JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J. 1. This was a suit for recovery of possession of certain plots of land which formed the occupancy holding of one Bhikka. He mortgaged the occupancy holding to the plaintiff by a usufructuary mortgage in 1874. The plaintiff sub-let the land to one Dal. After the death of Bhikka, the zamindar, defendant to this suit, applied to the Settlement Officer to expunge the name of Bhikka from the revenue papers and enter her name in regard to the holding which, she alleged had lapsed to her, The Settlement Officer ordered the name of Dal to be entered as the sub-tenant of the zamindar. The zamindar thereupon sued in the Revenue Court for the ejectment of Dal. That suit was resisted by Dal on the allegation that he was not the tenant of the zamindar, but was the tenant of the present plaintiffs, the mortgagee from Bhikka. The plaintiff was added as a party to that suit, and in the result the Revenue Court ordered the ejectment of Dal. This was on the 20th of December, 1902. The plaintiffs thereupon brought the present suit in the Civil Court to recover possession of the holding, on the ground that Dal was his tenant and that he was entitled to remain in possession as mortgagee from the original tenant, Bhikka. 2. The court of first instance decreed the claim, but the lower appellate court dismissed it on two grounds, first, that the suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court, and second, that the decision of the Revenue Court in the ejectment suit was conclusive against the plaintiff. I do not think that the view of the learned Judge is correct. However, I do not deem it necessary to decide the questions which he considered. In my opinion the suit was bound to fail upon another ground, namely, that the ejectment of Dal by the Revenue Court amounted to the ejectment of the plaintiff and the ejectment of the plaintiff amounted to the ejectment of the original tenant, whose son, Tula, may be deemed to have succeeded to the tenancy. This took place on the 20th of December, 1902, Tula, who became tenant after the death of his father of the occupancy holding, having thus been dispossessed, could have sued to be restored to possession within six months from the date of dispossession. This took place on the 20th of December, 1902, Tula, who became tenant after the death of his father of the occupancy holding, having thus been dispossessed, could have sued to be restored to possession within six months from the date of dispossession. He has not done so and the six months have expired. Consequently his right to the holding has become extinct and he has ceased to be the tenant of the holding. As the plaintiff derives his title from the tenant and as the tenancy has come to an end, the plaintiff's title to remain in possession as mortgagee has determined. Therefore he is not entitled to be restored to possession of the land in suit, For this reason he could not succeed in his suit, and the court below has rightly dismissed it. I would accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs. RICHARDS, J. The plaintiff in the present suit claims possession of certain plots of land. He bases his claim on the fact that in the year 1874 an occupancy tenant made or purported to make to him a usufructuary mortgage of the occupancy holding. The plaintiff being unable or finding is inconvenient to occupy the holding himself, he put one Dal into possession. The zamindar, finding this Dal into possession, brought a suit by way of ejectment to recover possession. This suit was brought in the Revenue Court, and in the course of the proceedings, it being discovered that Dal was in possession under the plaintiff in this suit claiming to be his tenant, the latter was added as a party and the Court proceeded to find that Dal was a tenant-at-will of the zamindar and gave a decree in ejectment. It is quite clear that the intention of the Legislature as demonstrated by the Rent Act of 1881 and the Tenancy Act of 1901 is to prevent occupancy tenants from transferring their occupancy interest, That it was the intention of the Legislature that all rights and questions between landlords and tenants of this class should be decided in the Revenue Court is equally clear. It is said that in a Full Bench case, Khiali Ram v. Nathu Lal, this Court decided that, notwithstanding the words of section 9 of Act No. XII of 1881, an occupancy tenant has power in some way to pledge his occupancy right, Assuming, that the Full Bench did so decide, it is quite clear from their judgment, which is to be found at page 230, that the Court never intended to interfere with the rights of the zamindar to recover possession and determine the occupancy by any legal means. A mortgagee of a tenant's interest has always a very frail security, for the moment the tenancy is determined, security is gone. I do not think that the Full Bench, decided that an occupancy tenant had any right to mortgage or pledge his occupancy rights. That matter was not before the Court. The Court was only asked to set aside a sub-lease, and the Court in my judgment without in any way deciding the validity or invalidity of the sub-lease refused to set it aside. In the present case the landlord finding that Dal was the only person in physical possession of the property, brought his action of ejectment Rightly or wrongly, a Court of competent jurisdiction decided Dal was the tenant and decreed possession to the landlord. It is conceded here that the original tenant or his heir could not bring this present suit for possession in this Court, and it appears to me that it would be a most extraordinary thing if a person claiming through and under a tenant of an occupancy holding, can have rights which that tenant has not. It has been said that he ought to have some remedy, I think the answer to this argument is that any person who, in spite of the clear policy of the law lends money on the security of an occupancy holding, must remember that he takes a security which is only of any value so long as he is permitted to remain in actual occupation. He cannot complain if he finds it difficult or impossible to enforce rights which, if they exist, are contrary to the policy of the Legislature. I concur in dismissing the appeal and in affirming the decree of the court below. He cannot complain if he finds it difficult or impossible to enforce rights which, if they exist, are contrary to the policy of the Legislature. I concur in dismissing the appeal and in affirming the decree of the court below. BY THE COURT The order of the Court is that the appeal is dismissed with costs, including fees on the higher scale.