JUDGMENT : Stanley, J. [After starting the facts as above, his Lordship proceeded as follows]:— We shall first deal with, the question of impartibility. The Tamkohi estate belonged to Rojah Fateh Sahi and is situate in territory which formerly belonged to the Nawab Wazir of Oudh, but was ceded to the British Government in the year 1801. Whether the entire of this estate was acquired by Fateh Sahi or part only was acquired and part inherited by him from his ancestors, is a matter in controversy in this appeal. It lies on the west side of the river Gondak. On the opposite bank of this river lies the Raj formerly known as the Hansapur Raj, now the Hatwa Raj, in the district of Saran, which belonged to Raja Fateh Sahi and to his ancestors before him for many generations. This teritory formerly belonged to the kings of Delhi. After the battle of Buxar in the year 1764, when this territory fell into the hands of the East India Company, Raja Fateh Sahi refused to acknowledge allegiance to the British, and in consequence was obliged to leave his estates in that territory. He crossed the Gandak and settled on property situate on the west bank of the river, which was formerly described as Bank Jogni. The Hansapur estate in the district of Saran is admittedly an impartible Raj. Owing to the hostility of Raja Fateh Sahi, it was confiscated by the British Government and let out to farmers until the year 1790, when the Government conferred it upon Raja Chhatardhari Sahi, at that time the eldest surviving member of a younger branch of the family of Raja Fateh Sahi. 2. The sons of Fateh Sahi made several ineffectual appeals to the British Government for re-instatement in this part of their ancestral property. At a later date litigation ensued between two of the grandsons of Raj Chhataidhari Sahi on the one side and a great-grandson on the other, The grandsons claimed to be entitled by inheritance in accordance with the ordinary rules of Hindu Law to a moiety of the entire property left by their grandfather. The great-grandson disputed their right to any share, alleging that the Raj had come to him as a member of the eldest branch of the family in accordance with the well-established custom of the family. The litigation closely resembled that in the present case. The great-grandson disputed their right to any share, alleging that the Raj had come to him as a member of the eldest branch of the family in accordance with the well-established custom of the family. The litigation closely resembled that in the present case. It was held by the appellate Court confirming the decision of the Court below that the Hansapur property was a Raj and that by the rule of the family it descended entire to a single heir; that the Government by setting aside a particular branch of the family did not intend or in fact confiscate the property and thereby extinguish the rights of every member of the family; that the family custom and the custom of the Raj were not destroyed by the infringement of the custom by virtue of which Raja Chattardhari Sahi acquired the estate (see Special Number, Weekly Reporter, 97). The decision was upheld upon appeal by their Lordships of the Privy Council, [12 M.I.A., 1]. This litigation established the fact that the Hansapur estate was an impartible Raj, and this indeed is not denied. The case for the plaintiff-appellant is not that Raja Fateh Sahi did not formerly possess an impartible Raj in the district of Saran, but that the property which he inherited or acquired on the west bank of the river Gandak and which belonged at the time of acquisition to the Nawab Wazir of Oudh formed no part of that Raj and was not impressed with the character of impartibility. It is said that it was his self-acquisition with which he could deal as he pleased. The litigation to which we have referred, it is to be observed, had no concern with any property situate out of the district of Saran, but only to the property in Saran which had been confiscated by the British Government. The Gorakhpur district was at this time in the territory of the Nawab Wazir. For tin's reason, no doubt, we do not find in the reports of the abovementioned suit any special reference to the possessions of Raja Fateh. Sahi out of the district of Saran, We notice, however, that in the judgment of their Lordships a reference is made to the estate of Raja Fateh Sahi in the dominions of the Nawab Wazir. The information given as to this family in the historical records of the district is meagre. Sahi out of the district of Saran, We notice, however, that in the judgment of their Lordships a reference is made to the estate of Raja Fateh Sahi in the dominions of the Nawab Wazir. The information given as to this family in the historical records of the district is meagre. Few matters are stated in them, and some of these, as we shall presently show, are inaccu rate. In the Settlement Report of the Gorakhpur district of 1871 we find the following passage at page 131:— “Taluka Bank Jogni belongs to the Raj of Tumookoee (Tamkohi). The original founder, a relative of the Hatwa Raja, is said to have crossed the river Gandak from the adjoining district of Saran and established himself in two villages, Bank and Jogni which he purchased from the former proprietors. In those days when a state of warfare and internal strife was the normal condition of this pargana, the natural consequence of a powerful Raja obtaining such a footing in it was the gradual formation partly by violent usurpation and partly by voluntary transfer, of weak and powerless zamindars, of a large taluka, which in time came to include all the villages in the vicinity which the talukdar considered worth possessing. This taluka has the reputation of always being well managed. The late Raja Khurak Bahadoor (Kharag Bahadur Sahi), whose systematic good management was a model to other talukdars in this district, died about a year before the present revision of settlement and the present Raja was then a minor. It is gratifying, however, to