JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - The only question in this appeal is whether or not the plaint discloses any cause of action. It is rather a peculiar case. The Plaintiff's case is that he is a merchant doing a large business in piece-goods in Calcutta, and he has, for the last two years, been in the habit of importing and selling grey shirtings with marks the same as those on his grey shirtings at present detained in the Calcutta Customs House under circumstances which will be presently mentioned. He says that the Defendants import and sell large quantities of grey shirtings bearing certain marks alleged to be those of Messrs. G. and R. Dewhurst &, Co. of Manchester and that the Defendants are interested in putting a stop to the sale of the Plaintiff's grey shirtings; that on the 25th April, 1904, the Plantiff had imported ten bales of grey shirtings, and that the same were then in the Calcutta Customs House in the ordinary course of business. Now comes the paragraph which substantially contains the gravamen of the Plaintiff's case. It is para. 4 of the plaint, which says: "The Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Defendants, on or about the said 25th April, 1904, with intent to injure the Plaintiff, falsely alleged to the Collector of Customs, Calcutta, that the marks on the said grey shirtings were an imitation of Messrs. G. and R. Dewhurst's 5x marks, commonly known as the rupee combination, and applied to him to order the said grey shirtings to be detained pending such legal proceedings as they might take in the matter, and they induced the said Collector, upon giving him their bond of indemnity, to make such an order without giving any notice to the Plaintiff, or giving him an opportunity of showing cause against such order being made." Then is set out a letter, dated 25th April, 1904, addressed to the Plaintiff by the Officiating Collector of Customs, Mr. Morshead, which is in these terms : " Gentlemen,--With reference to your inportation of grey shirtings, I have the honour to inform you that as the marks on these goods are alleged by Messrs. Shaw, Wallace & Co., to be an imitation of Messrs. Morshead, which is in these terms : " Gentlemen,--With reference to your inportation of grey shirtings, I have the honour to inform you that as the marks on these goods are alleged by Messrs. Shaw, Wallace & Co., to be an imitation of Messrs. G. and R, Dewhurst's 5 x, I have ordered the goods to be detained pending such legal proceedings as they may take in the matter, --I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servant, L. F. Morshead, Officiating Collector of Customs." The inference from that letter is that the Collector only intended to detain the goods temporarily pending legal proceedings by the Defendants, Messrs. Shaw, Wallace & Co., to assert their rights. Then I pass to para. 7 of the plaint: "The Plaintiff is further informed and believes that the said Collector was subsequently persuaded and induced by the Defendants, who were then anxious to avoid having the matter decided by any competent Court, to decide the matter himself in the absence of the Plaintiff, that they induced him for the purpose to peruse what purported to be notes by a private shorthand writer of certain proceedings alleged to have been had in the Manchester Police Court against other persons under very different circumstances." Then para. 17 alleges special damage. Although the Plaintiff asks for other relief he asks virtually for damages for the alleged wrongful acts of the Defendants. 2. Do these allegations disclose any cause of action ? We think they do. Upon the authority of such cases as of Ratcliffe v. Evans L. R. (1892) 2 Q. B. 524 and J. White v. G. Mellin I. L. R. (1895) A. C. 154. 3. To enable the Plaintiff to succeed he must show that the statements by the Defendants to the Collector were false malicious, and that he has suffered special damage. It is urged by the Respondents that it is not stated with sufficient precision in para. 4 what is the slander of which the Plaintiff complains, but it is a little difficult to see how he could have stated it more fully than he has done. His allegation was that the Defendants, with intent to injure the Plaintiff, falsely alleged to the Collector of Customs that his marks on the grey shirtings were an imitation of Messrs. G. and R. Dewhurst's mark. His allegation was that the Defendants, with intent to injure the Plaintiff, falsely alleged to the Collector of Customs that his marks on the grey shirtings were an imitation of Messrs. G. and R. Dewhurst's mark. In a case of this class, which is virtually one of slander of title of the Plaintiff's goods, the allegation would appear to be sufficient. It is said that "malice" is not strictly pleaded. The word doubtless is not actually used, but it is undoubtedly to be implied from the allegation that the Defendants were interested in putting a stop to the sale of the Plaintiff's grey shirtings, and that, with intent to injure the Plaintiff, the Defendants falsely alleged to the Collector that the marks were an imitation, and from the allegations in para. 7 of the plaint. But if there were any doubt as to this, I do not think that the suit ought to have been dismissed but that the Plaintiff ought to have been allowed to amend his plaint by specifically pleading malice. It is said, however, that the Plaintiff has himself shown there could have been no malice, as he has pleaded that the Collector found that the marks were a fraudulent imitation. That is true, but at the same time the Plaintiff also pleads that the action of the Collector was illegal, that the inquiry was not a judicial inquiry, and that the finding is of no binding effect as against the Plaintiff. We cannot properly go into this now : that is a matter for the hearing when the question of malice or no malice will have to be decided. I do not propose at this stage to go into the question of the Collector's powers or action. But his position and supposed powers are at least matter for some surprise. All the Plaintiff now says is that his suit should not have been summarily dismissed and asks that he may be allowed to go into evidence and prove his case I think the Plaintiff ought to have an opportunity of doing this, and that, consequently, this appeal must be allowed, and the case must go back for trial on the merits. 4. The costs of this appeal and the costs of the day's hearing before Mr. Justice Harington in the Court of first instance must be paid by the Respondents to the Appellant. 4. The costs of this appeal and the costs of the day's hearing before Mr. Justice Harington in the Court of first instance must be paid by the Respondents to the Appellant. Any costs the Plaintiff has paid must be refunded. Sale, J. 5. I think that the Plaintiff ought to be allowed an opportunity of establishing, if he can, the case made in his plaint on this short ground :--The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants by a false statement maliciously made with the intention of causing his goods to be wrongfully detained, did, in fact, cause those goods to be wrongfully detained by the Customs authority. I think that these allegations constitute a cause of action which, if established, would entitle the Plaintiff to a decree for damages as against the Defendants. If this be not the true view of the case a somewhat remarkable result must follow, because I do not see, nor has it been suggested in argument, how otherwise the Plaintiff can, in any civil action, have the issue determined as between himself and the Defendants whether his (the Plaintiff's) marks are counterfeit as alleged by the Defendants or not. It is true that the Defendants say that there is a finding by the Customs authority, upon this point and that, so long as this finding is not set aside, the Plaintiff is precluded from suing on the present cause of action. The answer seems to me to be two-fold. In the first place, so far as the present cause of action is concerned, I think that no question arises as regards the legality or otherwise of the action of the Customs authority and, in the next place, it is sufficient to say that, if the finding of the Customs authority be not a judicial act, and I am of opinion that it is not, then it is not one which is binding upon the Plaintiff in the sense that any duty is cast upon him to move the higher executive authorities to have it set aside. The Plaintiff has the right of disregarding this finding altogether so far as his civil rights are concerned and may proceed to sue for redress in a Civil Court against such parties as the law holds responsible for the injury done to him. The Plaintiff has the right of disregarding this finding altogether so far as his civil rights are concerned and may proceed to sue for redress in a Civil Court against such parties as the law holds responsible for the injury done to him. For these reasons I agree with the Chief Justice in thinking that this appeal should be allowed. Henderson, J. I also agree in the conclusion that the plaint in this case does disclose a cause of action.