Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (Dec. 22, 1902) affirming a decree of Stanley J. (July 11, 1900). The main question decided in this appeal was whether, under the circumstances detailed in the judgment of their Lordships, the High Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction had jurisdiction to make the decree appealed from. Administration was sought of the estate of one Mohendra Nath Bose, who died on August 16, 1874, by his widow Nistarini, the plaintiff-respond ent, by setting aside a partition of his estate and a scheme of administration settled by an award made on July 16, 1889. The award, which cancelled a deed of trust executed by the executors of the will on May 24, 1877, and effected a partition of the estate, was made a decree of the Court of the 24 Pergunnahs (Alipore) on August 27, 1889. It was acted upon for several years, and in pursuance of its directions certain leases in suit were executed on March 1, 1891. The suit was brought on May 25, 1898, seeking (1.) leave to institute the suit under s. 12 of the Charter of the High Court; (2.) a declaration that the deed of trust dated May 24, 1877, the award dated July 16, 1889, the decree made thereon dated August 29, 1889, and the leases dated March 1, 1891, were fraudulent and void as against the plaintiff, and in no way binding on her, and that, so far as they purport to affect the residuary estate, the same be set aside and cancelled; (8.) that the will of Mohendra Nath Bose may be construed, and for a declaration of the rights of all parties thereunder, and that the directions contained in the will to invest the surplus income of the residuary estate in Government securities are contrary to law and void, and that the plaintiff as heiress is absolutely entitled to such surplus income; and (4.) that an account be taken of Mohendra Nath Boses estate, and the estate be administered under the directions of the High Court. The allegations of fraud on which relief was sought were decided in favour of the respondent. The decree of the High Court granting the relief was impeached as beyond the jurisdiction. Stanley J. held, after discussing various authorities, and amongst others Meadows v. Duchess of Kingston ((1775) 2 Amb. The allegations of fraud on which relief was sought were decided in favour of the respondent. The decree of the High Court granting the relief was impeached as beyond the jurisdiction. Stanley J. held, after discussing various authorities, and amongst others Meadows v. Duchess of Kingston ((1775) 2 Amb. 756.), Queen v. Saddlers Company (( 1863) 10 H. L. C. 404, 431.), and Earl of Bandon v. Beecher((1835) 3 Cl. & F. 479.), that "The position of the plaintiff, if her case be true—and I must assume for the purposes of this argument that her case is true—is much the same as that of the party of weak intellect referred to in the case of Carew v. Johnston ((1805) 2 Sch. & Lef. 280.), whose helplessness was taken advantage of by the mortgagee and his estate foreclosed. No intelligent consent was given by her to the institution or carrying out of the award, or to its embodiment in the decree of the Alipore Court. If the plaintiffs case be true, I am of opinion that a decree so obtained cannot stand, and that this Court has jurisdiction, if not to set it aside, at least to treat it as a nullity and render its effect nugatory " ; and that the decree of the Alipore Court was not binding on the plaintiff. " The plaintiff was, in truth, no party to the proceedings. So far as she was concerned there was no matter of difference; there was no real argument, no real prosecution, no real defence, no real decision. " He also upheld the jurisdiction of the Court to set aside the leases, saying " The suit is merely to have this property administered under the direction of the Court, and for this purpose, if it be found that the trustees or executors have been guilty of misappropriation of assets or maladministration of the estate, to compel them personally to make amends. This does not turn the suit into one for the recovery of immovable property. This does not turn the suit into one for the recovery of immovable property. If the trustees had assigned some of the properties to a stranger, and recovery of the property from such stranger had been sought in the action, a question of jurisdiction might arise; but here it is the executors in whom the property was vested by the will of the deceased who are alone sought to be made responsible for an alleged act of maladministration, namely, the granting of leases of part of the trust estate to themselves. Counsel for Nundo Lal Bose points out that the plaintiff was a party to the leases, and this alters the complexion of the matter. It is true that she was a party to the leases, but she says that her concurrence was obtained by fraud of the defendants, and, if this be so, the defendants cannot rely upon her concurrence. The Court assumes jurisdiction in regard to immovable properties, situate outside the jurisdiction, in cases where it can act in personam, either to compel the owner to give effect to legal obligations into which he has entered, or to a trust reposed in him. All that is sought here is that the Court, in administering this estate, shall act in personam, and compel the trustees and executors to fulfil their obligations. This objection, therefore, in my opinion, is unsustainable." He also held that leave under s. 44, rule a, of the