be able to record that since the death of Khurak Bahadoor the estate has been equally well managed without the intervention of the Court of Wards by Rani Talessur Kuari, the mother of the minor Raja.” In his Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol. XI, p. 369, Sir W.W. Hunter writes in regard to the Hatwa family as follows;— “When the East India Company obtained the financial administration of Behar in 1765, Fatti Sahi, then Raja of Hatwa, refused to pay revenue to the Company, On being pressed by the English troops he retired to a large tract of forest between Gorakhpur and Saran, whence he frequently Invaded the British territory. His inroads constantly interrupted the collections of revenue in 1772, and he is supposed to have killed one Gobind Ram, who then rented the property of Hansapur. His inroads constantly interrupted the collections of revenue in 1772, and he is supposed to have killed one Gobind Ram, who then rented the property of Hansapur. The Collector finding that the revenue of the Hatwa estate could not be collected, recommended that the Raja should be pardoned on the promise of his receiving an allowance from Government. This proposal was sanctioned. The Raja came to Patna and promised that he would remain quietly with his family at Hansapur. This promise, however, she soon broke; and up to 1775 committed constant depredations on the Company's territories.” In the Historical Account of the North-Western Provinces, edited by Mr. Atkinson in 1881, at p. 450, Vol. VI, we find the following account of this district:— “The terrible state of insecurity in the Sidhua Jogna pergana gave the opportunity for the rise of the two principal talukas which still comprised between them the greater portion of the pergana. The first of these was Bank Jogni taluka or Tamkohi Raj, which was founded by Fateh Sahi Bhuinhar, Raja of Hoshyarpur (Hansapur) in Saran. He claimed descent from Mayyura, founder of the Majhauli Raj, by a Bhuinhar wife; and his descendants are still recognised as connections by the Majhauli family. Refusing to acknowledge British authority, he was, after the battle of Buxar, expelled from Saran and settled on an estate he had bought a few years before in tappas Bank and Jogni. He brought with him a large amount of treasure and received also the support of the Majhauli Raja, who was wise enough to see the advantage of retaining a friendly power as a rampart between himself and the Banjharas. He brought with him a large amount of treasure and received also the support of the Majhauli Raja, who was wise enough to see the advantage of retaining a friendly power as a rampart between himself and the Banjharas. By usurpation, or more commonly by voluntary transfers from weaker zamindars, he extended his possessions swiftly and widely over the south-east of Sidhua Jogna, and before his death was recognised as talukdar of nearly a hundred villages.” These extracts are relied upon by the appellants as showing that the possessions of Raja Fateh Sahi in the district of Gorakhpur were acquired by him after his succession to the Raj of Hansapur, and that no part of the Tamkohi estate” cams to him by descent, and the contention is that the property so acquired by the owner of an impartible Raj and dealt with by such owner in the manner in which Raja Fateh Sahi dealt with the Tamkohi estate, cannot be regarded as impartible or subject to the family custom which governs the devolution of the Raj. The Hansapur Raj, it will be observed, is situate in territory which belonged to the King of Delhi, whilst the Tamkohi estate is in territory which was ceded to the British by the Nawab Wazir of Oudh. But we do not think that anything turns on this. 3. The argument advanced by the appellants is that Raja Fateh Sahi was Raja of the Hansapur estate alone, and that when he was expelled from this Raj he was a Raja without any Raj; that the property acquired by him in Gorakhpur was a recent acquisition to which the family custom could not be said to attach; and that respondent cannot pray in aid of the alleged impartibility of that property, a custom which was incident to the Hansapur Raj. It was further contended on behalf of the appellants that if the custom did ever exist as an incident to the property, it was discontinued. On behalf of the respondent it is contended that the Hansapur estate extended into the district of Gorakhpur and embraced a considerable territory in that district long before the time of Raja Fateh Sahi, and that it is an error to suppose that all the Tamkohi estate was the self-acquisition of Raja Fateh Sahi. Now that the respondent is a Raja is not and cannot be disputed. Now that the respondent is a Raja is not and cannot be disputed. He is officially recognised by Government as an hereditary Raja and is known as the Raja of Tamkohi. The question is, is he a Raja without a Raj? We shall first then consider whether the Hansapur Raj extended into and embraced properly in Gorakhpur, and also whether the custom of impartibility, which was incident to the Hansapur Raj, also became or was incident to the Tamkohi estate and was an invariable and continuous custom bearing in mind that “it is of the essence of family usages that they should be certain, invariable and continuous,” and that “well established discontinuance must be held to destroy them.