JUDGMENT : Richards, J.:— The plaintiff in this suit was the personal servant of one Lala Prag Das. After his death he continued to be the personal servant of one Musammat Ram Piari, the widow of Prag Das. The widow made a will which contained a clause that the defendant to whom she had devised and bequeathed her property for life, should not have power to dispense with the services of a number of persons, including the plaintiff here, inasmuch as the plaintiff and others had been faithful servants to herself and her deceased husband, and that their dismissal would give pain to the spirits of herself and her husband. The question that has been argued is whether or not this created a trust in favour of the plaintiff. It was admitted here that the plaintiff's contention and claim is that the will created a charge on the life-estate of the defendant, and that it was a trust which ought to be carried into execution by the Court. We may mention in the first instance that the services of the plaintiff were of a purely personal character and were not in any way connected with the property. In the clause in the will there was no reference whatever to the property that was left to the defendant and there certainly is no express trust annexed to the life-estate which was given. There is no gift over or any other penalty imposed upon the defendant in the event of her dispensing with the services of the plaintiff. It seems to us that there was the greatest uncertainty in the subject of the alleged trust. We consider that it is quite repugnant to the absolute life-estate which was given by the will, and farther that if there was a trust, it is one which it is impossible for the Court to carry into execution. 2. It is impossible for the Court to enforce an obligation of personal service. It has not been contended here that the will created a charge on the estate of Rs. 4 per month unless services were actually rendered in return therefore. 2. It is impossible for the Court to enforce an obligation of personal service. It has not been contended here that the will created a charge on the estate of Rs. 4 per month unless services were actually rendered in return therefore. The very fact that the plaintiff was to remain a servant is in our judgment an almost unanswerable argument against our finding that the testatrix intended to create a trust or to do anything more than declare a strong wish and desire that the services of certain servants should, if possible, be retained. As observed in the judgment of Lord Chancellor COTTENHAM in the case of Shaw v. Lawless : [1837] 5 Cl. and F. 129, S.C. 47 R.R. 41, 7 E.R., 353, “all cases upon a subject like this must proceed on a consideration of what was the intention of the testator.” In considering what was the intention of the testator, we cannot lose sight of the fact that it was personal services which were to be retained and not the creation of a pension charged on the property independent of personal service. It is the very essence of personal service that the employer should be at liberty to dispense with the services of the employed. The case to which we have referred is an instructive case upon the question generally. The plaintiff there claimed under the terms of the will of one W. Alexander Shaw which contained the provision desiring the testator's executors to continue the services of the plaintiff, as land agent over the estates devised by the will. The service was directly connected with the property devised and was of a much less personal character, yet it was held that no trust was created. In our opinion the present case in which the plaintiff in merely a menial servant is an a fortiori case for holding that no trust whatever was created. Throughout the argument the learned Vakil for the plaintiff has fairly admitted, that his case was the case of a trust, and that the present suit must be dealt with as such. We accordingly consider that the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court was wrong. We, therefore, reverse it and restore the decree of the Court of first instance with costs in all Courts.