JUDGMENT : Stanley, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 11,000 odd, alleged to be due to the plaintiff under the following circumstances:— The plaintiff was the holder of four hundis for principal amounts of the aggregate value of Rs. 10,000, and on the 5th of June, 1900, on the application of her son-in-law, Prag Narain, she transferred these hundis to him as a loan with a view to starting him in a separate business. That the hundis were transferred as a loan is expressly stated in the plaint and also in the evidence of the plaintiff and of one at least of her witnesses, and is so found by the Court below. One of the plaintiff's witnesses, Jhinguri Lal, says that “on Asarh Badi 3rd, Samhat 1957, Prag Narain took hundis worth Rs. 10,000, as a loan from the Musammat and having sold them in the market, obtained hundis in his own favour with the money thus received and sold them to his father-in-law, Komal Prasad.” The plaintiff herself says that the money, which she gave to Prag Narain, was given by her as a loan. The claim is framed on the basis that the hundis were transferred to Prag Narain as a loan and not otherwise. Now it appears that Prag Narain, on the transfer of the hundis to him, went to the firm of Nathu Ram Ram Kishan Das, and exchanged the hundis for fresh ones drawn by them in his favour. Thereupon, it would appear that he endorsed over the new hundis to the defendant, Komal Prasad, who is his father-in-law, and it is said that Komal Prasad realized the amount of these hundis and holds the proceeds. The plaintiff sued not merely Prag Narain but also Komal Prasad, alleging as regards Komal Prasad, that the amount of the hundis is fictitiously and fraudulently invested benanti in the name of Komal Prasad. Now it appears to us that if the original hundis were transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant Prag Narain as a loan, to enable him to embark in a separate business it is perfectly immaterial, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, whether or not he transferred the hundis to a third party or what that third party did with them. The transaction was a loan transaction with Prag Narain alone, and Prag Narain alone became responsible to the plaintiff for the value of the hundis when realized. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, although he finds that the transaction was a loan in favour of Prag Narain, has come to to the conclusion that there has been some juggling with the hundis between Prag Narain and his father-in-law, Komal Prasad, and that Komal Prasad is the person who has benefited by the loan of the original hundis. Therefore he came to the conclusion that Komal Prasad, who never borrowed, so far as we are aware, a single pie from the plaintiff, is responsible to her in respect of the loan of the original hundis. This conclusion appears to us to be wholly wrong. Having found that the hundis were lent to Prag Narain alone, it is clear that, Prag Narain alone is responsible to the plaintiff in respect of them. The plaintiff or her advisers seem to think that she is entitled to follow the proceeds of the hundis, into the hands of any third party to whom these proceeds may have come, but such is not the law. The Court below was altogether in error in giving a decree against the defendant Komal Prasad, and as regards him the appeal must be allowed. 2. As regards Prag Narain it has been argued that the claim of the plaintiff was barred by limitation. This raises a rather novel question. The hundis are dated the 27th, 28th and 30th April, 1906, respectively, and were payable about 36 days after date. They were transferred by the plaintiff to Prag Narain on the 5th of June, 1900, and the suit was not instituted until the nth of June, 1903. In the case of a loan the period of limitation is three years. Therefore, if the period from which limitation is to be calculated, is the 5th of June, 1900, that is, the date on which the hundis were transferred by the plaintiff, the suit apparently is statute-barred. We find, however, that the hundis were not, as a matter of fact; turned into cash by Prag Narain for some 20 days after the 5th of June, 1900. We find, however, that the hundis were not, as a matter of fact; turned into cash by Prag Narain for some 20 days after the 5th of June, 1900. Is therefore limitation to start from the date when the transfer was made to Prag Narain or from the date when the hundis were realised and money was received by him in respect of them; that is to say,” when the loan actually took place? We are of opinion that the limitation runs from the latter period. The mere transfer of hundis for the purpose of making a loan of their value when realized, does not amount to a loan until money has been realized by the transferee. We are borne out in this view by the decision in the case of Garden v. Bruce, (1868) L.R., 3 C.P., 300. 3. In that case the plaintiff agreed to lend the defendant a sum of money, and gave him a cheque for the amount which the defendant paid into his bank, receiving credit for it. The cheque was not paid by the plaintiff's bankers until some days later. In an action for the money so lent, it was held that the statute of limitation only ran from the time of the payment of the cheque by the plaintiff's bankers. BOVILL, C.J., in his judgment said:—“The only question is whether the cheque should be treated as an advance from the time it was given to the defendant and used by him or only from the time it was paid by the plaintiff. I think it must be considered as an advance from the latter time only and that the statute of limitation did not begin to run before the cheque was paid.” MONTAGUE SMITH, J., in the course of his judgment, said, “I think the loan was when the plaintiff's money passed info the hands of the defendants and not when the cheque was given. Otherwise it follows that if an action had been brought by the plaintiff for money lent, he would, according to the opinion of PATTERSON, J., have been able to recover the amount of the cheque, although the cheque might have been subsequently dishonoured.” KEATING, J., observed, “The question is, when could the plaintiff' have first sued the defendant for money lent And it seems to me that he could not have done so till he had lent the money, which was when the cheque was cashed on the 21st of June.” Applying the principle laid down in this case to the case before us, we are of opinion that no suit could have been maintained for the recovery of the amount of the hundis lent by the plaintiff until the hundis had been realized and money had come to the hands of the defendant. If that were not so and it so happened that the hundis proved valueless through the insolvency of the persons responsible for their payment, the borrower would be liable for the amount of them, though he had not received any advantage from them. 4. As regards then the appeal of Komal Prasad, we allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and dismiss the suit as against him with half costs in this Court, seeing that both of the appellants are represented by the same advocate, and full costs in the Court below in which Court, we understand, he was separately represented. As regards the appeal of Prag Narain it is dismissed with half costs in this Court. The costs in this Court will include fees on the higher scale.