—Raj Kishun v. Ratnjoy, [1872] I.L.R., 1 Cal., 186. “The information given in the historical records, to which we have referred in regard to the Hansapur Raj, shows no trace of deep research or investigation, and it is doubtful if any great value can be attached to it. One might be led by it to suppose that no property in Gorakhpur was possessed by the Rajas of Hansapur before the time of Raja Fateh Sahi, and that it was only upon his expulsion from Satan that Fateh Sahi acquired property in Gorakhpur. On examination of the evidence before us, however, this does not appear to be the case, for there is documentary as well as oral evidence which leaves no doubt on our minds that Raja Fateh Sahi and his ancestors owned property in Gorakhpur long before his expulsion from Saran, and that these properties were of considerable extent and value. [His Lordship after discussing the evidence continued]: 4. Some witnesses, who are related to or connected with the Hansapur family, were examined on behalf of the defendant, and in the course of their evidence detailed from family tradition matters which also go to establish that in the time of the ancestors of Faleh Sahi the Raja of Hansapur possessed many villages in Gorakhpur which formed part of the Hansapur Raj, villages situate in Gorakhpur having been given by way of Babuai allowances to cadet branches of the family. This evidence was received in the Court below without objection and only at a late stage of the hearing of this appeal, namely, in the reply of the learned advocate of the appellants, was any objection as to its admissibility raised. Mr. This evidence was received in the Court below without objection and only at a late stage of the hearing of this appeal, namely, in the reply of the learned advocate of the appellants, was any objection as to its admissibility raised. Mr. Chaudhri on behalf of the appellants contend-ed that the statements of these witnesses were not admissible in evidence, being made merely from hearsay. Now, under section 49 of the Evidence Act when the Court has to form an opinion as to the usages of a family, the opinions of persons having special means of knowledge thereon are relevant facts. So far as the evidence objected to can be held to fall within this section, it is no doubt admissible. Commenting upon evidence of this description in the case of Garuradhwaja Prasad v. Super-undhwaja Prasad, [1900] I.L.R., 23 All, 37, their Lordships of the Privy Council say, at pages 51 and 52:— “By section 49 when the Court has to form an opinion on (inter alia) the usages of any family, the opinions of persons having special means of knowledge thereon are also relevant. But by section 60 if oral evidence refers to an opinion or the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those grounds. Their Lordships think it is admissible evidence for a living witness to state his opinion on the existence of a family custom and to state as the grounds of that opinion information derived from deceased persons, and the weight of the evidence would depend on the position and character of the witness and of the persons on whose statements he has formed his opinion.” Bearing in mind this rule, we shall deal with the evidence of these witnesses. There evidence is directed to establish the case of the respondent and to prove that the Tamkohi estate is an impartible Raj and has been held by a long succession of Rajas from a period long anterior to the expulsion of Fateh Sahi from Saran, [His Lordship after discussing the evidence continued]. It in substance represents the opinions of persons having special means of knowledge based on information derived from deceased members of the family and cannot be treated as of no value. It in substance represents the opinions of persons having special means of knowledge based on information derived from deceased members of the family and cannot be treated as of no value. It goes to show that the Rajas of Hansapur, prior to the time of Raja Fateh Sahi, owned a considerable extent of property in the district of Gorakhpur, and that that property was treated as forming part of the Hansapur Raj and as such, subject to the custom as to devolution prevailing in the family. [His Lordship discussed the evidence]. After careful consideration of all the evidence furnished on this head we have come to the conclusion that Raja Fateh Sahi and his ancestors owned property of considerable extent and value in the district of Gorakhpur, and that it is a mistake to suppose that only after the expulsion of Raja Fateh Sahi was property acquired in Gorakhpur. 5. Now let us see how Raja Fateh Sahi dealt with his properties. It appears that he gave up his property in Gorakhpur in or about the year 1799 to his sons and became a Faqir. He had offered a determined resistance to the British, but was ultimately forced to retire across the Gandak. From that retreat he made incursions into the adjoining territory which had fallen into the hands of the British, and is said to have been responsible for the death of at least one of the farmers to whom the Hansapur Raj was handed over by Government. Conscious no doubt, of the hopelessness of attempting to recover his estate and in despair of retrieving his fortunes, he became a Faqir. Before taking this step, however, he granted three Sanads to his three younger sons of shares in his property. To his second, son, Dalmardan Sahi, he gave a three and a quarter anna share and to each of the younger sons a two-anna share;’ thus leaving for his eldest son Arimardan Sahi, who became the Raja, an 8½ anna share. The disposition made by him is relied upon by both sides; by the appellants as showing that he did not regard the estate as being impartible, but divided it among his sons; and by the respondent as, on the contrary, establishing its impartiality and indicating a clear intention on his part that the property should be treated as an impartible Raj. The Sanads are not forthcoming, and this is unfortunate, as they undoubtedly would have thrown some light upon the situation at the time when they were granted. [His Lordship after discussing the evidence continued.] Mr. Mayne in his Treatise, on Hindu Law, says of these maintenance grants as follows:— ”The obligation imposed upon the head of a family to maintain its members is generally discharged either by defraying out of the common fund the expenses of those who live in the family house or by allotting to them sums of money payable periodically; sometimes, however, portions of land of separate villages are assigned to particular members to be held by them for their own support” (6th edition, page 508). He