JUDGMENT : Knox, J. The contention by the appellant is to the effect that the Court below have acted without jurisdiction in passing the order which they did. The respondent concedes this, but says that in that case no appeal lay to the Court below and no appeal lies to this Court. The Court of first instance professed to act under section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The circumstances briefly are as follows:— The decree-holder had got a decree granting him an order permanently restraining the respondent from making certain constructions upon a parcel of land from abstracting the decree-holder in certain work that he was erecting upon the land. The decree-holder had executed his decree and recovered costs. After he had done this, the judgment-debtor being of opinion that the decree-holder was making constructions over a larger area of land than that which was set out in the decree, came to the execution Court and asked the Court to order demolition of the buildings erected beyond the lands specified in the decree and give back possession. Both the Courts finding that the decree-holder under the colour of the decree had taken possession of land in excess of what was decreed to him, gave the judgment-debtor the relief he prayed for. I have no doubt whatever that these proceedings commencing with the judgment-debtor's objection, dated the nth March, 1904 (though they purported to be made under section 244), could not have been taken under that section. The Courts below had no jurisdiction. The question raised by the judgment-debtor was not a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The decree had been satisfied. The appeal then must fail and I dismiss it with costs. Appeal dismissed. 2. [After the dismissal of the appeal a motion was made on behalf of the appellant to convert the appeal into a petition of revision which was objected to by the other side, but his Lordship admitted the application and ordered notices to go. The case was afterwards re-argued and following judgment delivered.] KNOX, J. This revision case is an outcome of Execution Second Appeal No. 1283 of 1904, decided on the 30th May, 1905. For the facts of this case the judgment of that case may be consulted and considered part and portion of this judgment. The case was afterwards re-argued and following judgment delivered.] KNOX, J. This revision case is an outcome of Execution Second Appeal No. 1283 of 1904, decided on the 30th May, 1905. For the facts of this case the judgment of that case may be consulted and considered part and portion of this judgment. Sayed Aijaz Husain through his learned pleader raises the objection that this Court should not interfere in revision. The case of Mohammed Foyez Choudhary v. Goluck Dass, [1880] 7 C.L.R., 191, is cited as an authority for the contention that it is only on the application of a party interested that the High Court can act as a Court of revision. Rule 15 of the Rules of 18th January, 1898, is also put forward as an authority for the same contention. 3. Both the case and the rule cited refer to the procedure which a petitioner should adopt or must adopt if he wishes this Court to exercise its powers of revision. Neither precedent nor rule cited limits the authority of this Court to call for the record of a case and pass such order as the Court thinks fit. On the contrary, a Full Bench of this Court in The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Jillo, [1898] I.L.R., 21 All., 133, adopted the procedure which has been followed in this case. 4. It is next argued that this Court cannot interfere, inasmuch as there is another remedy which the opposite party can avail themselves of, and I am referred to a case of Guise v. Jaisraj, [1893] I.L.R., 15 All., 405. The head-note is somewhat misleading. What was laid down in that case was that this Court should not grant the extraordinary remedy by way of revision when a remedy by way of suit lies open. Ordinarily I am prepared to subscribe to that, but in this matter each case must be judged upon the circumstances peculiar to it. The subject-matter is valued at Rs. 40. The decree-holder is purporting to act under a decree which he obtained on 17th November, 1902. The application for execution, which has in no way been traversed, shows that his path in execution has been a very thorny one. The subject-matter is valued at Rs. 40. The decree-holder is purporting to act under a decree which he obtained on 17th November, 1902. The application for execution, which has in no way been traversed, shows that his path in execution has been a very thorny one. I have held that the order complained of was an order entirely without jurisdiction, and therefore it appears to me most consonant with equity to place the parties, as far as possible, in the position they occupied before the judgment-debtor moved the Court to pass the order which it had no jurisdiction to pass. On that date, if in fact a trespass had been committed by the decree-holder, it is the judgment-debtor who would have to bring a suit for redress. In no case that I can conceive would the decree-holder have had recourse to the Court. I accordingly pass this order, namely, that the orders of the Courts below be set aside with costs.