JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J. 1. This appeal arises in a suit brought by the respondent for possession of certain immoveable property which originally belonged to one Ibrahim Ali and of which a perpetual lease was granted to the applicant on 28th March, 1890, during Ibrahim Ali's minority, by his grandmother, who had been appointed, his guardian by the Court. The lease was granted by the guardian without previously obtaining the permission of the Court. Ibrahim Ali attained majority on 7th December, 1901 and on 21st of October, 1902, he sold the property to the plaintiff-respondent. It is by virtue of this sale that the plaintiff claims the property. In his plaint he also asks for the cancelment of the lease. 2. The Court of first instance held that the claim was barred by limitation, and accordingly dismissed the suit. 3. The Lower Appellate Court, differing from that court upon the question of Limitation, has set aside its decree and has remanded the case for trial on the merits. 4. The plea of limitation has been reiterated in this appeal and it is urged that article 91, schedule If, of the Limitation Act, governs this suit. The contention is that the lease is only voidable under section 30 of the Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), and that it was essential that it should be avoided by suit before the plaintiff's vendor or the plaintiff could recover the property. 5. No doubt, a voidable act is an act which is valid until repudiated. If the transfer in question had been made by the plaintiff's vendor himself or by some one through whom he claimed, and effect had been given to it, it would be necessary for him to get the instrument of transfer out of the way before he could recover the property. But when the act is the act of the guardian and not of the owner himself or of his predecessor in title, it is, I think, sufficient for him to repudiate the act, and it is not necessary to have the instrument cancelled. The claim to have the instrument cancelled must, in such a case, be ‘deemed to be only ancillary to the substantive claim for possession. The claim to have the instrument cancelled must, in such a case, be ‘deemed to be only ancillary to the substantive claim for possession. As the lease in this case was granted by Ibrahim Ali's guardian on the 28th March, 1890, that is, before Act No. VIII of 1890 came into operation, the guardian must have been appointed under Act No. XL of 1858, and in granting a lease for a longer period than five years, without the permission of the court, she violated the provisions of section 18 of that Act. It was held by this Court in Mauji Ram v. Tara Singh, [1981] I.L.R., 3 All., 852 that an instrument executed in contravention of section 18, Act No. XL of 1858, was ab initio void and could not be ratified by the minor on attaining majority. In the later case, however, of Girraj Bakhsh v. Kazi Hamid Ali, [1886] I.L R., 9 All, 340 it was held that such a transfer was not illegal or void ab initio, but that the omission to obtain sanction from the court “relegates the parties to the position in which they would lie if no certificate had been granted.” In either view it would not be necessary to set aside the transfer made by the guardian, it not being a sale provided for by article 44 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act. It was held by this Court in Ramausar Pandey v. Raghubar Jati, [1883] I.L.R., 5 All. 420 that a suit for possession of immoveable property and to set aside a mortgage made by the plaintiff's guardian on his behalf during his minority was not governed by article 91, The Madras High Court in Unni v. Kunchi Amma, [1890] I.L.R., 14 Mad., 2 observed that it had been held in the case of the guardian the Manager of a Hindu family and the Hindu widow wrongly alienating property, that the suit which may be brought to recover it is not governed by article 91 of the Limitation Act. The view of the court below is, therefore, fully supported by authority. The present case is that of a lease by a person whose authority to make it extended to a lease for a period not exceeding five years. The lease could have operation, if at all, for that period only. The view of the court below is, therefore, fully supported by authority. The present case is that of a lease by a person whose authority to make it extended to a lease for a period not exceeding five years. The lease could have operation, if at all, for that period only. After the expiry of that period, Ibrahim Ali could elect either to ratify it or to repudiate it. If he has ratified it, he would probably be estopped from questioning its validity, and so would the plaintiff who derive his title from him. It is not necessary to decide this question at present. If he has, on the other hand, repudiated it, as he must be allowed to have done by selling the property, to the plaintiff, the suit for possession is maintainable. It was not necessary for him to sue to have it cancelled, and article 91 has no application, The appeal, therefore, fails and must be dismissed with, costs. RICHARDS, J. The facts of this case so far as they are necessary for the decision of the present appeal are very simple. Ibrahim Ali Khan was the owner of the property the subject-matter of the, present suit. During his minority, Musammat Faiz-un-nissa, his certificated guardian, executed a perpetual lease of the property to the defendant No. 1 without having obtained the sanction of the Court; the lease is dated the 28th March, 1890. The minor attained age on the 7th December, 1901. On the 21st October, 1902, Ibrahim Ali Khan sold the property to the plaintiff, who has now instituted the present suit to re-rover possession of the property. It may be mentioned that the sale-deed contains no reference to the lease. The defence was raised that the suit is time-barred. The Court of first instance dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground of limitation, and on appeal the lower appellate Court reversed the Court of first instance and remanded the suit for trial on the merits. The guardian had absolutely no power to make the lease in question, and her action in doing so was in direct contravention of the provisions of section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The guardian had absolutely no power to make the lease in question, and her action in doing so was in direct contravention of the provisions of section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Were it not for the provisions of section 30 of the same Act, to which I shall presently refer, the position of the late minor and the plaintiff as his assignee would be very analogous to the position, according to English law, of a remainder-man of a settled estate when the tenant for life has made a lease unauthorised by the powers conferred upon the life tenant by the terms of the settlement or by statute. In such a case it is quite clear that the remainder-man could bring a suit for possession on the death of the tenant for life, without instituting any proceeding to set aside the lease. Such a proceeding would be neither necessary nor proper. The lease would be a good lease as against the tenant for life. It is, however, argued on behalf of the appellant that section 30 of the Guardians and Wards Act renders, the lease binding on the late infant and those claiming under him until a suit is instituted and a decree made setting it aside; and that inasmuch as an interval of more than 12 years elapsed between the making of the lease and the institution of the present suit, the lease cannot now be set aside by the present plaintiff, the assignee of the late infant. ‘ No point has been made as to the form in which the plaintiff claims his relief, and in the lower Court and here the suit has been treated as a suit for possession, notwithstanding that in the prayer mention is made of setting aside the lease. The plaintiff here does not seek to set aside or cancel the lease in the true and accurate sense of those expressions. When the Court cancels a lease, it places the parties in the position they would have been in if the lease had never been executed. The plaintiff does not seek to go behind the lease as regulating the rights of all parties during the minority of Ibrahim Ali Khan. If he did, very different considerations would arise, and it may well be that such a suit could not now be maintained by the present plaintiff. The plaintiff does not seek to go behind the lease as regulating the rights of all parties during the minority of Ibrahim Ali Khan. If he did, very different considerations would arise, and it may well be that such a suit could not now be maintained by the present plaintiff. The present suit is simply a suit for possession in which the plaintiff contends that the unauthorised lease cannot be set up as a defence to his suit for possession. In my opinion the true application of section, 30 of the Guardians and Wards Act to the present case is that the lease of 1890 not having been set aside, the lessee is protected from all claims by the infant or those claiming under him, at least in respect of the period covered by minority, but it does not render a suit to set aside the lease necessary or enable the lessee to set up the lease as a defence to a suit for possession. For these reasons I would affirm the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge and dismiss the appeal.