J. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge dismissing with costs an action which he brought for slander. The Defendant was a witness in a case before a Deputy Magistrate : in the course of his cross-examination he was asked whether his sister was in the employ of Tokhan Singh as cook instead of answering the question he said "the sister of Girwar Singh (the Plaintiff) is in the keeping of a Kaisth." 2. On this Girwar Singh sued the Defendant for slander and recovered a judgment for Rs. 500 damages before the Munsif. This was reversed on appeal on the ground that a slander imputing unchastity to a woman was not actionable without proof of special damage, and in this case no actual damage was proved. 3. The learned vakil for the Appellant contends that in the mofussil defamatory words are actionable without proof of actual damage. 4. For the Respondent it is contended that where no actual damage is sustained, redress must be sought through the Criminal Courts, and that the words without actual damage are not actionable : that in any case the suit is not maintainable by the Plaintiff because he was not slandered : and lastly that the occasion on which the words were spoken was privileged. 5. With the last contention I disagree and I do not think the cases laying down that words spoken in the course of an examination by a witness in a judicial enquiry are privileged even if they are irrelevant, touch the point. In this case the words were not spoken in the course of an examination in a judicial enquiry. The words had no sort of connection with the examination and were in no sense an answer to the question put to the witness. While I quite agree with the dictum that what a witness says in the course of his examination is privileged even if irrelevant, I am of opinion that no witness is entitled to claim privilege for a slanderous statement wantonly made which is neither au answer to any question addressed to him in examination or cross-examination, nor has any connection at all with the case under trial. 6. 6. In my opinion the judgment of the lower Appellate Court must be supported on the second ground taken, i.e., no action will lie at the suit of the Plaintiff because the words are neither defamatory of him nor have they caused him any injury. 7. The only person who can sue for defamatory words is the person defamed. He may be defamed directly or the slander may be only indirectly defamatory of him, as for example, a slander may be uttered of A. which implies that B. has committed au indictable offence. Then of course B. can sue. In the present case the words complained of can bear no innuendo imputing any sort of misconduct to the Plaintiff. 8. Had the words, though in the first instance defamatory to the Plaintiff's sister, been calculated to cause actual damage to the Plaintiff then under the principle laid down in Ratcliffe v. Evans L.R. (1892) 2 Q.B. 524 they would, if they had caused the Plaint id' actual damage, been actionable in a suit by him. 9. The learned vakil for the Respondent contends that the Plaintiff would have been entitled to institute a prosecution under sec. 499 of the Indian Penal Code and that he is therefore entitled to sue. I do not agree with this proposition. 10. Even if it be conceded that the Plaintiff would have been entitled to prosecute under sec. 499 of the Indian Penal Code as a person aggrieved under sec. 198, Cr. P.C., it by no means follows that he is entitled to bring a suit. If it could be contended that when the Criminal Procedure Code gives a person the power to prosecute it ex necessitate gives to that person a right to sue in tort, notwithstanding that the tort is not committed against him but against some one else and he has suffered no sort of damage from it, then it would follow that under sec. 199 a person who had the care of a married woman could get damages from a person who enticed her away, notwithstanding that she was not his wife, and he had suffered no damage, and further such view of the effect of the Criminal Procedure Code would involve this anomaly that, as for example in this case, a verdict in favour of the Plaintiff in a civil suit unlike a verdict in a criminal prosecution being no bar to a suit by the Plaintiff's sister, the Defendant might have to pay damages at the suit of person defamed, and also to pay damages in suits brought by any person who, though not defamed or injured by the slander, were entitled to institute a criminal prosecution under sec. 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In other words for a slander against A. causing damage to A. only he might have to pay damages to A. and B. and C. This would lead to injustice. 