cites as an authority for this, the case of Ranjeet Singh v. Roder Gujraj, [L.R., 1, 9], He then proceeds:— “Prima facie land so granted is resumable at the death of the grantee. Sometimes by special usage such grants are resumable at the pleasure of the grantor. Sometimes they are resumable on the death of the grantor by his successor. Where the head of the family is the owner of an impartible estate, it is not uncommon to find an alienation of villages made for the maintenance of a junior member and his direct male line, and in such a case it does not revert to the principal estate until that line becomes extinct. A further possibility is that the grant may have been absolute and irrevocable in full satisfaction of all claims to future maintenance. Such a grant if properly made out vests in the grantee not only a heritable but an alienable estate, and undisturbed possession for successive generations may justify a presumption that the grant was of such a nature. Sometimes the transaction takes the form of partition between the senior and junior members, which has the same effect.” It appears to us that, whatever was the nature of the grants made by Fateh Sahi in favour of his younger sons, these grants were made as maintenance grants, and even if they took the form of absolute and irrevocable grants, no reference can be drawn from them in support of the plaintiffs-appellants' contention. [His Lordship after discussing the evidence continued.] That the ceremonies of Tilak and Gaddi-nashini were continuously performed in this family from generation to generation, the evidence leaves no doubt. [His Lordship after discussing the evidence continued.] That the ceremonies of Tilak and Gaddi-nashini were continuously performed in this family from generation to generation, the evidence leaves no doubt. It is highly improbable that in the case of a family owning a little which was and is officially recognised by the Government as hereditary, the observances attendant upon the accession of a Raja would be overlooked. 6. We must not leave this branch of the case without referring to what in the case of the plaintiff Sarabjit at all events appears to us to be strong and cogent evidence. After the death of Raja Krishan Partap the plaintiff Sarabjit set up a claim to a moiety of the Tamkohi estate. His brother, Satrujit, resisted this claim on the ground that the estate was an impartible Raj and that his younger brother was only entitled out of it to Babuai allowance. Ultimately, after consultation with a number of lawyers, a compromise was come to which was embodied in the agreement to which we have already alluded, of the 20th of July, 1895. At the date of this agreement the plaintiff, Chhatrapat, was about a month old. In this agreement Satrujit is described as the proprietor of the estate of Tamkohi, and the eldest son of Raja Krishan Partap. The agreement contains a statement, declaration and agreement which are introduced by the following words:— “We, both the executants, make the following statement, declaration and agreement, and they will be binding upon us, the executants, and our male descendants.” Then came the following declarations:— (1) The last Raja of the estate, named Tamkohi, district Gorakhpur, was Raja Krishan Partap Bahadur Sahi, who died on the 31st of December, 1894. We, the two executants, are his sons; and of us Raja Satrujit Partap Bahadur Sahi is the elder and Sarabjit Sahi is the younger son. We, the two executants, are his sons; and of us Raja Satrujit Partap Bahadur Sahi is the elder and Sarabjit Sahi is the younger son. (2) According to the Hindu law and the custom of this family, after the death of the Raja occupying the Gaddi, his elder son becomes the owner and possessor of the entire property, moveable and immoveable, appertaining to the Raj Riasat, if there are also other sons of the deceased Raja; all of them live with and are maintained by their elder brother, i. e., the Raja occupying the Gaddi, and when they wish to” become separate from the Raja for the time being, they get their right as Babus out of the whole property, moveable and immoveable, appertaining to the estate existing at the time of separation. (3) Accordingly, after the death of Raja Kishan Partap Bahadur Sahi, I, Satrujit Partap Bahadur Sahi, the elder son, become the occupant of the Gaddi of the Raj Riasat of Tamkohi, mentioned above, according to the Hindu law and practice and custom of the family and am the owner in possession of the whole property, moveable and immoveable, appertaining to the Raj Riasat.” Then follows the declaration on the part of Sarabjit to the effect that he is living and will continue to live according to the old custom With his elder brother, Raja Satrujit, and will be maintained by the Raj Riasat; and that Raja Satrujit is and will remain the owner in possession of the entire property appertaining to the Raj Riasat, but that if at any time in the future, Babu Sarabjit, or after him his male descendants, desire to become separate from Raja Satrujit or his male descendants occupying the Gaddi of the Raj Riasat, then Raja Satrujit or his male descendants occupying the Gaddi would give Satrujit or his male descendants a three-eighth share out of the entire property, moveable and immoveable, appertaining to the Raj Riasat existing at the time so separation, Later on it is explained that at the date of separation, Babu Sarabjit or his male descendants should receive a three-eighth share not merely out of the moneys then existing but also out of all moneys which might be saved between the date of the agreement and the date of separation. After other provisions the agreement concludes with the following words:— “Both of us, the executants, have mutually executed this deed of agreement of our own accord and free will, in a sound state of body and mind, and we and our male descendants are and will be bound by it. This Raja Satrujit Partap Bahadur Sahi, or his male descendants, shall have no right contrary to the