JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal on behalf of the decree-holder against an order of the Judicial Commissioner of Chota Nagpur dismissing his application for execution on the ground that it is barred by limitation. It appears that on the 13th May 1899, the Appellant obtained a decree for rent against the Respondent under Act I of 1879 B. C. On the 5th February 1902, the Appellant applied for execution of his decree, but no steps were taken and the application was struck off on the 15th March 1902. On the 10th March 1903, the Appellant presented a second application for execution, to which the judgment-debtor objected that it was barred by limitation under sec. 105 of Act I of 1879 B C., which provides that no process of execution of any description whatsoever, shall be issued on a judgment under the Act, unless an application be made within three years from the date of such judgment. The Deputy Collector gave effect to this contention and dismissed the application as time barred. The decree-holder thereupon took the matter before the Divisional Commissioner who, though doubtful whether he had jurisdiction to revise the order, on the 1st August 1903, reversed it and held that the application was not barred, because it ought to be treated in substance as a continuation of the previous application of the 5th February 1902. On the 8th August 1903 the decree-holder presented a third application for execution, upon which no action appears to have been taken and it was struck off on the 5th December following. On the 23rd December 1903 the decree-holder presented a fourth application for execution, and thus initiated the proceedings which have given rise to the present appeal. The judgment-debtor objected that the application was barred by limitation and that in any event the order of the 4th April 1903 made in the course of a previous execution proceeding was conclusive upon the matter. It was argued in answer on behalf of the decree holder that the order of the Divisional Commissioner which had set aside the order of the Deputy Collector ought to be treated as final; to this the judgment-debtor replied that the order of the Commissioner was wholly without jurisdiction and absolutely null and void. The Court of first, instance held that the application was not barred by limitation. The Court of first, instance held that the application was not barred by limitation. This decision has been reversed on appeal by the Judicial Commissioner on the ground that the order of the Commissioner was without jurisdiction and that it did not affect the validity of the order of the Deputy Collector who had on the 4th April 1903 decided rightly or wrongly that the previous application for execution was time-barred, The decree-holder has appealed to this Court and on his behalf the decision of the Court below has been assailed on two grounds, namely, first, that the Commissioner had jurisdiction to revise the erroneous order of the Deputy Collector; and, secondly, that assuming he had not such jurisdiction, the order was nevertheless binding upon the judgment-debtor as is was made in his presence. In our opinion neither of these contentions can be successfully maintained. The first ground taken before us raises the important question whether under Act I of 1879 B. C, as it stood before its amendment by Act V of 1903 B. C., an order made by a Deputy Collector relating to the execution of a decree for rent could be revised by the Commissioner. The answer to this question must depend upon the construction to be placed upon secs. 135, 136, 137, and 144 of Act 2 of 1879 B.C. Sec. 135 broadly distinguishes between judgments and orders passed in suits and execution proceedings, and orders not falling within this description; of this latter class, an order under sec. 26 may be taken as an example. Section 135 then provides that all orders other than those made in course of suits and execution proceedings, shall be appealable, but that orders of this latter description shall not be open to revision or appeal, otherwise than is expressly provided in the Act. Sec. 136 then specifies the time within which an order made appealable by sec. 135 must be presented, and then provides that the order passed on appeal shall not be open to any further appeal, but authorizes the Board of Revenue or the Commissioner to call for any case and pass such orders thereon as they may think proper. It has been suggested by the learned vakil for the Appellant that this last clause gives jurisdiction to the Commissioner to revise every order of a Deputy Collector. In our opinion, this contention is manifestly unsound. It has been suggested by the learned vakil for the Appellant that this last clause gives jurisdiction to the Commissioner to revise every order of a Deputy Collector. In our opinion, this contention is manifestly unsound. Sec 136 must be read with sec. 135 and the effect of the two provisions taken together, is to make certain orders appealable and to make the appellate orders final, subject to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the Board of Revenue or the Commissioner. It seems to us to be perfectly plain that the second pan of sec. 136 has no application to judgments and orders in suits and execution proceedings against which no right of appeal is given by sec. 135. We must therefore look to secs. 137 and 144 to determine whether an order made after decree and relating to the execution there of is open to revision or appeal. Now it is obvious that secs. 137 and 144 are limited in their operation by their very language to judgments in suits which, as is manifest from sec. 135, are distinguished from and do not include, orders passed after decree, and relating to the execution thereof. We must therefore hold that under Act I of 1879 B.C., as it stood before its amendment in 1903, an order made in the course of execution proceedings was open neither to appeal nor revision. We are fortified in this view by the addition made to sec. 135 by sec. 41, cl. (2) of the Amending Act V of 1903 B. C. which expressly provides that orders passed after decree and relating to the execution thereof, shall be appealable to the Court to which an appeal from the decree itself would lie. The conclusion therefore seems to us to be irresistible that orders made in course of execution proceedings were not appealable under Act I of 1879 B. C. before its amendment, but that they have been made appealable by the amending Act. We must hold accordingly that the order of the Commissioner made on the 1st August 1903 was without jurisdiction. The first point taken on behalf of the Appellant therefore fails and must be overruled. 