JUDGMENT : Banerji, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit for pre-emption brought by the respondents upon the basis of a wajib-ul-mz. That document confers the right of preemption among others upon the co-sharers of the village. The plaintiffs claim as such share-holders, The defendant, vendee, who is the appellant before us, on the other hand, asserts that he was in proprietary possession of certain plots of land in the village at the time when he bought the share in dispute, that he is still in possession of these plots; and that he is a co-sharer in the village in the sense of the wajib-ul-arz. He contends that the plaintiffs have no priority of right over him. The Court of first instance found that the defendant vendee was in adverse proprietary possession of certain plots of land in the village, and that consequently he was a co-sharer within the meaning of the wajib-ul-arz. Upon this finding the Court dismissed the plaintiffs claim. The lower appellate Court has reversed the decree of the Court of first instance, being of opinion that as the defendant vendee is not recorded as a co-sharer, and had never paid Government revenue, he could not be regarded as one of the body of co-sharers in the Village who had rights of pre-emption under the Wajib-ul-arz. We think the view taken by the Court below is erroneous. The mere fact that the defendant is not entered in the khewat, does not lead to the necessary inference, that he is not a co-sharer and does not deprive him of his right of pre-emption, if he otherwise has such right. This is the effect of the ruling in Dakhni Din v. Rahim-un-nissa : [1894] I.L.R., 16 All., 412. It was held by the Full Bench in Safdar Ali v. Dost Muhammad : [1889] I.L.R., 12 All., 426, that the owner of isolated plots of land in the village was a co-sharer who had a right of pre-emption. As pointed out in the case of Dakhini Din v. Rahim-un-nissa : [1894] I.L.R., 16 All., 412, a purchaser of isolated plots of land does become res-possible for the revenue assessed for the time being on the mahal, although he had never obtained mutation of names in his own favour. 2. As pointed out in the case of Dakhini Din v. Rahim-un-nissa : [1894] I.L.R., 16 All., 412, a purchaser of isolated plots of land does become res-possible for the revenue assessed for the time being on the mahal, although he had never obtained mutation of names in his own favour. 2. It follows, therefore, from the rulings that if the defendant has acquired proprietary rights in respect of the plots of land of which he is in possession, he would be a co-sharer within the meaning of the wajib-ul-arz, although he has not acquired a definite share of the zemindari of the village. It appears in this case that in 1890 the present plaintiffs applied to the Revenue Court for the ejectment of a tenant of the defendant from the lands of which the defendant is now admittedly in possession. In that case the plaintiff's right was denied, and the Revenue Court held that the defendant was in adverse proprietary possession. It is thus manifest that so far back as 1890 the defendant's title as adverse to that of the plaintiffs was set up. Since then the defendant has been admittedly in possession, so that the defendant has clearly acquired by adverse possession for more than 12 years and indefeasible title to the plots of land of which he has thus been in adverse possession. He has thus become an owner of those plots, and consequently he is a co-sharer in the village, and has as much right to purchase the property in suit as the plaintiffs have. The learned Vakil for the respondents asks us to send down an issue to the Court below to record a finding upon a question as to the nature of the appellant's possession. But as we have already pointed out that upon the admitted facts of the case that possession must be held to be adverse proprietary possession, and as it has extended over a period of more than twelve years, this possession has conferred upon him a proprietary title. Under these circumstances the court of first instance was right in dismissing the plaintiffs suit, and the decree of the lower appellate Court must be set aside. We accordingly allow the appeal, reverse the decree of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the court of first instance with costs in all Courts, including in this. Court fees on the higher scale.