JUDGMENT : Stanley, J.:— The facts of this case are shortly as follows:— The plaintiffs' suit was brought to recover that amount due to him on a bond for Rs. 800 with interest, Before judgment he applied to the Court under section 483 of the Civil Procedure Code for security from the defendants to satisfy the decree and in default for attachment of the defendants' property. Security was not given by the defendants, although they appeared to be men of considerable means. In consequence of their refusal to give security, portion of their property was attached. The claim of the plaintiffs was not resisted and in fact the amount of the bond was deposited in Court. An application, however, at the hearing of the suit was made on behalf of the defendants for compensation in respect of the attachment of the defendants property, it being alleged that the attachment was applied for on insufficient grounds. The Court of first instance came to the conclusion that the claim for compensation was well-founded, that in fact the plaintiff had applied for attachment without any reasonable ground for believing that the amount of the decree which might be obtained against the defendants would not be forthcoming. Accordingly that Court awarded very substantial compensation. With the amount of it we are not concerned here in second appeal. 2. An appeal was preferred from this order for compensation. The learned Subordinate Judge before whom the appeal came, dismissed it on the ground that no appeal lay from an order passed under section 491. 3. From this decree the present appeal has been preferred and the question before us is whether or not an appeal lies from an order passed under section 491. 4. Section 491 empowers the Court on the application of the defendant as a case in which an attachment has been applied for on insufficient grounds, to award against the plaintiff in its decree such amount, not exceeding one thousand rupees, as it deems a reasonable compensation to the defendant for the expense or injury caused to him by the attachment. It has been forcibly contended by Mr. Sorabji on behalf of the appellant that inasmuch as the order passed under tin's section is embodied in the decree itself, it therefore forms part of the decree, and, having regard to section 540 of the Code, is the subject of an appeal. It has been forcibly contended by Mr. Sorabji on behalf of the appellant that inasmuch as the order passed under tin's section is embodied in the decree itself, it therefore forms part of the decree, and, having regard to section 540 of the Code, is the subject of an appeal. On behalf of the respondents it is contended that the mere fact that the order passed under section 491 is directed to be embodied in the decree does not make it part of the decree so as to render section 540 applicable, ‘We are disposed to take this view of the question and for these reasons: section 588 allows an appeal to be preferred in the case of an order passed under section 497 which is a parallel section with section 491. Section 497 allows the Court on the application of the defendant, against whom an injunction has been issued on insufficient grounds, to award, against’ the plaintiff, in its decree such sum, not exceeding one thousand rupees, as it deems a reasonable compensation to the defendant for the expense or injury caused to him by the issue of the injunction. The language of section 491 appears to be almost identical with the language of section 497, In both cases the order passed under the section is to be embodied in the decree and is called an award. Sub-section 24 of section 588 allows an appeal to be preferred against an order passed under section 497, but nowhere refers to an order under section 491. It therefore seems to follow, having regard to the opening words of section 588, that the legislature did not intend to give a right of appeal against an order passed under section. 491. The opening words of the section are: “An appeal shall lie from the following orders under this Code, and from no other such orders.” An order passed under section 491 is in all respects a similar order to an order passed under section 497, and therefore comes under the words “no other such orders.” It, therefore, seems to us that the legislature expressly excludes a right of appeal in respect of orders passed under section 491. We regret that we are obliged to come to this conclusion, because it is possibly the case that through inadvertence or otherwise orders under section 491 were not mentioned in section 588. We regret that we are obliged to come to this conclusion, because it is possibly the case that through inadvertence or otherwise orders under section 491 were not mentioned in section 588. Most unjust orders may be passed under this section, and yet there is no right of appeal, We are supported in the view which we have taken by the decision in the case of Narasinga Bhakshi v. Govinda Bkakshi : [1900] I.L.R., 24 Mad, 62. For the above reasons we dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees on the higher scale in this Court.