conditions and contents of this document, to object in giving to Babu Sarabjit Partap Bahadur Sahi or his male descendants at the time of separation one-eighth share detailed in paragraph 4 of this document, with the exception of the property mentioned in clause (e) of that paragraph. In the same way, Babu Sarabjit Partap Bahadur Sahi, or his male descendants shall have no right at the time of separation to claim more than the property detailed in paragraph 4 of this document, from which the property mentioned in clause (e) of that paragraph is excluded.” We may mention that the property which is excluded from the agreement is an ilaka situate in the district of Muzaffarpur which was acquired by Raja Satrujit from his father-in-law. Now no document could more clearly express the existence of the family custom upon which the defendant relies, or the fact that the Tamkohi estate was an impartible Raj. In view of this document it is difficult to conceive how the plaintiff Sarabjit came to advance the present claim. He has not in the plaint sought to have this agreement cancelled, but he has set up the case that the execution of it by him was procured by undue influence, misrepresentation and mistake, and that he was induced by his elder brother, in whom he reposed confidence, to sign it. Now we shall assume that the Court can disregard this agreement and give the plaintiff Sarabjit the relief which he claims, notwithstanding that there is no prayer for the cancellation of it, and shall consider the grounds which he has put forward for asking the Court to treat it as a nullity. His learned counsel have abandoned the case that its execution was procured by undue influence or misrepresentation, and properly so, for there is not a shred of evidence to support such a case. His learned counsel have abandoned the case that its execution was procured by undue influence or misrepresentation, and properly so, for there is not a shred of evidence to support such a case. It is, however, contended that the document was executed in the mistaken belief that the Tamkohi estate was an impartible Raj, and so having been executed under a mistake of fact may be disregarded. [His Lordship after discussing the evidence continued.] This evidence leaves no doubt on our minds that the iqramamah was deliberately executed by Sarabjit after full and careful consideration of the circumstances of the family and with as full knowledge of its history as was in the possession of any member of the family. After consultation with his relatives at Salemgarh he abandoned the position which he at first took up, that the estate was partible, which was the real matter in dispute between the brothers. If the Raj was an impartible Raj, then the plaintiff was clearly only entitled to Babuai alloance. If the estate was partible, he was entitled to the half of the estate. This was the matter in issue between the brothers and this was then finally decided, and an agreement drawn upon the basis that the younger brother had abandoned this claim and was willing to accept the position taken up by his elder brother that the Raj was impartible. The question of the impartibility of the Raj’ was intended to be set at rest on this occasion. The iqramamah opens with a solemn declaration as to the family custom and it seems to us now idle for the plaintiff, Sarabjit, to avoid the consequence of a deliberate and solemn act. It is to be noticed that no attempt was made to impeach this agreement during the lifetime of Raja Satrujit. It was only upon his death, when the estate came into the possession of his infant child, that the idea of procuring its cancellation occurred to him. The admissions made by Sarabjit in this agreement are the strongest evidence against him. 7. We have now referred to the documents and oral evidence which have been mainly relied upon by the respective parties in support of their cases. The admissions made by Sarabjit in this agreement are the strongest evidence against him. 7. We have now referred to the documents and oral evidence which have been mainly relied upon by the respective parties in support of their cases. After careful consideration of them the conclusion at which we have arrived is that Fateh Sahi before his expulsion from Saran held a considerable amount of property in the district of Gorakhpur and that that property formed and was treated as portion of the family estate, and that the custom of his family which is admitted to have prevailed in connection with the Hansapur Raj also extended to the estate, lying on the west side of the Gandak. We hold, therefore, that the estate which devolved upon Raja Arimardan Sahi on the abdication of his father in his favour and withdrawal into seclusion, was impartible. 8. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that even if it were the case that neither the ancestors of Fateh Sahi nor Fateh Sahi himself owned any territory in Gorakhpur prior to the expulsion of Fateh Sahi from Saran, nonetheless the family custom would attend and follow the family and govern the devolution of any property which it or the head of the family might acquire. 9. This argument appears to us to have force, but having regard to the conclusions at which we have arrived upon the question of fact, it is unnecessary to determine it. In India, questions relating to every kind of property are governed by the personal law of the owner, and it has consequently been held that a Hindu who migrates from one part of the country to another, will retain the law by which he was governed at the time of migration unless he elect to change his family custom and adopt the custom of the district into which he has migrated. In other words, a family which has family customs and usages will not necessarily lose them by migrating. The presumption is that the family which has moved from one district to another carries with it family customs, and the onus is upon a party who alleges the discontinuance of any such custom to prove that fact. Soorendro Nath Roy v. Musammat Heeramonee Burmoneah, [1868] 12 M.I.A., 81. 