Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (Oct. 10, 1898) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Gonda (March 13, 1897). This was a claim to certain alluvial lands, to which the plaintiff asserted title as an accretion to her taluqdar estate of Kamyar. The respondent made title to them as part of the villages Raksaria and Pura Angad, which were included in his estate of Dhanawan. The estates of Kamyar and Dhanawan were separated in 1858-59 by the main stream of the river Ghogra. A Revenue survey was made in the years 1863-64, and the Revenue survey map shewed the position of the villages named and of the river in that year. For practical purposes it was in much the same position in the years 1858-59, the only difference being that the river had gone a little further north and left dry a narrow strip of sand between its southern bank in 1858 and its southern bank in 1863. The effect of the second summary settlement of that year was to confer title on the Kamyar taluqdar of the land up to the southern bank of the river, and on the Dhanawan taluqdar of the land up to the northern bank ; the river being navigable, the bed of the river remained the property of Government. In the year 1866 the river suddenly changed its course from the channel marked No. 5 in the map to the channel marked No. 2, which then became the main stream. In consequence of the change in the main stream Thakur Raghubir Singh, the respondents predecessor, in 1867 instituted suits against Thakur Sher Bahadur Singh, of Kamyar, and the Raja of Harha, who also owned land on the southern bank of the river, to recover possession of the land between the old and the new main streams, i.e., between channels 5 and 2. The suit against Thakur Sher Bahadur Singh was dismissed by the settlement officer, Mr. Harrington, on February 10, 1870. The suit against Thakur Sher Bahadur Singh was dismissed by the settlement officer, Mr. Harrington, on February 10, 1870. He decided that the taluqdari sanads conferred title on the Kamyar taluqdar of all land up to the southern bank of the river as it was situated in 1858-59, and that, in the absence of the custom known as " dhardhura " (that the main stream should be the boundary), the sudden change of the river in 1866 left the title to the said lands still in Thakur Sher Bahadur Singh. He also held Thakur Sher Bahadur Singh entitled to the narrow strip of sand formed by the gradual change in the rivers course northwards between 1859 and 1866. This decision was confirmed on appeal by the Commissioner on April 26, 1870, and by the Judicial Commissioner on August 6, 1870. The suit against the Raja of Harha was also dismissed. In 1876 further litigation arose in consequence of the retrocession of the river northwards. In that year Raja Narinder Bahadur Singh of Harha instituted a suit against Thakur Raghubir Singh for possession of certain lands, claiming them as a gradual accretion to his estate, which extended to the south bank of channel No. 5, as shewn in the survey map of 1863. This litigation terminated in a judgment of the Privy Council dated November 17, 1881, which affirmed the concurrent findings of fact by the Courts in India that the land then in suit had been added by gradual accretion to the Raja of Harhas estate. In shifting its course or spreading northwards the river sub merged portions of the villages of Raksaria and Pura Angad; and again shifting south, about the year 1883, left dry the land now in dispute, which was then situate to the north of the main stream. Disputes having arisen as to the possession, proceed ings were taken under Act X. of 1882, s. 145, and on March 10,- 1884, an order was passed declaring the lands in dispute to be a portion of Raksaria, and maintaining the possession of Thakur Raghubir Singh. Applications were then made for the demarcation of the boundaries between the villages of Kamyar and Raksaria. Applications were then made for the demarcation of the boundaries between the villages of Kamyar and Raksaria. A joint inquiry was made by a tehsildar of the Gonda district and another of the Barabanki district, who made reports on May 7, 1885, and July 19, 1885, fixing the boundaries and declaring the lands in dispute to belong to Thakur Raghubir Singh as part of his villages. The suit was brought to establish title to these lands as having been added to the village of Kamyar by gradual accretion. The defendant pleaded that they were not an alluvial accretion to that village, which was several miles lower down the stream than his villages, and was still separated from them by the main stream of the river. The Subordinate Judge was of opinion that although the main stream of the river was for some years in channel 2, as shewn in the survey map of 1863, yet the water in channel No. 5 had been cutting away to the north, the land in dispute gradually forming; that