11. But the learned vakil has further contended that this point was not taken in either of the lower Courts and therefore ought not to be entertained here. It is true that the point was not taken and that as a rule we decline to entertain points which have not been taken in the Courts below. But that rule cannot be adhered to in the present case. We are asked by the Appellant to set aside the judgment of the lower Appellate Court in favour of the Defendant and to enter judgment for the Plaintiff for damages not with standing the fact that the plaint, shows that he has no right of action against the Defendant. That is we are asked to give a judgment which on the pleadings in the case would be clearly wrong. That of course cannot be done notwithstanding that this point was not taken below, but inasmuch as the Respondent did not take the point before, we decline to allow him any costs of appeal. 12. The other question is one of some difficulty but in my view it is unnecessary to discuss it because in this case the words are not defamatory of the Plaintiff, and therefore the question whether the lady could sue for slander imputing unchastity to her without special damage is irrelevant to any question in the case. 13. 12. The other question is one of some difficulty but in my view it is unnecessary to discuss it because in this case the words are not defamatory of the Plaintiff, and therefore the question whether the lady could sue for slander imputing unchastity to her without special damage is irrelevant to any question in the case. 13. Mookerjee, J.--I agree with my learned brother that the decree made by the Subordinate Judge must be affirmed on the ground that the Plaintiff is not entitled to maintain this action. It is well settled that no action can be brought except for the infringement of a right and the person who sustains the injury that is whose legal rights are infringed is the person to bring an action for the injury against the wrongdoer; for no one can bring an action for an injury which is not an injury to himself, Dicey on Parties, Rule Nos. 78 and 79). It follows therefore that A. can never sue X merely for an injury done to B. by X., though language is sometimes used as if there are exceptions to this rule, for instance, actions are spoken of as brought by masters for injuries to servants, or by parents for wrongs to their children. It will be found, however, than in all such cases where A. is described as suiting X. for injuries to B, the real foundation of the action is au invasion of some right of his own, though it may happen that the injury to A. is the result of or closely connected with a wrong done to B. If we apply these principles to the case of slander, it is manifest that the only person who can sue for the slander is the person with reference to whom the slander has been uttered; but it is quite conceivable that a slander upon A. may involve directly or indirectly a slander upon B. and thus give the latter also a cause of action. Now in the case before us, the statement complained of, namely, that the sister of the Plaintiff was in the keeping of a Kaisth, though defamatory of his sister, cannot be said to be a slander upon him. Now in the case before us, the statement complained of, namely, that the sister of the Plaintiff was in the keeping of a Kaisth, though defamatory of his sister, cannot be said to be a slander upon him. If we analyse for a moment the duty, the breach of which gives rise to the action, it may be stated to be the duty which A owes to B., not to publish of B., either defamation in its nature actionable per se or defamation in its nature not actionable per se to the damage of B. It is impossible to define absolutely what words are defamatory and what are not, and in each case the question must be whether the words have appreciably injured the Plaintiff's reputation. Such injury may be presumed from the nature of the words themselves or may be proved by evidence of their consequences. The presumption arises from the nature of the words themselves, if being spoken they charge the Plaintiff with the commission of a crime or impute to him a contagions disorder tending to exclude him from society or they are spoken of the Plaintiff in the way of his profession or trade or disparage him in an office of public trust. In the case before us no proof has been given of any injurious consequence to the Plaintiff by reason of the words uttered in respect of his sister and no presumption of injury clearly arises from the nature of the words themselves. I am therefore unable to hold that the words are defamatory of the Plaintiff and if they are not, he is not entitled to sue in reaped of them. 14. The view I have indicated is not only well founded in principle but is supported by high authority. Thus it is well established in England that A. cannot as a rule sue for words defamatory only of B., although he may have suffered loss or inconvenience there from. Indeed, when forms of pleading were regarded as essential it was held that the declaration must state that the words were spoken or the libel was written "of the Plaintiff," unless the matter itself spoken or published, manifestly pointed out and applied to the Plaintiff, otherwise the count would he bad even on error; see Clement v. Fisher 7 Barn & Cress. 