JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - This is a suit to enforce a mortgage dated the 28th April 1887. The due date of payment was in January 1888. The mortgage covered various properties and on the 28th December 1888, the mortgagor, without apparently any knowledge on the part of the mortgagee, sold one of the mortgaged properties, namely, property No. 3, to one Baroda Charan Banerjee. Baroda Charan subsequently mortgaged that property to one Sheo Baksh Bogla, who obtained a decree in a suit to realise his security, and at a sale in execution of that mortgage decree, the property was purchased by the present Defendant No. 2 on the 15th June 1897. The Defendant No. 2 is the only Respondent who has appeared in the present appeal. The present suit was instituted on the 7th February 1903 and admittedly the suit would have been out of time but for the fact that there had been various payments on account made by the mortgagor and an acknowledgment given by him of his liabilities under the mortgage. On the 29th December 1893, a sum of Rs. 1,000 was paid by him, and on the 2nd February 1894, a small sum of Rs. 10 was paid, and on that date there was an acknowledgment by the mortgagor of his liability under the mortgage. A further payment apparently was made by the mortgagor on the 9th February 1900, so that, as against the mortgagor, Defendant No. 1, the case is clear and his liability has not been disputed by him. But the Defendant No. 2 contends that she is not bound by any acknowledgment given by the mortgagor. She says that the mortgagor was not her agent, that he had sold the property No. 3 that she claimed through that purchaser, and that any acknowledgment given by the mortgagor was, as against her, of no avail. 2. The Subordinate Judge in the Court below in deciding this point in favour of the present Respondent, based his decision on sec. 21 of the Limitation Act but his view of that section has not been supported by the learned vakil, who appears on her behalf. 2. The Subordinate Judge in the Court below in deciding this point in favour of the present Respondent, based his decision on sec. 21 of the Limitation Act but his view of that section has not been supported by the learned vakil, who appears on her behalf. I should have been disposed myself, on the evidence, to hold that when Baroda Charan purchased in 1888, he had notice of the Plaintiff's mortgage, for not only was the mortgage by registered deed but the Defendant No. 1, the mortgagor himself, swears positively that he informed the purchaser of the existence of this mortgage. But for some reason not given the Court below has not treated this evidence as sufficient and has arrived at the conclusion that Baroda had no notice of the mortgage at the time he made the purchase. The question is, to say the least, very doubtful. But whether Baroda had notice or not, we think the acknowledgment given by the mortgagor, Defendant No. 1, was in the circumstances sufficient to keep the debt alive as against property No. 3. It is not disputed that there was an acknowledgment on the bond by the Defendant No. 1, of his liability. The question is whether that binds Defendant No. 2. The case seems to depend upon the effect of sec. 19 or 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. Sec. 19 runs as follows : - "If, before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he derives his title or liability, a new period of limitation, according to the nature of the original liability, shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed." It is not disputed that the acknowledgment made by the Defendant No. 1, in respect of the properties which had not been sold was perfectly good as against him. But it was also an acknowledgment given by a person through whom the Defendant No. 2 derived his title. It was again by the mortgagor and it was through that mortgagor that the Defendant No 2 derived his title. But it was also an acknowledgment given by a person through whom the Defendant No. 2 derived his title. It was again by the mortgagor and it was through that mortgagor that the Defendant No 2 derived his title. It seems difficult therefore to get over the precise language of this section. Again it may be said that the language of sec. 20 meets the case. That section provides that when part of the principal of a debt is "before the expiration of the prescribed period, paid by the debtor or by his agent authorised in that behalf, a new period of limitation according to the nature of the original liability shall be computed from the time when the payment was made." Here part of the principal was undoubtedly paid by the debtor, Defendant No. 1, that is, the mortgagor, before the expiration of the prescribed period, and would perhaps be sufficient to bring the case within that section. The section would consequently seem to apply. In our opinion having regard to the language of this section, we do not think the action is barred as against property No. 3. We may add that the principle to be deduced from the case of Maria Chinnery v. Eyre Evans 11 H.L.R. 115 (1864) is applicable to the present case, viz., that a mortgagee cannot, by the act of the parties entitled only to the equity of redemption, be deprived of his right to resort to any estate comprised in his mortgage so long as ho has not released or given it up and so long as that mortgage is legally kept alive. 3. It may be that the question may become of no practical importance to Defendant No. 2 for Mr. Sinha for the Plaintiffs is quite willing that the property No. 3 should not be sold until the other properties comprised in the mortgage have been sold first. If the proceeds of sale of these properties are sufficient to pay off the mortgage debt, Defendant No. 2 will not be hurt. 4. The result, therefore, is that the decree of the Court below must be reversed and the mortgage decree will extend to property No. 3, with this limitation that, by consent of parties, it is not to be sold until the other properties covered by the mortgage have been first sold. 4. The result, therefore, is that the decree of the Court below must be reversed and the mortgage decree will extend to property No. 3, with this limitation that, by consent of parties, it is not to be sold until the other properties covered by the mortgage have been first sold. The Appellants were get their costs both in this Court and in the Court below which may be added to their security. Mitra, J. I am of the same opinion.