JUDGMENT 1. This is a rule calling upon the District Magistrate of Bankura to show cause why the conviction of and sentence passed upon the applicants should not be set aside, on the first two grounds mentioned in the application, or why such other order should not be passed in this matter as to this Court may seem fit. The facts of the case are these. The decree-holder applied to the Munsif of Khatra for execution of a decree by attachment of the moveable property of the judgment-debtors The Munsif issued a warrant of attachment; but, when the decree-holder went to seize the property, the judgment-debtors and several other persons turned out, prevented the attachment, beat the decree-holder, and threatened to beat the peon, who ran away. The peon then reported to the Munsif that he could not execute the warrant; and the decree-holder came to the Munsif and complained of non-execution of the warrant. The Munsif enquired into the matter and made over the present applicants to the Honorary Magistrate of Bankura under sec. 47G, C. Cr. P. They were tried and convicted. 2. The applicants have now obtained a rule to show cause why the conviction and sentence should not be set aside on the ground, first, that there had been no sanction to prosecute on the complaint of any one, and, secondly, that the Munsif was not justified in directing the prosecution of the Petitioners under sec. 476, C. Cr. P, because he was not engaged in a judicial proceeding. In support of the second of the above two grounds the case of Har Churan Mukerjee v. The King-Emperor 9 C.W.N. 364 : s.c. ILR 32 Cal 367 (1905) has been relied upon. We are of opinion that the Munsif was justified, in the circumstances, in proceeding under sec. 47G, C. Cr. P., and that the facts did come to his knowledge in the course of a judicial proceeding. He was engaged in a proceeding in an execution case, and a proceeding in an execution case is undoubtedly a judicial proceeding and every order passed by an officer in such a case is subject to an appeal or second appeal; which would not be the case if the proceeding was not a judicial one. He was engaged in a proceeding in an execution case, and a proceeding in an execution case is undoubtedly a judicial proceeding and every order passed by an officer in such a case is subject to an appeal or second appeal; which would not be the case if the proceeding was not a judicial one. We consider that the case of Har Charan Mukerjee v. The King-Emperor 9 C. W. N. 364: S. C. I. L. R. 32 Cal. 367 (1905), is entirely distinguishable from the present case. In the case cited by the pleader for the applicant it was held that the Munsif had passed an order for possession, which finally determined the case. The present case is quite different. In the present case the matter came before the Munsif in the course of an execution proceeding. There were money matters which had to be determined by the Munsif and upon which evidence could be taken; and therefore the execution case was not finally disposed of. 3. We see no reason, therefore, to interfere in this case; and we discharge the rule.