JUDGMENT : RICHARDS, J. 1. This was a suit for possession of certain plots of land. It appears that there was previous litigation between the parties; the subject-matter of which was certain other lands. In that suit a compromise was come to on the 27th of April, 1890, under which it was arranged that certain lands were to belong to the patties separately as their separate property, while other lands were to remain joint property. The compromise dealt with lands that were the subject-matter of that suit and also with lands which are the subject-matter of the present suit but not of the previous litigation. The particular plot now in question admittedly forms part of the property which according to the terms of the compromise was to remain joint property of the parties. When the compromise was entered into, it was brought before the Judge and he disposed of the suit by making a decree incorporating the entire compromise. The decree commences in the following words: “It is decreed and ordered that according to the deed of compromise, marked A, the appeal be dismissed” The short point argued before us is whether or not this compromise can be given in evidence in the present suit, being an unregistered document affecting immoveable property of the value of upwards of Rs. 100. It is admitted that if it can be received in evidence, it is binding upon the parties to the present litigation and regulates their rights in respect of the plot of land now in dispute, Unless the document can be regarded as a judicial proceeding, it requires registration and cannot be admitted in evidence. In the case of Bindesri Naik v. Ganga Saran Sahu, [1897] I.L.R., 20 All., 171 their Lordships of the Privy Council observe that “the provisions of section 17 of the Act do not apply to proper judicial proceedings, whether consisting of pleadings filed by the parties, or of orders made by the Court.” The same point was considered by their Lordships in the case of Pranal Anni v. Lakshmi Anni, [1897] I.L.R., 22 Mad., 508. 2. In that case, as in the present, there had been previous litigation, and a compromise had been entered into affecting lands the subject-matter of the previous litigation and also lands the subject-matter of the litigation under consideration by their Lordships. 2. In that case, as in the present, there had been previous litigation, and a compromise had been entered into affecting lands the subject-matter of the previous litigation and also lands the subject-matter of the litigation under consideration by their Lordships. Their Lordships held that the compromise not being registered was inadmissible; but their judgment was founded on the fact that the parties, to the compromise had by separate deeds separately dealt with the property the subject-matter of the suit and the property not the subject-matter of the suit. Their Lordships considered that the Court had only dealt with and recognized the compromise so far as it affected the lands actually in dispute at the time, and that the parties had deliberately left the compromise so far as it affected the other lands to stand in the unregistered agreement, At page 514 of the judgment of their Lordships the following passage occurs:— “The razinamah, in so far as it was submitted to and was acted upon judicially by the learned Judge, was in itself a step of judicial procedure not requiring registration; and any order pronounced in terms of it constituted res judicata binding upon both the parties to this appeal who gave their consent to it. If the parties, after agreeing to settle the suit of 1885 on the footing that they were each to take a half share of the lands involved in that suit, and also a half share of the lands now in dispute, had informed the learned Judge that these were the terms of the compromise, and had invited him, by reason of such compromise, to dispose of the conclusions of the suit of 1885, their Lordships see no reason to doubt that the order of the learned Judge, if it had referred to or narrated these terms of compromise, would have been judicial evidence, available to the appellant, that the respondents had agreed to transfer to her the moiety of land now in dispute.” Now the compromise of April, 1890, as a whole, was submitted to the learned Judge, he was invited to dispose of the suit on its basis, and he in fact made a decree, in which the compromise is referred to as an exhibit. The case therefore falls entirely within the clear and emphatic words of the judgment just referred to. The case therefore falls entirely within the clear and emphatic words of the judgment just referred to. Our attention has been called to the recent case of Birbhadta Rath v. Kalpataru Panda, [1905] 1 Cal. Law Journal, 388 which appears in some respects to be inconsistent with the opinion of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case last referred to and with our decision in the present case. It is there suggested that if the parties are permitted by compromise to deal with property not the subject-matter of the litigation, they might evade the provisions of the Court-Fees Act, and the Court might, by accepting the compromise in the same case, exceed its jurisdiction. It appears to us that the answer to this objection is that the decree of the Court will be enforceable only as a decree so far as it relates to the subject-matter of the suit. It is impossible to ignore the strong opinion expressed by their Lordships in the case of Pranal Anni v. Lakshmi Anni, [1899] I.L.R., 22 Mad., 508. We therefore hold that under the circumstances of the present case the compromise of the 27th of April, 1890, did not require registration and was admissible in evidence and should have been admitted by the lower appellate Court. It is unnecessary to go into the question of stamp, which has been decided by the lower Court in favour of the appellant. As the lower appellate Court decided the matter on a preliminary point, we allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and remand the case to that Court under section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure for trial on the merits. The appellants will have their costs of this appeal. Other costs will follow the event.