JUDGMENT Mitra, J. - The findings of fact arrived at by the lower Appellate Court are these: That the land in dispute is included within the estate of the Plaintiffs, that the land was unfit for the ordinary purposes of cultivation until the year 1880, that in or about that year the Defendants took possession adversely to the Plaintiffs and they were in possession for seven years. Then they were dispossessed by the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs were in possession for nearly a year. In the meantime a suit under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act was instituted against the Plaintiffs and the Defendants recovered possession. The present suit has been instituted within twelve years from the date when the Plaintiffs were dispossessed in execution of the decree obtained by the Defendants under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. The question arises whether in calculating the period of limitation, twelve years, the period during which the Plaintiffs were in possession by forcibly dispossessing the Defendants should be taken into account. If the possession then obtained by the Plaintiff is possession in the eye of the law, the period of limitation under Art. 142 of the second schedule of the Limitation would begin to run from the date when they were dispossessed by the Defendants through the Court in execution of the decree under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. 2. The learned vakil for the Respondent has drawn my attention to certain decisions of this Court, Golam Nubee v. Bissanath Kar 12 W.R. 9 (1809), Prem Chand Kybutta v. Haridas Kybutta 22 W.R. 259 (1871), Tarabanu v. Abdul Gafur Chowdry 12 C.L.R. 480 (1882), as authorities for the proposition that possession obtained by force followed by dispossession in a proceeding under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act is not possession within the meaning of the Limitation Act. But these were cases under Act XIV of 1859. I have to decide the present case with reference to Art. 142 of the second schedule of the present Limitation Act. I am not therefore bound by the authorities cited by the learned vakil for the Respondent. 3. On the other hand, my attention has been drawn by the learned vakil for the Appellants to the case of Lillu Bin Raghu Sett v. Annaji Paraskram ILR 5 Bom. 387 (1881), and the case of Bandu v. Naba ILR 15 Bom. I am not therefore bound by the authorities cited by the learned vakil for the Respondent. 3. On the other hand, my attention has been drawn by the learned vakil for the Appellants to the case of Lillu Bin Raghu Sett v. Annaji Paraskram ILR 5 Bom. 387 (1881), and the case of Bandu v. Naba ILR 15 Bom. 238 (1890), as authorities for the contrary view and I am disposed to accept the view taken by the Bombay Court, specially on account of certain observations made in the case of The Trustees, Executo's and Agency Company, Limited v. Short L.R. 13 App. Cas. 793. (1888). The possession of a true owner whether such possession is taken forcibly or not, must be considered as rightful possession in law. In the case of The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Krishnamoni Gupta 6 C.W.N. 617: s.c. ILR 29 Cal. 518 (1902), the Judicial Committee adopted the rule laid down in the case of The Trustees, Executors and Agency Company, Limited v. Short L.R. 13 App. Cas. 793. (1888), and came to the conclusion that there could be no constructive possession of a trespasser with reference to a property notwithstanding that such trespasser was in possession before the submergence of the land. 4. In Andrew Lows v. Edward Telford L.R. 1 App. Cas. 414 (1876), the English law on the subject is dealt with and I have no reason to suppose that the law in this country is or ought to be different from that in England. 5. I am, therefore, of opinion that the suit of the Plaintiffs is not barred by limitation and that this appeal should be decreed with costs in all the Courts to the extent of the shares of the Appellants who are now on the record, that is to say, to the extent of a two-thirds share. Maclean, C.J. 6. I think Mr. Justice Mitra is right in this case. When the Plaintiffs' title is once established, his possession however obtained was possession within Art. 142 of the Limitation Act. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed with costs. The cross-appeal must also be dismissed. The point now raised does not seem to have been discussed in the Court below. I think Mr. Justice Mitra is right in this case. When the Plaintiffs' title is once established, his possession however obtained was possession within Art. 142 of the Limitation Act. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed with costs. The cross-appeal must also be dismissed. The point now raised does not seem to have been discussed in the Court below. It is rather a novel one: "you must give the Plaintiffs who are now before the Court a decree for the share of the other Plaintiff who is dead and whose heirs have not been substituted," for their application for substitution was refused as too late--that is what the argument comes to. I do not think that effect can be given to this contention. Pratt, J. I agree.