Civil Procedure Code was unnecessary, as there was only one cause of action and not several. The High Court in its appellate jurisdiction agreed with Stanley J. on all the questions of law and fact decided by him, and in particular on the question of jurisdiction, substantially on the same grounds, referring in particular to ss. 11 and 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, and to clause 12 of the High Court Charter. Asquith, K.C., and De Gruyther, for the appellants, contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit of this nature where the relief sought was to set aside the decree of another Court which itself had jurisdiction to make the decree impeached, that it had not the power to treat such decree as a nullity, or to cancel leases of property outside the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. They relied upon ss. They relied upon ss. 11, 17, and 44 of the Civil Procedure Code, and ss. 11 and 12 of the Charter of the High Court; and referred to Aliens. Macpherson. (( 1841) 5 Beav. 469; ( 1847) 1 H. L. C. 191.) A claim to set aside leases of land out of the jurisdiction could not (see s. 44) be joined without leave, and it did not appear that leave had been given. Upon the construction of the will they contended that the executors had full discretion as to the pooja expenses, and that the ultimate trust for accumulation of the surplus funds was not void by Hindu law. They referred to Mullick v. Mullick ((1829) 1 Knapp, 245.); The Tagore Case (( 1872) L. R. Supp. Vol. 47, 66,67.); Soorjeemoney Dossee v. Denobundoo Mullick (( 1881) Ind. L. R. 8 Calc. 157; and on appeal, Ind. L. R. 8 Calc.637.); Act XXI. of 1870, s. 2, making ss. 98, 99, 100, and 101 of the Succession Act applicable to Hindu wills; Alangamonjori v. Sonamoni Dabee (( 1862) 9 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca.123.); Ramlal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State for India (( 1881) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 46, 60.); Sreemutty Kristoromoney Dossee v. Norendro Krishna Bahadoor (( 1888) L. R. 16 Ind. Ap. 37.); Norendranath Sircar v. Kamalbasini. (( 1896) L. R. 23 Ind. Ap. 18. 123.) W. C. Bonnerjee and C. W. Arathoon, for the respondent Nistarini, contended that under the circumstances of the case the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and to make the various declarations sought for by the respondent. Those declarations were ancillary to the real relief sought. The primary object of the suit was administration and a decree in personam against the executors who were subject to the jurisdiction. The setting aside of decree and leases was ancillary to the relief of administration. They relied on s. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, and contended that no section forbade the suit. Under s. 44 of Act I. of 1872 the respondent was entitled to shew that the decree of the Alipore Court was obtained by fraud; so also with regard to the award and the leases. They, referred to Bank of Hindostan, China, and Japan v. Nundolall Sen. (( 1873) 11 Beng. Under s. 44 of Act I. of 1872 the respondent was entitled to shew that the decree of the Alipore Court was obtained by fraud; so also with regard to the award and the leases. They, referred to Bank of Hindostan, China, and Japan v. Nundolall Sen. (( 1873) 11 Beng. L. R. 301.) Under the true construction of the will the executors had not the unlimited discretion contended for as to pooja expenses, and the respondent was entitled to the surplus income of the residuary estate absolutely for her own benefit. If there was an intestacy she took the residue for the estte of a Hindu widow therein as the nearest heir of her husband. Under the will she took it as the right heir of the testator at his death. In either case the accumulations belong to her. If the construction was that the residue was given to the right heir of the testator living at the widows death, then, on the assumption that that was a valid gift, the direction to accumulate was invalid, for s. 103 of the Succession Act was not extended to Hindu wills. The gift, however,, was invalid, for the contingent heirs living at his death might not be in existence at the widows death, and till then were not heirs, but persons with a spes successionis see Soorjeemoney Dossee v. Denobundoo Mullick (9 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 123.); Bai Motivahoo v. Bai Mamoobai (( 1897) L. R. 24 Ind. Ap. 93.); Srinivasa v Dandayadapani (( 1889) Ind. L.R. 12 Madr.411.); Bai Bishen Chand v. Asmaida Koer (( 1883) L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 164.); Callynath Naugh Chowdhry v. Chundernath Naugh Chowdhry. (( 1882) Ind. L. R, 8 Calc. 378.) De Gruyther replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DAVEY. But few of the 1805 pages which form the record in this case relate to the few and narrow questions submitted in argument to this Board. The first respondent, a Purdanashin lady, brings a suit in the High Court of Calcutta for administration of the estate of her husband, Mohendra Nath Bose, who died in 1874. By his will she was entitled, inter alia, to the interest of part of his estate. After his death, however, she was induced to execute certain instruments by which she surrendered her rights under the will. By his will she was entitled, inter alia, to the interest of part of his estate. After his death, however, she was induced to execute certain instruments