in 1887 the main stream went north, cutting right into the villages of Raksaria and Pura Angad, that it flowed in 1892 considerably to the north, and that in consequence all land south of the main stream was gradual accretion to the village of Kamyar. The appellate Court, on the other hand, decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to any portion of the defendants land which had been submerged and reformed; that the land in suit formed at one time a portion of the defendants villages; and that it had not been proved that there had been any gradual accretion of the land in suit to the plaintiffs estate. W. C. Bonnerjee and Kenworthy Brown, for the appellant, contended that the evidence shewed that the lands in suit were a gradual and imperceptible accretion to the appellants village of Kamyar, They relied on Lopez v. Muddun Mohun Thakoor (( 1870) 13 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca.467, 475.); Sree Eckowrie Singh v. Heeralall Seal (( 1868) 12 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca.136.); Sardar Jagjot Singh v. Brijnath Kunwar. (( 1900) L. R. 7 Ind. Ap. 81.) Bengal Regulation XI. of 1825, s. 4, sub-ss. 1, 2, applied to Oudh by Act XVIII. of 1876. De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that on the evidence the claim of title by gradual accretion failed. Ap. Ca.136.); Sardar Jagjot Singh v. Brijnath Kunwar. (( 1900) L. R. 7 Ind. Ap. 81.) Bengal Regulation XI. of 1825, s. 4, sub-ss. 1, 2, applied to Oudh by Act XVIII. of 1876. De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that on the evidence the claim of title by gradual accretion failed. The evidence shewed that the lands were identified as the respondents lands, being a reformation thereof in situ. The onus was on the appellant to give clear proof of title as claimed. He referred to Rajcoomar Roy v. Gobind Chunder Roy (( 1892) L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 140.); Dinomoni Chowdhrani v. Brojo Mohini Chowdhrani. (( 1901) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 24, 34) Brown replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. The parties to this appeal are the owners of estates situated on opposite sides of the river Gogra, in the province of Oudh. The plaintiff, who is now the appellant, is the widow and heiress of Thakur Rachpal Singh, and as such the present holder of the taluqa of Kamyar, in the district of Barabanki, on the south bank of the river; and the defendant now on the record (the respondent) is the widow of the son of the original defendant, Thakur Raghubir Singh, the taluqdar of Dhanawan, in the district of Gonda, on the north bank of the river. The suit was brought to recover possession of certain alluvial lands, 2062 acres and 10 roods in extent, which the plaintiff claimed as an accretion to her estate of Kamyar, by reason of a change in the channel of the river. The Subordinate Judge of Gonda made a decree in favour of the plaintiff; but this was reversed on appeal by the Judicial Commissioner, and the suit was dismissed with costs. The law of India in relation to cases of this kind is contained in Bengal Regulation XI. of 1825, which was applied to Oudh, with some unimportant modifications, by Act XVIII. of 1876. The principle laid down in this regulation, as James L.J. observes in giving the judgment of this Committee in the well-known case of Lopez v. Muddun Mohun Thakoor (13 Moored Ind. Ap. Ca. of 1825, which was applied to Oudh, with some unimportant modifications, by Act XVIII. of 1876. The principle laid down in this regulation, as James L.J. observes in giving the judgment of this Committee in the well-known case of Lopez v. Muddun Mohun Thakoor (13 Moored Ind. Ap. Ca. 467.), "is one not merely of English law, not a principle peculiar to any system of municipal law, but it is a principle founded on universal law and justice; that is to say, that whoever has land, wherever it is, whatever may be the accident to which it has been exposed, whether it be a vineyard which is covered by lava or ashes from a volcano, or a field covered by the sea or by a river, the ground, the site, the property, remains in the original owner." The first point to be ascertained, therefore, is who was the original owner of the property in dispute in this suit; and on this point their Lordships are of opinion that there is no room for doubt that it was the property of the respondents predecessor in title. Indeed, the plaint itself describes the land as " situate in the villages Raksaria, Bharsanda, Pura Angad, and Dulahpur," which admittedly form part of the respondents taluqa; and the Subordinate Judge is clearly mistaken in treating it as land " opposite " to those villages. For, not only is the statement in the plaint perfectly definite on the point, but it is repeated six years after the filing of the plaint, and after issues had been settled in