JUDGMENT Pargiter, J. - This rule his been granted in a proceeding held by the Deputy Magistrate of Dacca under sec. 145, Cr. P.C., regarding a large julkar which is in dispute between three parties. He decided in favour of the first party and the second party obtained this rule calling on the District Magistrate to show cause why the order under that section should not be set aside on the ground that a copy of the preliminary order was not published at or near the julkar as required by sub-sec. 8 C.W.N. 590 (1904) of that section. The Deputy Magistrate has sent in an explanation and admits that no notice was served. He treats the omission to comply with the requirements of that sub-section as a trivial informality; but when the Code expressly directs a thing to be done, it is the duty of the Magistrate to see that that thing is done. 2. Sec. 537 does not in my opinion cure the defect; for, as pointed out in Raj Chunder Mozumdur v. Gour Chunder Mozumdar ILR 22 Cal. 176 (1804), that section is made expressly subject to the provisions before contained in the Code and cannot therefore override them. Moreover the provision in sec. 537 (taking so much of the words as apply here) is that no order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed on revision on account of any omission in any proceeding, unless such omission has in fact occasioned a failure of justice; that is to say, applying it to this case, if the notice had been served, any defect in it would have been cured by the section; but if there was no notice at all, there was no basis for the application of the section That this is the meaning of the section was pointed out by the Privy Council in Subramania Iyer v. King-Emperor 5 C.W.N. 866 : s.c. ILR 25 Mad. 61 (1901). The object of the section is to remedy mere irregularities and not to excuse total disregard of the plain commands of the law. Sec. 537 therefore does not cure the defect. 3. The next point that we have to consider is whether this contravention of sub sec. (3) of sec. 145 is a matter of jurisdiction in which this Court can interfere under sec. 15 of the Charter. Sec. 537 therefore does not cure the defect. 3. The next point that we have to consider is whether this contravention of sub sec. (3) of sec. 145 is a matter of jurisdiction in which this Court can interfere under sec. 15 of the Charter. It was held to be such in the case of Janu Manjhi v. Maniruddin 8 C.W.N. 590 (1904), where it was declared that the provisions of this subsection are mandatory, and the failure to publish a copy of the order affects the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. 4. I concur in this view. The sub-section says that at least one copy of the order shall be published at or near the subject of dispute; and sub-sec. (4) says that the Magistrate shall then peruse the statements, hear the parties etc. This means that, until the provisions of sub sec. (3) are complied with, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed to the inquiry under sub-sec. (4); for the publication of the notice locally is made an important preliminary to the further proceedings under sec. 145. This view is in agreement with the object of such notice. It is no doubt intended to ensure that full intimation shall, if possible, be conveyed to all persons interested in the subject of dispute; for there may be persons interested who are not known to the Magistrate and who may not have received personal service of the notice. Woodroffe, J. 5. In this case proceedings were taken under Chap XII. The first party was found to be in possession. 6. The second party thereupon obtained a rule upon the District Magistrate to show cause why the order of the Magistrate in these proceedings should not be set aside on the ground that a copy of the order was not published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute according to the provisions of sec. 145, cl. 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 7. There is no question but that the notice was not so published nor that the 3rd party who supports the 2nd party in this rule took objection at the time to this defect in the proceedings. 8. 145, cl. 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 7. There is no question but that the notice was not so published nor that the 3rd party who supports the 2nd party in this rule took objection at the time to this defect in the proceedings. 8. No attention was, as appears to be not unusual in these cases, paid to this objection or attempt made to remedy It by the Magistrate who in his explanation describes it as a flimsy ground of technicality. It is true that the application before us appears to have no merits other than such as may be involved in the objection taken. It is however to be regretted that in this and other cases care has not been taken to see that there is no ground for objection instead of trusting to its being held that the objection was of no account. The section of the Code is express and there has been in this as in other cases which have come before us, a deliberate disregard of it. It is for the Courts to give effect to the directions of the Legislature whatever their opinion as to their necessity or reasonableness may be. As the Magistrate has not done so it becomes necessary to consider what the effect of his omission in the proceedings is. Reversional jurisdiction having been take away by the Code in respect of proceedings under Ch. XII, this Court will only interfere in questions of jurisdictions under the power vested in it by its charter. 9. The question then is whether the objection goes to the jurisdiction of the Court or is one of irregularity or illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction. 10. The question has already been answered in the former sense in Janu Manjhi v. Maniruddin 8 C.W.N. 590 (1004). I was at first, disposed to doubt the correctness of that decision which does not state the grounds on which it is based. On further consideration however I have come to the conclusion that these doubts are not justified. The matter appears to me to be one of construction. Sec. 145 is composed of 5 clauses, cl. 4 deals with the enquiry as to possession. This is preceded by the clause under discussion. Cl. On further consideration however I have come to the conclusion that these doubts are not justified. The matter appears to me to be one of construction. Sec. 145 is composed of 5 clauses, cl. 4 deals with the enquiry as to possession. This is preceded by the clause under discussion. Cl. 4 commences "The Magistrate shall then" (that is after the provisions in the preceding clause have been given effect to) make enquiry as to possession. The use of this word " then " makes the preceding provisions a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction under cl. 4 and in consequence if there is a failure to carry out these provisions there is no jurisdiction to make the enquiry under cl. 4. The matter is not then as I was at first disposed to think one of procedure only, but of jurisdiction and I would therefore make the rule absolute and set aside the order of the Magistrate.