JUDGMENT : Banerji, J. This is an application under section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure for revision of the order of the Munsif of Ghaziabad, refusing to entertain an application made by the applicants under section 310A of the Code for setting aside a sale which, had taken place in execution of a decree obtained by Salig Ram, respondent, upon a mortgage made in his favour by one Shibba. The Court below holds that the applicants are not, within the meaning of section 310A, persons whose property has been sold in execution of the decree. It has been urged on behalf of the respondents that no application for revision lies. I am not prepared to hold that this objection is valid, as it seems to me that, if the applicant's contention is correct, the Court below failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law, At the same time I do not wish to decide the question, inasmuch as, assuming that an application lies, I hold that the Court below was right in its decision as to the provision of section 310A, In my judgment it is not every judgment-debtor who can under that section apply to have the sale set aside, but only those judgment-debtors whose property has been sold in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The object of the section is to afford to the person whose property has been sold a chance of relieving it from the effect of the sale. No one except that person or persons deriving title from him can, in my opinion, come in under the section. The auction purchaser has by his purchase stepped into the shoes of the judgment-debtor whose property has been sold, and if he has made a good bargain, he is not bound to give up the property to any other judgment-debtor who may offer to pay the amounts mentioned in the section. 2. In the present case the Court below has found that the applicants are not persons whose property has been sold. The mortgagor was one Shibba. The applicant, Ram Singh, and two other persons, who were made parties to the suit, were joined as defendants, not because they derived title from Shibba, the mortgagor, but because they claimed an interest adverse to that of the mortgagor, and denied that he had any right to mortgage the property. The mortgagor was one Shibba. The applicant, Ram Singh, and two other persons, who were made parties to the suit, were joined as defendants, not because they derived title from Shibba, the mortgagor, but because they claimed an interest adverse to that of the mortgagor, and denied that he had any right to mortgage the property. In the suit itself an issue was raised as to whether Shibba was the rightful owner of the property, and as between the mortgagee and the other defendants it was decided that he was the rightful owner. Further, the Court below has found in these proceedings that Shibba was the rightful owner of the property, and that the applicants have not acquired such a title to it as would entitle them to be regarded as persons whose property has been sold. There is, in my opinion, another reason for refusing the application. Assuming that section 622 applies, this Court is not bound to exercise the discretion given to it by the section in every case. In the present instance the applicants did not pay the decretal amount after the decree was passed. They did not pay after the order absolute was made. Not only did they pay nothing after the making of that order but they also omitted to pay or tender the decretal amount until the sale had actually taken place. I see no reason why in the case of such persons whose application has been refused by the Court below I should interfere in revision. For the above, reasons I would dismiss the application with costs. RICHARDS, J. The applicants claim to be persons whose immoveable property has been sold within the meaning of section 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The applicants were made parties 10 the mortgage suit out of which the execution arose. It is true that there was an allegation that they claimed, not through or under the mortgagor, but adversely to him. The fact, however, remains that the mortgagee thought it right to make them parties. The applicants were made parties 10 the mortgage suit out of which the execution arose. It is true that there was an allegation that they claimed, not through or under the mortgagor, but adversely to him. The fact, however, remains that the mortgagee thought it right to make them parties. A decree was made against them, and so far as the various proceedings go, the property appears to have been treated as their property as much as of any other defendants, Further, I take it as being quite clear from the judgment of the Court below that they are and have been for a considerable time in physical possession of the property in question. Now it appears to me that it is impossible to give a very strict interpretation to section 310A, and to hold that only those persons who have an absolutely perfect title as against all the world can claim the benefit of tin's section, and I have great doubts whether it is possible for mortgagee who has thought fit to make party a defendant to the mortgage suit to say that he has not sufficient interest in the properly to claim the benefit of section 310A, and if he cannot, I do not think that an auction-purchaser of mortgaged property sold in execution of such a decree can be in a better position, However, upon another ground I think the present application must fail. In my opinion the lower Court did not fail to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law, nor did it act in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally. The lower Court heard and entertained an application to set aside the sale. It went carefully and thoroughly into the evidence, and having done so, even if it came to a wrong decision whether in fact or in law, its decision ought not to be questioned by way of revision, In the case of Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, [1884] L.R., 11 I.A. 237; S.C. I.L.R., 11 Cal., 6, this very question arose in a case in which the Court whose decision was sought to be revised had decided the question of res judicata. Their Lordships say (at page 239):— ”It appears that they had perfect jurisdiction to decide the question which was before them and they did decide it. Their Lordships say (at page 239):— ”It appears that they had perfect jurisdiction to decide the question which was before them and they did decide it. Whether they decided it rightly or wrongly, they had jurisdiction to decide the case, and even if they decided wrongly they did not exercise the jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.” In my opinion the lower Court had full jurisdiction to decide the question whether or not the applicant's property had been sold, and having honestly decided to the best of its ability that the property sold was not the property of the applicants, it had jurisdiction to refuse to make an order setting aside the sale. For these reasons I would also dismiss the application. The application is dismissed with costs, including fees on the higher scale.