JUDGMENT : Banerji, J.:— The suit which has given rise to this appeal was brought by Muhammad Fasih, plaintiff, for his share of profits against five defendants. One of the questions involved in the suit was whether the profits of sir land should be calculated at the rates of rent paid by tenants-at-will or at the rates paid by ex-proprietary tenants. The Court of first instance decided against the plaintiff upon that point and decreed a part of his claim jointly against all the five defendants. One of these defendants, Abdul Majid, alone appealed, making the plaintiff and the other defendants parties to the appeal. The plaintiff preferred objection under section 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure, disputing the correctness of the decree of the Court of first instance in so far as it related to the principle upon which the profits of sir land were assessed. The lower appellate Court held that the objections were valid, and allowed them, thereby raising the amount of the decree by about Rs. 94. It is contended by the appellant before us that as the plaintiff did not appeal against him he was not competent under section 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure to prefer objections in regard to the decree in so far as it concerned this defendant. 2. The question thus raised is no doubt one of some difficulty. After considering the rulings upon the point which have been laid before us and the arguments addressed to us, we are of opinion that the scope of the section was correctly explained in the following observations of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Bishun Churn Roy v. Jogendra Nath Roy : [1898] I.L.R., 26 Cal. After considering the rulings upon the point which have been laid before us and the arguments addressed to us, we are of opinion that the scope of the section was correctly explained in the following observations of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Bishun Churn Roy v. Jogendra Nath Roy : [1898] I.L.R., 26 Cal. 114,— “As a general rule, the right of a respondent to urge cross-objections should be limited to his urging them against the appellants, and is only by way of exception to this general rule that one respondent may urge cross-objections as against the other respondents, the exception holding good (we do not attempt to lay down any definite exhaustive rule on the point), among other cases, in those in which the appeal of some of the parties opens out questions which cannot be disposed of completely without matters being allowed to be opened up as between co-respondents.” We think the present case is an exception to the general rule, and that the appeal of one of the defendants opened out questions as between the plaintiff and all the defendants, some of whom were the co-respondents of the plaintiff. The Court of first instance had decided the suit upon a ground common to all the defendants. Consequently, under section 544 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the appeal of only one of the defendants, the appellate Court could modify or set aside in favour of all the defendants the decree of the lower court, The whole case was thus opened out in appeal, not only as between the plaintiff and the defendant who had appealed, but also as between the plaintiff and other defendants who had been made respondents apparently because they had not joined in the appeal. Having regard to the nature of the suit and of the decree passed by court of first instance, those defendants were necessary parties to the appeal, and complete justice could not be done without having them before the Court. Under the circumstances of the case they were to all intents and purposes appellants in the lower appellate Court. The objections under section 561 were preferred not only against these other defendants, the co-respondent of the plaintiffs, but also against the appellant. Under the circumstances of the case they were to all intents and purposes appellants in the lower appellate Court. The objections under section 561 were preferred not only against these other defendants, the co-respondent of the plaintiffs, but also against the appellant. As the Court of first instance had made a decree jointly against all the defendants, and, as we have already said, the appellate Court could not do complete justice between all the parties without opening up the whole case, we hold that this is one of the exceptional cases in which the plaintiff-respondent could be allowed to prefer objections under section 561 as against his co-respondents. As the Court on the appeal of one of the defendants could have varied or set aside the decree in favour of all the defendants, it seems to us to be just and equitable that it should also have the power upon objections taken by the plaintiff to vary the decree against all the defendants. This case is similar to the case of Mohamed Ameer v. Prankishore Deb : [1874] 21 W.R., 338. The case of Kallu v. Monni : [1900] I.L.R., 23 All., 93, to which the learned Vakil for the appellant invited our attention, is distinguishable. In our judgment the appeal has no force. Accordingly we dismiss it with costs.