by which she surrendered her rights under the will. In her administration suit she anticipated and met any defence founded on those instruments by alleging them to have been obtained by fraud, and by asking that they should be declared void. Those issues of fraud have been tried and decided in her favour; and the learned counsel for the appellants intimated to their Lordships that they could not impugn the soundness of this conclusion on the facts. The appellants, therefore, limited their argument to three points, namely, (1.) they dispute the jurisdiction of the High Court of Calcutta; (2.) on the terms of the will, they deny that there can be inquiry into certain pooja expenses; and (3.) they assert the invalidity of a gift over contained in the will, and the consequent invalidity of the gift to the widow of the interest of that part of the estate. Such being the subject-matter of the appeal, it is obvious that any statement of the very numerous facts of the case would be irrelevant to the questions now to be determined. It is only necessary to mention such facts as bear on those points. The will of the ladys husband is, in scheme, simple enough. The testator gives two-thirds of his estate to his two brothers. The remaining one-third is to be " looked after" by his executors. They are to pay out of it a great many minor bequests, and of these the only two now in controversy are the following (1.) And for the poojas, &c, that shall be performed by my brothers in our own house you shall give my share of the expenses." (2.) The ultimate disposal of this residuary third is as follows— "After paying all these legacies and monthly allowances and my debts and other expenses whatever sum shall remain to the credit of my estate shall be used in the purchase of companys papers and you shall pay the interest thereof to my wife the said Nistarini Dassi for her life for her to perform pious acts therewith. And after her death you are to make over all that property of mine and Companys paper, &c, which you shall have in your possession to them who shall be my heirs and they shall be in enjoyment and possession after paying the monthly allowances, &c." The respondent Srimati Nistarini Dassi, the widow, now lives in the suburbs of Calcutta, and the family residence is in Calcutta, where the testator resided. Her suit was brought on April 25, 1898, in the High Court of Calcutta, in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, against Nundo Lal Bose and Pashupati Nath Bose, who were the executors of the will of Mohendra Nath Bose, and also against Kadumbini Dassi, who was the surviving trustee under one of the deeds sought to be set aside. As already indicated, the primary prayer was for administration, but the Court was also asked to have it declared that a trust deed, an award, a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Alipore filing the award and giving, judgment in accordance therewith, and certain leases should be declared not binding on her. The whole of these documents were impugned on the ground of fraud, the decree being merely a step ministerially effectuating the antecedent fraud. In defence the jurisdiction of the High Court of Calcutta was challenged, and various other grounds of defence were put forward. The following issues were settled — " 1st. Has this Court jurisdiction in this suit to set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge of the 24 Pergunnahs ? " 2nd. Is the decree binding on the plaintiff? " 3rd. Has the Court jurisdiction under the charter to set aside the leases of the Gaya property ? " 4th. Has the Court jurisdiction to set aside and cancel the leases dated the 1st day of March, 1891, so far as they purport in any way to deal with the residuary estate of Mohendra Nath Bose ? " 5th. Is the plaintiff entitled in the absence of all parties and persons beneficially interested in the deed of trust of the 24th May, 1877, to obtain a declaration that that deed is fraudulent and void so far as it affects her interests and to have the deed set aside as against her ? " 6th. " 5th. Is the plaintiff entitled in the absence of all parties and persons beneficially interested in the deed of trust of the 24th May, 1877, to obtain a declaration that that deed is fraudulent and void so far as it affects her interests and to have the deed set aside as against her ? " 6th. Can the plaintiff maintain this suit without having obtained leave under s. 44 of rule a of the Civil Procedure Code?- " 7th. Is this suit defective by reason of misjoinder of causes of action ? “ 8th. Is the deed of trust of the 24th May, 1877, fraudulent and void as against the plaintiff? " 9th. Are the award, decree, and leases respectively fraudulent and void as against the plaintiff ? " 10th. To what extent are the defendants Nundo Lal Bose and Pashupati Nath Bose accountable to the plaintiff in this suit, and is the plaintiff entitled to have the accounts taken as against them on the footing of wilful default ? " 11th. Is the relief claimed or any portion thereof barred by limitation ? " 12th. What is the true construction of the will of the testator Mohendra Nath Bose—(a) As regards his movable property, has there been any disposition of it by the will? (b) Are the defendants, the Boses, as executors, entitled under it to spend any money out of the estate of Mohendra Nath Bose for the performance of religious services and worship held anywhere except at No. 13, Mohendra