JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J. :— This is an appeal from an order declaring right of the respondent to get a certificate under the Succession Certificate Act (No. VII of 1889). A preliminary objection has been taken to the hearing of the appeal on the ground that the Court has not made any order granting a certificate, and that therefore no appeal lies under section 19 of the Act. The Court made a conditional order to the effect that if the applicant furnishes security with two sureties in the sum of Rs. 85,000, a certificate will be granted to her to the extent of outstandings mentioned in the schedule attached to the application. 2. The preliminary objection is supported by the ruling of this Court in Bhagwani v. Munni Lal : [1891] I.L.R., 13 All, 214, and Nannhu Mal v. Gulaboo : [1903] I.L.R., 26 All., 173, and there is no ruling of this Court to the contrary. In the case last mentioned, all the rulings on the point were fully considered, and I see no reason to depart from the view adopted in that case. In my opinion the preliminary objection must prevail, no final order granting a certificate having yet been passed, I would accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs. RICHARDS, J.:— This appeal comes before us as appeal under section 19 of Act No. VII of 1889, from an outer of the District Court, granting a certificate under hat Act. The order of the District Court grants the right to obtain a certificate on the applicant furnishing the security mentioned in the order. The order fixes no time within which the security is to be furnished and does not set forth any consequences which are to follow on the failure to security. It occurs to me that this is an order within the meaning of section 19, granting certificate, and were it not for the rulings of this Court just referred to by my brother BANERJI, I would certainly have considered that the order was an order granting a certificate. In my judgment every order granting a certificate under the Act ought to contain as a matter of course a provision that the applicant should give security, and that this provision should only be absent on the Court being supplied with special grounds for dispensing with the giving of such security. In my judgment every order granting a certificate under the Act ought to contain as a matter of course a provision that the applicant should give security, and that this provision should only be absent on the Court being supplied with special grounds for dispensing with the giving of such security. In my opinion the order which the legislature intended to be appealable was the decision of the Court as to who was or was not the proper person to be granted the certificate and not the question whether or not that person should within definite or indefinite period furnished the security. The order appealed from in the present case was a decision that the respondent here was the proper person to be granted a certificate. I should have thought that it would involve a great deal of unnecessary delay and expense if no appeal lay from an order granting certificate subject to security being given until there has been a failure to comply with the condition imposed. The successful applicant may be put to great unnecessary expense in furnishing the security in the event of the appeal being allowed. As, however, the rulings of this Court are binding upon me, I concur in dismissing the appeal. BY THE COURT.— The appeal is dismissed with costs including fees on the higher scale, but not including the costs of translation and printing.