10. The presumption is that the family which has moved from one district to another carries with it family customs, and the onus is upon a party who alleges the discontinuance of any such custom to prove that fact. Soorendro Nath Roy v. Musammat Heeramonee Burmoneah, [1868] 12 M.I.A., 81. 10. As was pointed out by the Privy Council in the case which we have cited, Orientals are commonly tenacious of their usages and customs, and therefore on the ordinary principles of viewing evidence a continuance of the existing state of things is presumable. Well-established discontinuance of family customs will, however, destroy them. 11. This brings us to the further argument which was advanced on behalf of the appellants, namely, that, assuming that Raja Fateh Sahi did hold property in Gorakhpur and that the same was governed by the family custom of impartiality, which it is admitted, governed the devolution of the Hansapur estate, that custom has been discontinued and no longer can be regarded as binding. There is no doubt that a family custom may be discontinued. In the case of Raja Kishen Singh v. Ramjoy Surma Mojamdar. [1872] I.L.R., 1 Cal, 186, the following passage appears in the judgment at page 195:— “Their Lordships cannot find any principle or authority for holding that in point of law a manner of descent of an ordinary estate depending solely on family usage may not be discontinued so as to let in the ordinary law of succession. Such family usages are in their nature different from a territorial custom which is lex locie binding all persons with the local limits in which it prevails. It is of the essence of family usages that they should be certain, invariable and continuous, and well established discontinuance must be held to destroy them, This would be so when the discontinuance has arisen from accidental causes; and the effect cannot be less when it has been intentionally brought, about by the concurrent will of the family. It would lead to much confusion and abundant litigation if the law attempted to revive and give effect to usages of this kind after they had been clearly abandoned and the abandonment had been as in this case long acted upon.” Let us see then whether the family usage in this case has been abandoned. It would lead to much confusion and abundant litigation if the law attempted to revive and give effect to usages of this kind after they had been clearly abandoned and the abandonment had been as in this case long acted upon.” Let us see then whether the family usage in this case has been abandoned. It is necessary here to advert to the pedigree and to see in what way the succession has devolved since the death of Raja Fateh Sahi. After his abdication his eldest son, Arimardan Sahi, became the Raja, his younger brothers having been allotted shares by way of Babuai allowance under the Sanads granted by Raja Fateh Sahi. Raja Arimardan Sahi died on the 21st February, 1825, and was succeeded by his next brother. Dalmardan Sahi. Raja Dalmardan Sahi died in the year 1838, leaving a son Dalip Sahi, who became the Raja. He died without issue sometime before the year 1844, leaving a widow, Musammat Usmedh Kuari. Upon his death, Shamsher Sahi, the third son of Raja Fateh Sahi, was clearly entitled to succeed as Raja. He, however, had, as we have already pointed out, instituted a suit for partition of the share which was allotted to him by Fateh Sahi and had succeeded in obtaining a decree which possibly gave him more than he was strictly entitled to. Whether it was that he considered that he had thus become separated from the family and had forfeited his right to succeed to the estate or not, we cannot say. He does not appear to have advanced any claim on the death of Raja Dalip Sahi, but allowed Musammat Usmedh Kuari to have her name recorded as owner. He died on the 23rd of June, 1847, and the only son who survived him, Sawan Sahi, died on the 19th of November, 1848, without male issue. The person entitled on the death of Sawan Sahi to the estate, according to the family custom, was Kharag Bahadur Sahi, the grandson of Ran Bahadur Sahi, the fourth son of Raja Fateh Sahi. He lost no time in putting forward a claim to the estate. This claim was compromised by an arrangement made in 1851, whereby Musammat Usmedh Kuari purported to give him the property reserving to herself a life estate in certain villages. He lost no time in putting forward a claim to the estate. This claim was compromised by an arrangement made in 1851, whereby Musammat Usmedh Kuari purported to give him the property reserving to herself a life estate in certain villages. There is no doubt that Musammat Usmedh Kuari under the family custom had no title whatever to the property, in taking possession after the death of her son, she undoubtedly committed an act of usurpation. This act is strongly relied upon by the appellants as establishing a discontinuance of the family custom. [His Lordship after discussing the evidence continued.] 12. The plaintiffs also, as we have mentioned, relied upon the fact that Raja Fateh Sahi divided the property amongst his sons, and the argument is that this disposition also was contrary to the family custom and evidence of its discontinuance. We have, however, most contemporaneous evidence to prove the nature of that disposition in the petition which was filed by the sons of Raja Fateh Sahi on the 9th of April, 1808, when they were endeavoring to recover from Government the Hansapur estate, and in the later petitions which were filed by Raja Arimardan Sahi, to which reference has already been made in an earlier part of our judgment. These documents show that the estate was regarded as an impartible Raj. If the estate had not been so regarded, then on the death of Raja Arimardau Sahi, his brothers, Dalmardan and Shamsher Sahi and nephew Pirthipat Sahi, son of his brother Ran Bahadur, who was then dead, would have been jointly entitled to it as his