2. The second ground urged on behalf of the Appellant involves the question of the effect et of an order made without jurisdiction. We must hold accordingly that the order of the Commissioner made on the 1st August 1903 was without jurisdiction. The first point taken on behalf of the Appellant therefore fails and must be overruled. 2. The second ground urged on behalf of the Appellant involves the question of the effect et of an order made without jurisdiction. It cannot be disputed that the agreement of parties cannot authorize a superior Court to revise a judgment of an inferior Court in any other mode of proceeding than that which the law prescribes, Kelsey v. Forsyth 21 Howard 85, United States of Emholt 15 Otto. 414, Bailey on Jurisdiction, Vol. I, p. 40. Even express consent of the parties to the litigation cannot confer on a Court jurisdiction which it does not possess; see Ledgard v. Bull L. R. 13 I. A. 134 (1886) and Meenakshee v. Subramaniya L. R. 14 IndAp 160(1887); in other words, where no jurisdiction exists, no action on the part of the Plaintiff, no inaction on the part of the Defendant can invest the Court with any of the elements of power or of vitality so as to convert the proceeding before it into a proper judicial process. What then is the effect of a judgment rendered by a Court which has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation ?. We think that the judgment must be treated as null and void As stated in Herman on Estoppel and Res judicata, Vol. I, sec. 110, " when a Court transcends the limits prescribed for it by law and assumes to act where it has no jurisdiction, its adjudications are utterly void and of no effect, either as an estoppel or otherwise." A judgment pronounced by a tribunal, having no authority to determine the matter in issue, is necessarily and incurably void, and may be shown to be so in any collateral or other proceedings in which reliance is placed upon it (Black on Judgments, Vol. I, sec. 218). In the case before us sec. 135 of the Act read with the other sections expressly prohibits any revision of an order made in the course of execution proceedings. The order of the Commissioner therefore bears on the face of it the proof of its illegality and shows the want of power in the tribunal which made it. 218). In the case before us sec. 135 of the Act read with the other sections expressly prohibits any revision of an order made in the course of execution proceedings. The order of the Commissioner therefore bears on the face of it the proof of its illegality and shows the want of power in the tribunal which made it. It was consequently not necessary for the judgment-debtor to have the order set aside by the Board of Revenue but it is open to him to show in the present proceedings where the conclusiveness of the order is the subject of judicial enquiry that it is void for want of jurisdiction and that therefore in legal contemplation it has never had lawful existence. The order must hence be regarded as a nullity and need not be adjudged to be such, by a formal and direct proceeding to have it vacated or reversed. There is nothing in this view opposed to the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Malkarjun v. Narhari 5 C.W.N. 10: s. c. L. R. 27 I. A. 216 (1900), where as is pointed out in Khiarajmal v. Diam 9 C.W.N. 201 : s.c. L. R. 32 I. A. 23; ILR 32 Cal. 296 (1904), their Lordships had to consider the effect of an erroneous decision, ruling or exercise of discretion of the Judge in a matter in which the Court had jurisdiction. Nor do we think that the view taken by us is in any way inconsistent with the decision of the Judicial Committee in Mungul Peshad v. Girija Kant L. R. (sic) I. A. 123 (1881) upon which considerable reliance was placed by the learned vakil for the Appellant. In that case it was ruled by their Lordships that assuming that a decree is barred at the date of some order made for its execution, such order though erroneously made is nevertheless valid, unless reversed on appeal, and cannot be ignored at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. There the erroneous order had been made by a Court of competent jurisdiction; here the order of the 4th April 1903 assuming it to have been erroneous was made by a competent Court and was reversed by a Court which was not competent to exercise either appellate or revisional jurisdiction. There the erroneous order had been made by a Court of competent jurisdiction; here the order of the 4th April 1903 assuming it to have been erroneous was made by a competent Court and was reversed by a Court which was not competent to exercise either appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The order therefore which possesses any binding character by virtue of the principle deducible from the decision of the Judicial Committee is the order of the 4th April 1903, and not the order of the 1st August 1903, which is unavailing for want of jurisdiction and consequently neither binds nor bars any one; see Kalka Persad v. Kanhaya Singh ILR 7 All. H.C.R. 99 (1875). The second point taken on behalf of the Appellant cannot accordingly be sustained. The appeal therefore fails and must be dismissed with costs. We assess the hearing fee at 2 gold mohurs.