459 (1827), O'Brien v. Clement 4 D. & L. 563 (1847) and Bignell v. Buzzard 3 H. & N. 217 (1858), though Cook v. Ward 4 M. & P. 99 (1830) shows that the stringency of the form might sometimes be relaxed. But as I have stated before, words defamatory of A. may in some cases be also indirectly defamatory of B and thus give the latter a cause of action; as illustrations of this, we have Vicars v. Worth 1 Strange 471 (Mich. Term. 8 Geo.) and Hodgkins v. Corbet 1 Strange 545 (Hil. Term. 9 Geo.), where it was held that when a married man was called a cuckold in the city of London, his wife could sue, for it was tantamount to calling her a whore; similarly in Huckle v. Reynolds 7 C.B.N.S. 114 (1859), where the wife of the Plaintiff was addressed by the Defendant, "your house is no better than a bawdy house," the Plaintiff was allowed to maintain the action, because if in fact his wife did keep such a house, he himself could be indicted for it. It is obvious that the case before us does not fall within this latter class of authorities. The same rule has been adopted in the American Courts; see Hilliard on Torts, 4th Ed., Vol. I, p. 315, where it is stated upon the authority of Harvey v. Coffin 5 Blackford 566 and Longhead v. Bartholomew Wright 90, that the general rule is that in an action for slander, the words must, have been spoken of the Plaintiff and the Courts will not allow two persons to litigate in a suit for a libel which consists in an attack upon the chastity of a third person not a party to the suit. I may observe that it is pointed out by Starkie in his Commentary on the Law of Slander and Libel (Folkard on Slander and Libel, 6th Ed., p. 19), that by the Roman law, a party was not only entitled to sustain an action for contumacious words spoken concerning himself, but also in respect of those spoken of others of his family, if they tended collaterally to subject him to degradation and contempt; thus a father was entitled to recover in respect of a contumacious injury offered to his wife, children or domestics provided the offender knew the relationship of the party so offended The indefiniteness however which pervades this branch of the Roman law has not been introduced into the law of England, under which contumacy is not a ground of action, and substantially the same principle has been recognised in our Courts. The question now before us has been considered by the Courts of this country in more than one case. In Subbayar v. Kristnaiyar ILR 1 Mad 383 (1878), it was held by the High Court of Madras, that a brother cannot sue for a slander of his sister. The same view was followed in Brahmanna v. Ramakrishna ILR 18 Mad. 250 (1894), where the learned Judges held that a suit was not maintainable by the Plaintiff for damages for defamation where the words complained of were spoken by the Defendant to the effect that the Plaintiff's wife had committed adultery; it was pointed out that a contrary view would lead to the position that a slanderer might he liable to as many actions as there are relations of the persons defamed. A similar view has been adopted by the High Court of Allahabad; see Oodai v. Bhowance I Agra H.C. Rep. 264 (1866), and Daya v. Param Sukh ILR 11 All. 104 (1888), in which latter case Edge, C.J., observed that an action for damage is a purely personal action which can be maintained only by or on behalf of the person defamed. The High Court of Bombay has adopted the same rule; see Luchumsey v. Hurbun Nursey ILR 5 Bom. 264 (1866), and Daya v. Param Sukh ILR 11 All. 104 (1888), in which latter case Edge, C.J., observed that an action for damage is a purely personal action which can be maintained only by or on behalf of the person defamed. The High Court of Bombay has adopted the same rule; see Luchumsey v. Hurbun Nursey ILR 5 Bom. 580 (1881), where it was held that a suit brought by the heir and nearest relation of a deceased person for defamatory words spoken of the dead man, but alleged to have caused damage to the Plaintiff as a member of the same family, was not maintainable. The cases of Basumati v. Budram ILR 22 Cal. 46 (1894) and Thakur Das v. Adhar Chandra 8 C.W.N. 515 : s.c. ILR 32 Cal. 425 (1904) are not opposed to this view and are clearly distinguishable, as they were both cases under the Indian Penal Code. In the first case the question that we have to determine was not raised. The second case turned upon the construction of sec. 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and it was held that where imputations are made against the character of a Hindu lady, a widow, residing in the house and under the charge of her brother, the brother under the circumstances and the conditions of life of the people in this part of India, is a person aggrieved within the meaning of sec. 198, Cr. P.C., and that it is consequently competent to a Court to take cognizance of the offence of defamation upon his complaint. In my opinion the rule that a suit for damages for defamation can only be brought by the person actually defamed is applicable to this case and the contrary view urged by the Appellant is supported by neither principle nor authority. The appeal consequently fails and must be dismissed.