heirs; but Dalmardan Sahi alone succeeded to the estate and became the Raja. On his death, his son, Raja Dalip Sahi, succeeded, and then followed the usurpation of his widow Rani Usmedh Kuari. Then, when litigation was imminent between her and Raja Kharag Bahadur, who was then the rightful heir to the property, she gave up the estate to him in 1851, reserving to herself a life estate in portion of it. Raja Kharag Bahadur was succeeded by his only son, Raja Krishan Partap, the father of the plaintiff, Suabjit Partap. Under such circumstances we are unable to hold that the break, in the succession caused by Usmedh Kuari's usurpation, or any other circumstances upon which the plaintiffs rely, establishes a discontinuance or abandonment of the pre-existing and long established custom. Raja Kharag Bahadur was succeeded by his only son, Raja Krishan Partap, the father of the plaintiff, Suabjit Partap. Under such circumstances we are unable to hold that the break, in the succession caused by Usmedh Kuari's usurpation, or any other circumstances upon which the plaintiffs rely, establishes a discontinuance or abandonment of the pre-existing and long established custom. [His Lordship after discussing the evidence continued.] 13. There is not, as we have before said, the slightest founda-tion for the allegation of Sarabjit that the execution of this agreement by him was procured improperly, The allegation of fraud and misrepresentation has been withdrawn, and properly withdrawn, for there was not a little, of evidence to support it, and it ought never to have been made. The agreement was entered into with the utmost deliberation and with as full knowledge on the part of Sarabjit of all the circumstances of the family as was available. It is idle, therefore, to set up a case of mistake and to ask the Court to set aside an arrangement made for the purpose of adjusting the differences between the two brothers and preserving the peace of the family. This agreement, we hold, is certainly binding on the plaintiff Sarabjit. But is it also binding upon his son, Chhatarpat, who was no party to it? The learned Subordinate Judge has given a reply in the negative to this question. We are unable to agree with him in this. It is clear that the two brothers intended that the agree-ment should be binding upon their descendants, In the opening part of it is the declaration that it shall be binding upon them, the executants, and their male descendants. Later on in the deed is the following passage:— ” Both of us, the executants, have mutually executed this deed, of agreement, of our own accord and free will, in a sound state of body and mind, and we and our male descendants are and will be bound by it. This Raja Satrujit Partap Bahadur Sahi shall have no right contrary to the conditions and contents of this document to object in giving to Babu Sarabjit Partap Sahi or his male descendants at the time of separation one-eighth share detailed in paragraph 4 of this document, with the exception of the property mentioned in clause (e) of that paragraph. This Raja Satrujit Partap Bahadur Sahi shall have no right contrary to the conditions and contents of this document to object in giving to Babu Sarabjit Partap Sahi or his male descendants at the time of separation one-eighth share detailed in paragraph 4 of this document, with the exception of the property mentioned in clause (e) of that paragraph. In the same way Babu Sarabjit Partap Bahadur Sahi or his male descendants shall have no right at the time of separation to claim more than the property detailed in paragraph 4 of this document.” Mr. Mayne in his work on Hindu Law, 6th edition, at page 623 and following page, says:— “It is now quite settled that a partition made during the minority of one of the members (i.e., members of a joint Hindu family) will be valid, and if just and legal/will bind him. Of course his interest ought to be represented by his guardian or someone acting on his behalf, though I imagine that the fact of his not being so represented will be no ground for opening up the partition, if a proper one in other respects.” We may also refer to West and Buhler's Digest, page 672, and Dr. Jolly's History of the Hindu Law, pp. 99-100, 138 and 129. It is difficult to see how a partition could in many cases take place if this were not so. If a father can bind his minor son by partition proceedings a fortiori as it seems to Us, he can bind him by a compromise whereby Babuai allowance is fixed and a dispute in regard to family property is terminated. In the case of Pitam Singh v. Ujagar Singh, [1878] I.L.R., 1 All., 651, it was held that a son who was not a party to a suit brought by his father in respect of properly in which the son had an interest, was, bound by a compromise entered into by his father and by a decree passed on that compromise. PEARSON and TURNER, JJ., in delivering the judgment of the Court in an appeal from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Mainpuri, observe as follows:— “Assuming which is not certainly, proved, that the family remained joint until 1867, the respondent's father for all intents and purposes represented the interest in the estate which devolved and would on partition fall to the separate share of himself and his children, and the respondent must be bound by his acts unless he can show such fraud and collusion, as would entitle him to relief on those grounds.” In the case of Chanvirapa v. Danava, [1894] I.L.R., 19 Bom., 593, it was held that a partition made by a mother as the guardian of her minor son who was the member of an undivided family is valid, and if just and legal, will bind the minor. Holding, as we do, that the estate in dispute is an impartible Raj, it is obvious that the compromise entered into between the two brothers was altogether favourable to the interests of the minor plaintiff, Chhatrapat; and even if there existed at the time of the execution of the iqrarnamah some more solid foundation for the claim of Sarabjit than that upon