JUDGMENT : Stanley, J.:— We are of opinion that the suit which gave rise to this appeal was wholly misconceived and that the appeal must be decreed. The litigation arose under the following circumstances:— In February, 1892, one Sheo Ram and another mortgaged two villages in favour of the appellant Har Parshad, one of the conditions of the mortgage deed being that if the debt was not paid by a certain date, the mortgagee should be entitled to take possession of the mortgaged property. On the 10th of November, 1892, the mortgagee, Har Parshad, brought a suit for recovery of the mortgage debt, the debt being unpaid, and in June, 1893, a decree for possession was passed in his favour. In March, 1897, the mortgagors made an application to the Court under the provisions of section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for possession of the mortgaged property, alleging that the mortgage-debt had been satisfied. This application was granted and possession was restored to the mortgagors, but upon appeal to the High Court the decision of the Court below was reversed. The case is reported in the Indian Law Reports, XX All., at page 507. The Court consisting of BLAIR and BURKITT, JJ., held that the application of the mortgagors under section 244’ did not lie, and that their proper remedy, if their allegations were true, was to institute a suit for redemption of the mortgage and not by an application in the execution department. Har Parshad, after the passing of the decree of the High Court, applied to be restored to possession of the property, and Phul Chand, the plaintiff in the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, who had become a sub-mortgagee of the property under a mortgage, dated the 20th December, 1897, objected to the application of Har Prashad, but his objection was disallowed on the 5th September, 1902, and in the same month possession of the mortgaged property is said to have been given to Har Parshad. There is a question before us as to whether or not actual possession was given, but it is immaterial to determine that question for the purposes of this appeal. On the 9th of January, 1898, the plaintiff, Phul Chand, instituted a suit against the mortgagors for possession of the mortgaged property, but did not implead the prior mortgagee, Har Parshad. There is a question before us as to whether or not actual possession was given, but it is immaterial to determine that question for the purposes of this appeal. On the 9th of January, 1898, the plaintiff, Phul Chand, instituted a suit against the mortgagors for possession of the mortgaged property, but did not implead the prior mortgagee, Har Parshad. This suit was dismissed in the Court below, but on appeal to the High Court the judgment of the Court below was reversed and a decree for possession was passed on the 7th of May, 1902, and subsequently, in the month of June, 1902, the plaintiff was put in possession of the mortgaged property. Whether or not subsequently in September, 1902, the appellant, Har Parshad, recovered possession is not satisfactorily established. The present suit was then instituted by Phul Chand on the 25th of August, 1902, and the relief claimed by him in his plaint is that “a declaratory decree may be passed to the effect that the amount of the decree No. 12 of 1902, High Court Appeal No. 52 of 1898, held by the defendant No. 1, having been paid up and satisfied, it is incapable of execution, and that the defendant No. 1 is not entitled thereunder to get possession of village Madara, etc.” Further relief is also asked. One of the defendants', namely, Har Prashad raised the objection that this suit was wholly misconceived and that the plaintiff was bound, if this allegations were true, to institute a suit for redemption on the earlier mortgage, and that a suit asking for a declaratory decree was not open to him. We are of opinion that this plea of the defendant is well funded. The proper course, as pointed by this Court in the decision to which we have referred for the mortgagor to adopt, if he alleged that the mortgage debt of the defendant, Har Parshad, was satisfied, was to institute a redemption suit. 2. In that suit it would have been open to the plaintiff to allege that the mortgage debt had been satisfied and to claim the costs of the suit in the event of its being found that his allegations were correct. 2. In that suit it would have been open to the plaintiff to allege that the mortgage debt had been satisfied and to claim the costs of the suit in the event of its being found that his allegations were correct. Without, however, bringing a redemption suit, it appears to us that the mortgage of the defendant Har Parshad and the decree which was obtained by Har Parshad, upon that mortgage, could not be got rid of, and that the lower Court ought not, particularly in view of the decision of this Court, to which we have referred, to have passed the decree which it did. The learned Subordinate Judge, we observe, states that the circumstances had undergone a change since the judgment of the High Court, We are at a loss to understand what he means to convey by this. The rights of the parties had not undergone any change, and if there was a change, it was a change unfavourable to the case which was put forward by the plaintiff. It is to be observed that the plaintiff found it necessary to ask the Court to declare that the decree obtained by the defendant, Har Parshad, was incapable of execution. In order to satisfy the Court as to this, it was necessary for the plaintiff either to have the decree set aside or else to show the Court that the money due under it had been fully satisfied and therefore to have accounts taken, This is not such a decree as the Court in the exercise of its discretion, ought to pass under the provisions of the specific Relief Act. We think it unfortunate that the learned Subordinate Judge did not accept the guidance afforded by the judgment of this Court in the former case. It would have saved a great deal of time and money if he had done so. It is still open to the plaintiff to take the course which is prescribed by law for the recovery of the mortgaged property and if he is able to satisfy the Court that the mortgage of Har Parshad has been fully satisfied, he is in a position to obtain redemption of that mortgage upon instituting a suit for that purpose. The present suit, as we have said, has been entirely misconceived and this appeal must be allowed. The present suit, as we have said, has been entirely misconceived and this appeal must be allowed. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below, and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs both Courts including fees in this Court on the higher scale.