Boses Lane, and the family dwelling-house at Baraset ? (c) Is the direction in the will to accumulate the surplus income of the estate and invest it in Government paper and pay the income of it to the plaintiff valid in law; if not, is the plaintiff entitled to that surplus income absolutely ? “ 13th. Is the plaintiff entitled to have the estate of her husband administered by this Court, and, if so, for what period ? " 14th. Whether the house and premises No. 13, Mohendra Nath Boses Lane, or a third share of it, formed part of the estate of Mohendra Nath Bose at the time of his death ? " 15th. Is the plaintiff entitled to have the estate of her husband administered by this Court, and, if so, for what period ? " 14th. Whether the house and premises No. 13, Mohendra Nath Boses Lane, or a third share of it, formed part of the estate of Mohendra Nath Bose at the time of his death ? " 15th. Whether or not the residuary estate of Mohendra Nath Bose became vested in the trustees under the indenture of the 24th May, 1877, in the plaint mentioned upon the trusts therein declared, or remained unaffected by that deed?" The ultimate result of the proceedings was that both Stanley J. and, on appeal, the Appellate Bench sustained the jurisdiction, set aside the series of deeds and decrees impugned, and granted administration. On the specific points raised on the will the High Court held that the direction to accumulate the surplus income and invest it in Government securities is void, but that the widow is entitled to the estate of a Hind, widow in the residue of the trust estate. On the point as to the poojas it was held that the estate was liable for what should be ascertained on inquiry to be a fit and proper sum to be allowed to the executors for the expenses of the poojas rites and ceremonies performed by them year by year since the death of the testator, regard being had to the position of the family and the value and circumstances of the estate. On the question of jurisdiction their Lordships consider the decision right. The primary object of the suit was the administration of the estate of a deceased person resident within the jurisdiction, the principal executor being also resident there and the actual administration going on there. The High Court of Calcutta, in its ordinary jurisdiction, had right to order administration of this estate, and, as ancillary to such an order, to set aside deeds obtained by the fraud of the executor. Nor does the circumstance that a decree had been granted by the Court of the 24 Pergunnahs making a fraudulent award an order of Court protect that decree from the jurisdiction of the Calcutta Court when redressing that fraud. Nor does the circumstance that a decree had been granted by the Court of the 24 Pergunnahs making a fraudulent award an order of Court protect that decree from the jurisdiction of the Calcutta Court when redressing that fraud. In like manner, their Lordships consider the Calcutta Court entitled, for the due administration of the estate, to set aside leases of land outside the territorial limits of their jurisdiction, those leases having been made as an incident of the same fraud. With regard to the poojas, their Lordships think that there is some force in the criticisms of the appellant, and that the order would be improved if the inquiry directed were thus expressed — ""Whether the sums appearing to have been expended by defendants Rai Nundo Lal Bose and Rai Pashupati Nath Bose as such executors as aforesaid out of the said trust estate for the expenses of poojas rites and ceremonies performed by them year by year since the death of the testator were reasonable and proper to be allowed to the said executors having regard to the terms of the testators will and all the circumstances of the case, and if not what sums ought to be allowed them for the purposes aforesaid." With regard to the gift of the residue, the question does not appear to their Lordships to be one of any practical importance. If the word " heirs M is taken to mean the persons who will be the testators heirs at the widows death, the gift; is no doubt void, as was held by Stanley J., and the result is an intestacy. If, on the other hand, the word means the testators right heir (as their Lordships think it may), that is the widow herself. In either case, therefore, the widow is entitled to the residue for a widows estate. Being solely entitled to the fund directed to be accumulated, she can release the directions for accumulation and enjoy the whole income. Their Lordships, therefore, do not see any necessity for varying the directions on this subject in the decree of Stanley J. and affirmed by the High Court. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that, with the variation above expressed in the inquiry as to the amount expended on poojas, the judgment of the High Court should be affirmed. Their Lordships, therefore, do not see any necessity for varying the directions on this subject in the decree of Stanley J. and affirmed by the High Court. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that, with the variation above expressed in the inquiry as to the amount expended on poojas, the judgment of the High Court should be affirmed. The result is in favour of the respondents ; and the variance made in the judgment does not affect their substantial success. The appellants will, therefore, pay the costs of the first respondent, who alone defended the appeal.