JUDGMENT : Banerji, J.:— The only question in this appeal, which arises out of a suit for pre-emption brought on the basis of a wajib-ul-arz, that of the interpretation to be put on that document. It is difficult to distinguish this case from that of Sheo Balak Singh v. Lachmidhar : [1902] I.L.R., 23 All., 427. Each case must depend on the terms of the particular wajib-ul-arz on which the suit is founded. In this case the purchaser is a co-sharer in the village, but not in the same patti with the vendor. The plaintiff pre-emptor is a co-sharer in the patti. It is for this reason that the plaintiff claims priority over the vendee. The question is whether a right of pre-emption arises under the wajib-ul-arz of the village in question, unless a sale is made to a person who is stranger to the village. The clause in the wajib-ul-arz relating to pre-emption begins with the recital that “for such price as a stranger (shakhs ghair) may pay,” pre-emption may be claimed by the three classes of persons mentioned in the document. 2. The intention, therefore, seems to be that only when the sale is made to a stranger, the right of pre-emption arises. In this respect the provisions of the wajib-ul-arz are different from those of the wajib-ul-arz in the case of Sukhdeo Singh v. Bahadur Singh, reported in the Weekly Notes of 1904, at page 104, and in the other case reported in the foot-note on page 105 : [1904] 1 A.L.J.R., 272, 274. The wajib-ul-arz in each of those cases made no reference to a stranger, but simply provided that the price to be paid by the pre-emptor was to be the same as that paid by any other person, that is to say, by any other purchaser, whether a stranger or not. The use of the word “stranger” in the wajib ul-arz in the present case indicates, as I have already said, that no right of pre-emption could arise unless the sale was to a stranger. The lower appellate Court, therefore, placed a right of interpretation on the wajib-ul-arz, and I dismiss this appeal with costs.