JUDGMENT : BLAIR, J.:— The suit out of which this appeal arises was one brought by the plaintiffs for a declaration of their right and title to certain market dues which they alleged had been leased to them by the Zamindars. The defendants are persons who claim under some similar title. That which is conveyed appears to have been a right to enter temporarily upon certain land upon which a weekly fair was held and to receive the dues which but for the execution of some document of transfer would have been received by the landlords themselves. The transaction between the parties is in the form, as usual, of a patta signed by the Zamindars and Kabuliat by the so-called lessees. The patta was not registered, and the kabuliat was. The defendants objected to the admissibility of the unregistered patta, and contended that inasmuch as that document was unregistered, it transferred nothing, and could not be used as evidence of a transfer. To that contention the court of first instance acceded and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The lower appellate court reversed that decision and remanded the case under Section 562, Code of Civil Procedure, for trial on the merits. It is against that order that the present appeal is brought. 2. On behalf of the appellants it is urged that by virtue of Section 107 of Act No. IV of 1882 and also by dint of Section 17, clause (d), of the Registration Act such a lease could be made only by a registered instrument, the lease being one of immoveable property for a term exceeding one year and reserving a yearly rent. Our attention is called to the definition of immoveable property contained in Section 3 of the Registration Act. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the interest purporting to be transferred by the lease in the present case did not fall within the definition of immoveable property as given in Section 3 of the Registration Act. Our attention is called to the definition of immoveable property contained in Section 3 of the Registration Act. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the interest purporting to be transferred by the lease in the present case did not fall within the definition of immoveable property as given in Section 3 of the Registration Act. Among the classes of property included in that definition is to be found, after the last of the specific classes of property set forth, the general term “any other benefit to arise out of land.” Therefore the principal question we have to consider is whether the right to collect dues upon a given piece of land, the property of the alleged lesser, is a benefit to arise out of land within the purview of Section 3 of the Registration Act. In our opinion the right to collect dues upon a given spot is such a benefit, and therefore we are constrained to find that the document in question purported to convey that which falls within the definition of immoveable property. The so-called lease being an unregistered instrument, it could not effect the transfer and could not be admissible in evidence. We are therefore of opinion that the court of first instance was right. We set aside the order of the lower appellate court and restore the decree of the court of first instance with costs in all Courts.