JUDGMENT 1. This is a rule calling upon the Deputy Commissioner of Palamau to shew cause why the order passed by the Judicial Commissioner, sanctioning the prosecution of the applicant, under sec. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, should not be set aside, on the ground that the Magistrate could not legally examine him on oath at the time when the false statement is said to have been made; or why such other or further order should not be made as to this Court may seem fit. The facts of the case are these. The applicant before us was a party to a proceeding under sec. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that is, a proceeding for the removal of an obstruction. He was examined before the Magistrate on oath and made a statement, which the Magistrate found to be false. He was therefore prosecuted under sec 193, I. P. C. and convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500. 2. On appeal to the Judicial Commissioner that officer set aside the conviction and sentence, on the ground that the charge, as framed, was defective; and he remanded the case, in order that it might be retried on a charge properly framed. 3. Then in this Court a rule was obtained, on the ground chat was not urged before the Judicial Commissioner that, as the applicant was a party to the proceeding which had been instituted against him under sec. 133, Cr. P. C., the Magistrate was not entitled to put him on oath, or to call upon him to give evidence in the case. 4. The learned pleader on behalf of the applicant contends before us that his client was in the position of an accused person and, therefore, under sec. 342, Cr. P. C, the Magistrate was not authorised to administer an oath to him when he gave evidence. He also contends that an accused person is any person against or over whom a Magistrate or other Court is exercising jurisdiction. In sup-port of these contentions he calls attention to the cases of The Queen-Empress v. Mona Puna I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661 (1892), Jhoja Singh v. Queen-Empress I. L. R. 23 Cal. 493 (1896), and The Queen-Empress v. Mutasaddi Lal I. L. R. 21 All. 107 (1898). He also relies upon sec. 488, Cr. In sup-port of these contentions he calls attention to the cases of The Queen-Empress v. Mona Puna I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661 (1892), Jhoja Singh v. Queen-Empress I. L. R. 23 Cal. 493 (1896), and The Queen-Empress v. Mutasaddi Lal I. L. R. 21 All. 107 (1898). He also relies upon sec. 488, Cr. P. C. 5. Now, no doubt, the first of these cases does apparently lay down that by the word "accused" in sec. 342, Cr. P. C., is meant "any person over whom a Magistrate or other Court is exercising jurisdiction." This however seems to us to be too wide a definition; and it would appear that the learned Judges who were deciding the case of The Queen-Empress v. Mona Puna I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661 (1892) in defining the word "accused" in such broad terms, went somewhat beyond the necessities of that case. In that case several persons had been arrested in a matter under Police investigation, one of whom, Hari, made certain disclosures to the Police, who thereupon discharged him and made him a witness. At the trial he gave evidence against his accomplices, who were all convicted. It was therefore contended that the man Hari was an accused and that his evidence was inadmissible. But the learned Judges held that he was not an accused and that Ida evidence was admissible, because the Police had discharged him and the Magistrate was not exercising jurisdiction against him at that time. The decision is directed to the question of the time at which a person ceases to be an accused. Probably, the learned Judges did not mean to go further than to lay down that the ?accused? Hari was no longer in the position of an accused, as at the time when he gave evidence no jurisdiction was being exercised against him. If they did, their decision was an obiter dictum. 6. Then in the cases of Jhoja Singh v. Queen-Empress I. L. R. 23 Cal. 493(1896) and The Queen-Empress v. Mutasaddi Lal I. L. R. 21 All. 107(1898) the persons concerned were persons against whom proceedings were being taken under Chap. VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that is, proceedings for the purpose of binding them down to keep the peace. Now, when a person against whom proceeding under Chap. 493(1896) and The Queen-Empress v. Mutasaddi Lal I. L. R. 21 All. 107(1898) the persons concerned were persons against whom proceedings were being taken under Chap. VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that is, proceedings for the purpose of binding them down to keep the peace. Now, when a person against whom proceeding under Chap. VIII are taken does not obey the order passed against him, he is liable to be punished with imprisonment; and this differentiates the case of such a person very much from the case of a person against whom proceedings under sec. 133, Cr, P. C., have been taken. The proceedings in the latter case are more of the nature of civil than of criminal proceedings. 7. Then, the learned pleader of the applicant relies on sec. 488, Cr, P. C.; and he points out that a person against whom proceedings for maintenance are being taken is, in cl. (7), called an accused person. That may be so; but it will be seen, from cl. (3), that a person who does not comply with an order for maintenance passed against him under sec. 488 is liable to be punished with Imprisonment which may extend to one month. 8. That being so, we think that the cases cited by the learned pleaders for the applicant are entirely distinguishable from the present case; and, furthermore, we may call attention to the fact that throughout the chapter in which sec. 133 occurs, namely, Chap. X, a person against whom proceedings are taken under that chapter is never called an accused person but is always spoken of as "a person" against whom proceedings are being taken; and the reason for this would appear to be that, if he neglects to obey the order passed, ho is not liable to punishment. If he disobeys that order, he can apply for the appointment of a jury to try whether the order is reasonable and proper; but if he does not carry out the order or shew cause, or apply for the appointment of a jury, he is liable to the penalty prescribed in that behalf in sec 188, I. P. C. 9. In these circumstances the applicant cannot, in our opinion, be held to be an accused person and there is nothing to prevent his being examined on oath. In these circumstances the applicant cannot, in our opinion, be held to be an accused person and there is nothing to prevent his being examined on oath. We would here point out that it would be very dangerous to hold that a person against whom proceedings under Chap. X of the Code of Criminal Procedure are being taken is an accused person, because then it would follow that all persons against whom quasi-civil proceedings are being taken under the Code of Criminal Procedure, are accused persons and may make false statements, on oath, without being liable to punishment. For example, a person who is a party to a proceeding under sec. 145, Cr. P. C., would seem to be in exactly the same position as a person against whom proceedings are taken under sec. 133; and if we were to lay down that a person against whom proceedings under sec. 133 are being taken are accused persons, then it would follow that a person against whom proceedings under sec. 145 are instituted cannot be examined on oath, and can make any false statements he pleases without being liable to punishment. For these reasons we discharge this rule.