JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. This is an appeal by the Crown against the acquittal of two sonars, called Deni and Amiti, father and son, of charges under sections 235 and 243 of the Penal Code, 1860. The case for the Crown is that on receipt of an anonymous letter the Police searched the house of the accused, that during the search Amiri entered a room of the house, and on coming out dropped from under his arms a basket containing 11 dies and a small block of iron and also a large pocket knife, and that in a room of the courtyard, the door of which was chained, in a large brass vessel nearly full of flour was found a child's jacket containing 35 Murshidabadi rupees. The dies are of various sizes and patterns intended for the coining of Murshidabadi ashatfts and rupees. The coins are all Murshidabadi rupees, of one pattern, but do not correspond with any of the dies which are said to have been found. With one exception they are all blackened and tarnished, indicating that they had not been recently stamped. The assessors all disbelieved the story as to the finding of the dies, and three of them, the story as to the finding of the coins, while one was of opinion that both the accused were responsible for the possession of the coins. The learned Sessions Judge, differing from the assessors in regard to the dies and from the majority of them as regards the finding of the coins, held that the dies were found in the manner described by the witnesses for the prosecution and that both the accused were guilty, if an offence was committed. He also held that the coins were found, but that Deni only was responsible for their possession. He held further that under section 235 possession of the dies was criminal, if the possession was for the purpose of using the dies for counterfeiting coins and that if the impressions on the dies are those of coins, it might be presumed that such possession was criminal. He also held that under section 243 possession of counterfeit coins is only an offence if such possession be fraudulent or for the purpose of fraud. He also held that under section 243 possession of counterfeit coins is only an offence if such possession be fraudulent or for the purpose of fraud. Declining to follow the decision of a Bench of this High Court in the case of the King-Emperor v. Gopal, [1903] 23 A.W.N., 115 he held that the expression “Government of India” as defined in section 16 of the Code does not and was not intended to include “Governor-General in Council under the East India Company” and that the expression “Government of India” contained in section 230 of the Code was not intended to mean “Government at Fort William under the Company” and that unless it could be shown that Murshidabadi rupees were minted after 1858, he was unable to hold that they arc Queen's coin within the meaning of “Queen's coin “in section 230. In reference to the decision of the High Court to which we have referred, the learned Sessions Judge uses the following language: “The learned Government pleader has not shown me any provision of law directing that rulings of a High Court (“whether by one or more Hon'ble Judges or by a Full Bench) have the force of law. A ruling is an interpretation either of the law itself or of its applicability to certain facts or circumstances. Rulings frequently vary in principle or are overruled by fresh rulings (occasionally by their own authors) while the law has all along remained unaltered; sometimes rulings have caused amendments of the law to be made by detecting ambiguities (more specially in Rent Law)—While the uncertainty of rulings is well-known, at the same time the opinions expressed therein are entitled to great weight, and in the interests of continuity and to avoid foreseen results of appeals, it is proper for subordinate Courts to follow those rulings as far as the existing law is consistent therewith; but this does not mean that Courts are to follow a ruling blindly even when inapplicable, if such ruling appears to conflict with existing law or to make new law. 2. We shall consider the duty of subordinate Courts in regard to the decisions of superior Courts later on, and shall first take up the question of law which has been ably argued by Mr. Boys on behalf of the accused. 3. 2. We shall consider the duty of subordinate Courts in regard to the decisions of superior Courts later on, and shall first take up the question of law which has been ably argued by Mr. Boys on behalf of the accused. 3. Queen's coin is defined in section 230 of the Penal Code, 1860 to be” metal stamped and issued by the authority of the Queen or by the authority of the Government of India, or of the Government of any Presidency, or of any Government in the Queen's Dominions, in order to be used as money, and metal which has been so stamped and used shall continue to be the Queen's coin for the purposes of this chapter notwithstanding that it may have ceased to be used as money.” One of the illustrations appended to the section is the following:— “The Farrukhabad rupee which was formerly used as money under the.authority of the Government of India is Queen's coin, although it is no longer so used.” This illustration was added by the Penal Code, 1860 Amendment Act of 1896. 