which his claim was based, the compromise cannot, we think, be said to be unreasonable or unjust. It was, we think, a just and fair settlement of a family dispute a dispute which might have led to disastrous litigation. For these reasons we hold that the iqrarnamah is binding, not only on Sarabjit, but also on the minor plaintiff. We have now disposed of the principal questions raised in this appeal, and we come to the alternative case set up by the plaintiffs, They allege that Raja Kharag Bahadur derived his title to part of the property in dispute under a gift from Rani Usmedh Kuari, and that his mother, Rani Rajeshri Kuari, purchased some villages with funds supplied to her by her father, and that these villages were recorded in the name of her husband Raja Pirthipat Sahi and devolved upon Raja Kharag Bihadur as absolute owner; and that he, a few days before his death, executed a deed of gift in favour of his wife, Rani Tileshri Kuari, of a moiety of these villages. These properties are set forth in schedules B-I and B-3 appended to the plaint. These properties are set forth in schedules B-I and B-3 appended to the plaint. Raja Kharag Bahadur is also said to have been absolute owner of the villages mentioned in schedule B-2. 14. [A portion of the judgment, dealing merely with the evidence as to the title to certain specific properties claimed by the plaintiffs-appellants, is here omitted,—ED.] Schedule E comprises property which is said to have been the self-acquired property of Raja Krishan Partap, and so to be property which would devolve upon members of his family in accordance with the ordinary principles of Hindu law and not according to family custom, It appears that this property was thus acquired. Rani Rajeshri Kuari, grand-mother of Raja Krishan Partab, was sister of Babu Benode Narain, who held zamindari property, known as Raj zamindari Tikari, in the district of Gaya. Raja Krishan Partab laid claim to this property by right of inheritance against Ram Bahadur Sahi, who claimed to be the owner of it. His suit was dismissed by the District Judge of Gaya, whereupon an appeal was filed by him to the Calcutta High Court, A compromise was come to whereby Krishan Partab relinquished his claim to the property in dispute on the terms that Benode Narain should grant to him a mukar-rari lease of the villages comprised in Schedule E. In accordance with this compromise the mukarrari lease was granted and the property has since been held under it. The plaintiffs contend that this property cannot be regarded as part of the Tamkohi state or subject to the custom governing the devolution of that estate. It seems to us that it was quite open to Raja Krishan Partab upon the acquisition of this property to have treated it as separate private property or to incorporate it with and treat it as part of the Tamkohi estate. It seems to us that it was quite open to Raja Krishan Partab upon the acquisition of this property to have treated it as separate private property or to incorporate it with and treat it as part of the Tamkohi estate. But the only object of acquiring property as private property would be for the purpose of alienation, and we think that if the owner of an estate, the devolution of which is governed by family custom, does not in his life-time alienate the property so acquired, or dispose of it by his will, or leave behind him some indication of a contrary intention, the reasonable presumption is that he intended to incorporate it with the family estate (see Lakshimipathi v. Kandasami, [1892] I.L.R., 16 Mad., 54 and Ramasami Kamaya Naik v. Sundra Lingasami Kamaya Naik, [1893] I.L.R., 17 Mad., 422. The plaintiff Sarabjit in his evidence admitted that he regarded this property as included in and forming part of the Tamkohi estate at the time he signed the iqrarnamah. [His Lordship after discussing the evidence continued,] It is clear, we think, from what we have pointed out in the evidence that Raja Krishan Partap did not treat or regard any portion of the property which is now claimed as separate and distinct from the Raj property, and this applies to the moveable as well as the immoveable property claimed. He did not in his life-time make any disposition of the estate, nor did he in any way indicate an intention on his part to treat any portion of it otherwise than as part and parcel of or appurtenant to the Raj. He did not execute a will, but allowed the property to devolve in accordance with the old and well established family custom. On his death the plaintiff-appellant, Sarabjit, did not suggest that any part of the property was held on a distinct and separate title from that of the Raj. On the contrary, he deliberately, and after obtaining legal advice in regard to his position, executed the iqrarnamah on the basis that all the property now in dispute formed portion of the estate and descended in accordance with the family custom. In regard to the moveable property we agree in the view entertained by the learned Subordinate Judge that it is appurtenant to and part of the Raj estate, and as such, passed to the defendant, Raja Indarjit. In regard to the moveable property we agree in the view entertained by the learned Subordinate Judge that it is appurtenant to and part of the Raj estate, and as such, passed to the defendant, Raja Indarjit. This point it would be unnecessary to decide, if we be right in thinking that the iqrarnamah is binding on both the defendants, for if it be, it is obvious that the claim in regard to the moveable property can no more be supported than the claim to the immoveable property. The plaintiffs-appellants have wholly failed to satisfy us that the learned Subordinate Judge has come to a wrong conclusion on any of the matters dealt with in his exhaustive judgment. We differ with him only in the opinion which he expressed that the minor plaintiff is not bound by the iqrarnamah, but in other respects we entirely agree in his conclusions. 15. For these reasons we hold that the it with costs.