JUDGMENT : Knox, J. The appellant is a zemindar of muhalla Jangam Ban in the city of Benares. He was plaintiff in the Court of first instance. To his suit he arrayed as defendants Bhagwan Das and one Pandit Behari Lal. Pandit Behari Lal is now represented by his daughter. According to the plaintiff, Bhagwan Das executed a qabuliat on the 19th of January, 1899. That qabuliat was registered. It is on the record. According to the appellant, by that qabuliat, Bhagwan Das bound himself by a covenant that in the case of a transfer of the materials of a house which stood on the land leased, the zemindar would be entitled to receive a certain payment known as haq chaharumon the occasion of transfers. By a registered mortgage-deed dated the 13th December, 1901, Bhagwan Das transferred to Pandit Behari Lal his interests in the materials of the house or houses under a transfer purporting to be a mortgage by conditional sale Pandit Bihari Lal demolished the house and is building it anew. From botli defendants,—for the appellant says in his plaint that Pandit Bihari Lal had knowledge of the conditions in the qabuliat relating to the payment of kaq ckaharum—the appellant claims that haq chaharum. It is further alleged that the payment of haq chaharum depends on custom and usage of the muhalla. It has been found by the Court of first-instance that such custom does not exist and this finding was not challenged in the lower appellate Court, The Court of first instance dismissed the claim so far as Pandit Bihari Lal was concerned. In appeal the Lower Appellate Court, holding that no charge so far as haq chaharum was concerned had been created by the qabuliat, dismissed the appeal. In this Court it is contended, first that a charge was created by the qabuliat; and secondly, that the respondent had notice of the said qabuliat and of the charge created thereby. It is necessary first to examine the terms of the qabuliat. By this instrument Bhagwan Das covenanted to pay rent otherwise known as zar parjote and kaq zar ckaharum which is said to be current according to the custom of the muhalla and as provided by the conditions in the patta and the qabuliat. It is necessary first to examine the terms of the qabuliat. By this instrument Bhagwan Das covenanted to pay rent otherwise known as zar parjote and kaq zar ckaharum which is said to be current according to the custom of the muhalla and as provided by the conditions in the patta and the qabuliat. Then follows the clause upon which the appellant relies and this clause may be thus translated;— “The burden of the liability for paying ear parjote and zar chaharum will remain first (mukaddam) upon the materials of the house.” What I have to consider is whether these words are sufficient as an act of parties to make the materials of the house in dispute security for the payment of zar chaharum to the appellant. The question is by no means free from difficulty. 2. But after carefully considering it in the light of section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, the case of Madho Misser v. Sidh Binaik Upadhya, [1887] I.L.R., 14 Cal., 687 and Paloniappa v. Lakshmanan, [1893] I.L.R., 16 Mad., 429, I agree with the Courts below that these words, standing as they are not sufficient to constitute a charge upon the property within the meaning of section 100 of Act IV of 1882. As was observed by the learned Judges of the Calcutta Court, the document before me seems not to create a charge at the time of the execution, but at the utmost the possibility of charge which might ultimately arise out of the land. I say at the utmost for I doubt whether even this can beheld. The peculiarity in the case is that this liability is imposed upon bricks and mortar which have been pulled down and are now being re-created in a fresh form. Something far more definite and clear, it seems to me, is required than the vague words which are set out above, before it can beheld that the intention of the parties was that the amla makan should be security for the payment of this haq chaharum. Something far more definite and clear, it seems to me, is required than the vague words which are set out above, before it can beheld that the intention of the parties was that the amla makan should be security for the payment of this haq chaharum. Holding as I do that a charge has not been created, it is unnecessary to consider the second point raised in the memorandum of appeal, There is one further remarkable point and that is that the plaintiff in his plaint prays not that the zar chaharum may be realized from the amla makan but from land specifically described and bounded as set out in the schedule to the plaint. This point does not, however, seem to have been noticed, and under the circumstances it is not necessary for me to consider it. The appeal is dismissed with costs which in this Court will include Vakil's fees on the higher scale.