4. Mr. Boys' argument is that the essential quality to make a coin a Queen's coin is that it should be stamped and used by the authority of the Queen, or by the authority of the Government of India, et cetra, and that this is lacking in illustration (e), and that consequently what purports to be an illustration is in reality not an illustration but an addition to the law and is only applicable to ‘Farrukhabad rupees.’ He further contended that the coins which are said to have been found in the house of the accused are counterfeits of Murshidabad rupees which were minted between the years 1793, and 1818, and that these rupees were not stamped and issued by an authority referred to in section 230. 5. The following are a few facts in connection with the Indian coinage which are gleaned from Prinsep's Indian Antiquities and also from the Historical Outline to the catalogue of the coins of the Moghal Emperors in the British Museum by Mr. Stanley Lane Poole. 5. The following are a few facts in connection with the Indian coinage which are gleaned from Prinsep's Indian Antiquities and also from the Historical Outline to the catalogue of the coins of the Moghal Emperors in the British Museum by Mr. Stanley Lane Poole. James II by Letters Patent, dated the 12th of April, 1686, empowered the East India Company to issue at their Forts copies of the current native coins, and the Bombay Factory was directed to use “such stamps, dies and tools as were common in the country.” For a length of time however, all coining by the Company at their own mints was carried on with difficulty. In Bengal the Company were for a long time obliged to send their bullion to be coined at the mints of the Nawab of the Province at Dacca, Patna and Murshidabad; but in 1759 the then Nawab gave the Company permission to establish a Mint at Calcutta. After the Battle of Buxar in 1764,’ when the Moghul Emperor Shah Alum submitted to the English, the Company assumed the right of coinage and the Mints at Patna,. Dacca and Murshidabad were shortly afterwards abolished and all the coins for Bengal were struck at Calcutta. Up to 1793 there appears to be little or no distinction between the Nawab's and the Company's coins; but in that year, Acts 33 and 34, George III, Chapter, 52, was passed, by section 24 where if the Civil and Military Governments of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal and all the territorial acquisitions and revenues in the Kingdoms or Provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa were vested in a Governor-General and three councillors, and by section 40 the Governor-General in Council at Fort William was empowered to superintend the other Presidencies. Under Regulation 35 of 1793, passed by the Governor-General in Council on the Ist of May, 1793, rules were made for the reform of the gold and silver coins in Bengal, Behar and Orissa, and prohibiting the currency of any gold and silver coins in those Provinces except the 19th san sikkah rupee and gold mohur and their respective sub-divisions, and for preventing the counterfeiting or defacing of the coin. Amongst the rupees mentioned in those Regulations are the Murshidabad and Farrukhabad rupees. Amongst the rupees mentioned in those Regulations are the Murshidabad and Farrukhabad rupees. A standard currency was thus established, the coinage struck at Murshidabad in the 19th year of Shah Alam's reign being selected, as the standard—the result was the coin known as the “19th san” or “sikkah” rupee of Murshidabad. The standard rupee so adopted had oblique milling on the edges. This milling was continued until the year 1818 when the milling was changed and straight milling was adopted, and later on, namely, from 1832 to 1835 milling was discarded and a dotted rim on the face of she coin took its place. The upper country in Bengal had been served from other mints, of which Benares and Farrukhabad were the chief. The Company's Farrukhabad Mint was founded in 1803 and it issued a rupee in imitation of what was known “Lucknow 45 san sikkah “struck at the Fatehgarh mint of the Moghul” the 45th year of Shah Alam. The mint at Farrukhabad was closed in 1824. These rupees were also struck at Benares, which was under native control, and this mint coined the Company's coin up to 1830, After 1830 the native mint at Sagar and the Company's mint at Calcutta issued Farrukhabad coins up to the year 1835. In September, 1835, the Company, established English coinage with the head of King William IV, in place of the name of the Moghul Emperor and the older issues were ordered to be sup-pressed.’ 6. From the foregoing we gather that the Famikhabad and Murshidabad rupees stand exactly on the same footing and were stamped and used under the same authority, also that the lower part of Bengal circulated the Murshidabad rupees whilst the upper country was served by the Farrukhabad mint. Whether these rupees had oblique or straight or no milling at all, they were all known as and came’ under the description of Murshidabad or Farrukhabad rupees. It is unnecessary to follow Mr. Boys in his subtle and able argument,’directed to show that the British Crown did not enjoy territorial sovereignty in India at the period when the Murshidabad rupees with oblique milling were minted. We are not prepared to admit that there is any force in his argument, but in the view which we take of the question before us it is unnecessary to discuss this matter. We are not prepared to admit that there is any force in his argument, but in the view which we take of the question before us it is unnecessary to discuss this matter. The point for our decision is whether or not Murshidabad rupees are “Queen's coin” within the meaning of section 230 of the Penal Code, 1860. Mr. Boys argued that the illustration to the section, which was added by the Penal Code, 1860 Amendment Act, 1896, was not in reality an illustration at all, but amounted to a substantive enactment that the Farrukhabad rupee was Queen's coin. His contention is that the essential quality to make a coin a Queen's coin, viz., that it should be stamped and issued by the authority of the Queen or by the authority of the Government of India, etc., is lacking in the illustration, and that, therefore, the illustration is not an illustration properly so-called, but amounts to a substantive enactment that the Farrukhabad rupee is “Queen's coin” and does not go further so as to embrace coins standing on the same footing as Farrukhabad rupees such as Murshidabad rupees. We cannot accede to this argument. We must treat what is expressed in the Code to be an illustration as an illustration and deal with it accordingly. Accepting the addition to the Act as an illustration and having in view Acts XXXIII and XXXIV, George III, Cap. 52, and Regulation 35 of 1793 and other legislations, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that Murshidabad rupees stand on the same footing as Farrukhabad rupees and fall within the illustration, and that these rupees were stamped and issued by the authority of the Government of India, or at least of the Government of a Presidency and were issued as money under the authority of the Government of India as were Farrukhabad rupees. We therefore hold that section 230 was intended to, and does apply to Murshidabad rupees, and that the view of our learned brothers, KNOX and AIKMAN, JJ. in the case of K.E. v. Gopal, [1903] 23 A.W.N., 115 was correct. 7. [His Lordship then discussed the facts and proceeded thus:] In view of the discrepancies in the evidence given for the prosecution and the improbabilities of the story told by the witnesses for the prosecution, we think that it would be wholly unsafe to convict the accused. in the case of K.E. v. Gopal, [1903] 23 A.W.N., 115 was correct. 7. [His Lordship then discussed the facts and proceeded thus:] In view of the discrepancies in the evidence given for the prosecution and the improbabilities of the story told by the witnesses for the prosecution, we think that it would be wholly unsafe to convict the accused. It is highly probable we think that advantage was taken of the absence of the accused from their home by some person who is ill-disposed towards them to place the dies and coins in their house, if indeed they were found there at all. 8. We cannot conclude our judgment without expressing our [surprise that the learned Sessions Judge refused to follow the ruling of a Bench of the High Court. He says that the learned Government pleader has not shown him any provision of law directing that rulings of a High Court (whether by one or more Hon'ble judges or by a Full Bench) have the force of law, “and then he afterwards remarks that Courts are not to follow a ruling blindly even when applicable, if such ruling appears to conflict with the existing law or to make new law.” We presume that the learned Sessions Judge means by this that it rests with a Subordinate Judge to decide whether or not a ruling of the High Court conflicts with the existing law and is or is not to be followed. We should have thought that it did not require any authority for the proposition that subordinate Courts must abide by and follow loyally the rulings of the High Court to which they are subordinate. We may quote the following passage bearing on this subject from a well-known work. We should have thought that it did not require any authority for the proposition that subordinate Courts must abide by and follow loyally the rulings of the High Court to which they are subordinate. We may quote the following passage bearing on this subject from a well-known work. “It is then an established rule to abide” by former precedents, stare decisis, where the same points come again in litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice steady, and not liable to waver with every new Judge's opinion, as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared, what before was uncertain and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequently Judge to alter according to his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws of the “land—not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain the old—jus dieere et non jus dare” (Broom's Legal Maxims, edition 7, p. 118). This rule is accepted by every Court of Justice in England or, Ireland and is loyally followed even by Judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction; a fortiori is the rule binding upon subordinate Courts. The Judge of a subordinate Court, however, brilliant and well-trained a lawyer he may be, is not entitled to assume the powers of an appellate Court, or refuse to follow the decision of the High Court to which his Court is subordinate. It is the duty of every subordinate Judge loyally to accept the rulings of such High Court unless or until they have been over-ruled by a higher tribunal We regret that the learned Sessions Judge should have seen fit in this case to deviate from a well recognised rule. We direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to him for his guidance in future. 9. We dismiss this appeal and direct that the accused Deni and Amiri be forthwith released from custody.