which the question of the position of the land had been specifically raised in a petition in which the plaintiff impeached the correctness in other respects of a map prepared for the suit by an Amin, or Commissioner, appointed by the parties. Presumably land situated in the respondents villages would belong to the respondent whether covered by water or not, and however it might be intersected by the river in its devious course from year to year. This view was adopted by the local authorities in proceedings taken in 1883 under the Code of Criminal Procedure for possession of the land, and upon application to the Revenue officials in 1885 for demarcation of boundaries. This view was adopted by the local authorities in proceedings taken in 1883 under the Code of Criminal Procedure for possession of the land, and upon application to the Revenue officials in 1885 for demarcation of boundaries. And in July, 1885, the Revenue settlement of " the alluvial and diluvial land " of these villages was made with Thakur Raghubir Singh, the respondents predecessor in title. It would require very strong evidence on the part of the appellant to disturb the conclusion thus arrived at, and no such evidence has been adduced. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that, whoever may have been originally entitled to the land, it had gradually become accreted to the appellants property by an alteration in the course of the river; and he relied in support of his contention on a passage in the judgment in the case of Lopez v. Muddun Mohun Thakoor (13 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 467,), in which it is stated that " where there is an acquisition of land from the sea or a river by gradual, slow, and imperceptible means, there, from the supposed necessity of the case, and from the difficulty of having to determine year by year to whom an inch or a foot or a yard belongs, the accretion by alluvion is held to belong to the owner of the adjoining land." Of the correctness of this proposition there can be no doubt; but in the opinion of their Lordships it is entirely inapplicable to the present case. Here is no question of a gradual and slow process of acquisition to be measured by the inch or the foot or the yard ; here land to the extent of more than two thousand acres is claimed, not on the ground that the action of the river has been slowly and gradually to push forward the northern boundary of the appellants land, but that the northern channel of the river, however it may shift, must be taken to be that boundary. Nor is it the case here that the land laid bare by the alteration of the rivers course adjoins the land of the respondent; on the contrary, the evidence is that there is still a channel of the river between the two properties, although the main stream has shifted to the north. Nor is it the case here that the land laid bare by the alteration of the rivers course adjoins the land of the respondent; on the contrary, the evidence is that there is still a channel of the river between the two properties, although the main stream has shifted to the north. It appears to their Lordships that this is one of the cases provided for by the second clause of the 4th section of the regulation, which enacts that the rule as to gradual accretion " shall not be considered applicable to cases in which a river, by a sudden change of its course, may break through and intersect an estate without any gradual encroachment, or may, by the violence of stream, separate a considerable piece of land from one estate and join it to another estate without destroying the identity and preventing the recognition of the land so removed. In such cases the land, on being clearly recognised, shall remain the property of its original owner/ This is in accordance with the English law as laid down in the case of Mayor of Carlisle v. Graham (( 1869) L. R. 4 Ex. 361, 368.) " All the authorities, ancient and modern, are uniform to the effect that if, by the irruption of the waters of a tidal river, a new channel is formed in the land of a subject, although the rights of the Crown and of the public may come into existence and be exercised in what has thus become a portion of a tidal river, .... the right to the soil remains in the owner, so that if at any time thereafter the waters shall recede, and the river again change its course, leaving the new channel dry, the soil becomes again the exclusive property of the owner, free from all rights whatsoever in the Crown or in the public.” It is, perhaps, unnecessary to add that, although the specific reference in that case is to a tidal river, their Lordships consider the principle equally applicable to a non-tidal river. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal ought to be dismissed and the decree of the Judicial Commissioner confirmed. The appellant must pay the costs of the appeal.