JUDGMENT : Knox, J.:— Hem Nath Rai held a decree against one Sheodan Rai. That decree was of 30th March, 1897. He first put it in execution on 30th March, 1900. Other applications for execution followed, and we come to the present application which was filed on 14th April, 1904. The defendant prayed that the money due under the decree with costs and interest and costs of execution, might be recovered by attachment and sale of certain properties set out in the application. Janki Rai and Tapesri Rai, who are representatives in interest of Sheodan Rai, deceased objected, alleging that on the death of their father they became the owners by succession to his entire ancestral property, and this property-was part of such property, The court of first instance found that the objectors as sons of the judgment-debtor and members of the joint family, became the owners of the property by right of survivorship, There is a further finding that the property now sought to be attached was purchased in the name of the objectors, and it is not shown that it was purchased by the original judgment-debtor, Sheodan Rai, and not by the objectors themselves. The lower appellate Court, without determining the issue which had been raised before it that the property was joint property, struck off the application on the authority of the ruling Koran Singh v. Bhup Singh : [1904] I.L.R., 27 All., 16, I accordingly found it necessary to remit an issue as to whether the property in dispute was joint ancestral property of Janki Rai and Tapesri Rai and of their father, Sheodan Rai. 2. The return to this issue made by the lower appellate Court is to the effect that there is no evidence to show that the property was purchased by father in the name of the sons from joint ancestral funds. The finding is that it is not joint ancestral property of the objectors and their father Sheodan Rai, but the self-acquired property of Sheodan Rai, Objections were taken to this finding on the ground that under the circumstance, viz., that the father and sons were living jointly, it will be presumed that the property in question was joint unless the contrary was proved. Further it was objected that it was for the decree-holder to show that the property in question was the self-acquired property of Sheodan Rai, and that there was no evidence to support the finding of the Court that the property was Sheodan Rai's property. The question on whom the burden of, proof lies in such a case as this has to be judged from observations contained in Mayne's Book on Hindu Law and Usage, 6th edition, 353. Such questions have been very often considered by the Calcutta High Court. No decision of this Court was laid before me. The view of the Calcutta High Court may be and briefly summed up by Mayne in the following words: “To render it joint property, the consideration for its purchase must have proceeded either out of ancestral funds or have been produced out of the joint property, or by joint labour. But neither of these alternatives is matter of legal presumption. It can only be brought to the cognizance of a Court of Justice in the same way as any other fact viz., by evidence. Consequently, whoever's interest it is to establish it, he must be able to produce the evidence.” It was the interest of the respondents to establish that the property was, as stated in their objections, joint ancestral property to which they had succeeded by right of survivorship. Before me an attempt was made to shift the ground and to claim the property as being self-acquired property. In either, case it appears to me that the burden of proof lay on the respondents. No evidence was produced by respondents, and the lower appellate Court has found as a fact that the property is self-acquired property of Sheodan Rai alone. That being the case, as the property has come into possession of the respondents, I hold that the decree of the appellant may be executed against them to the extent of their property. I decree the appeal, set aside the orders of the Courts below, and return the proceedings through the lower appellate Court to the Court of first instance with a view to the execution being carried out according to law. The appellant will get his costs in all Courts.