JUDGMENT 1. It appears chat, in a suit for recovery of possession of certain immoveable property, with mesne profits, the Court before which the suit was brought declared in its judgment that the Plaintiff was entitled to obtain possession of the property with mesne profits as claimed; but in the decree that was drawn up, no mesne profits were allowed, it being confined to an order for recovery of possession of the property. That decree was appealed against to the higher Court and was affirmed by that Court. Subsequently an application was made in the Court of first instance by the Plaintiff decree-holder to amend its decree under sec. 206, C.P.C., so as to bring it into confirmity with the judgment that it had pronounced. That Court allowed the amendment; and added an order to its decree in respect of the mesne profits. The decree-holder subsequently presented an application for execution of the amended decree, and the question was then raised by the judgment-debtors, whether that decree was not ultra vires. The learned Judge of the Court below has held that it was ultra vires, and has accordingly rejected the application for execution for mesne profits. It has been held in certain cases that have been cited by the learned vakils on both sides that, after a decree passed by the original Court has been affirmed on appeal by a higher Court, the decree of that Court becomes the final decree in the suit, and, therefore it would not be competent to the original Court to amend its decree. [See Mahammad Suliman v. Fatima I. L. R. 11 All. 314 (F. B.) (1889), Shiv Lal Kalidas v. Jumak Lal I. L. R. 18 Bom. 542 (1893) and Pichuvayangar v. Seshayyangar I L. R. 18 Mad. 214 (F. B.) (1894)]. And we might mention that, for some years together, it has been the practice, after an application under sec. 206 of the Code for amendment of a decree of the Court of first instance affirmed in appeal had been made to and refused by that Court upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it, for the applicant to move this Court, and this Court has always interfered and amended the decree of the Court of first instance or the Appellate Court, as the case might be. [See, for instance, Uma Sundari v. Hindu Bashinee ILR 24 Cal. [See, for instance, Uma Sundari v. Hindu Bashinee ILR 24 Cal. 759 (1897)]. 2. But, at the same time, it will be observed that the original Court in this case--erroneously though it may be-- did entertain the application for amendment of the decree under sec. 206 of the Code and amended its decree, so as to allow the decree-holder the mesne profits which, under its judgment, he was entitled to. Such amended decree was a decree between the parties within the meaning of the Code and would be binding between them, unless and until it be set aside on appeal. 3. Our attention has, however, been called to certain cases, in which it has been held that an appeal does not lie against an order under sec. 206. No doubt, such an order, not being an order specified in sec. 588 of the Code, is not appealable, but it does not follow from this that an appeal does not lie against the decree as amended. That would be a new decree in the suit, and as such would, we are disposed to think, be appealable. (See in this connection, Kali Prosonno Basu Roy v. Lal Mohun Guha Roy ILR 25 Cal. 258 (1897), Joy Kishen v. Ataoor Rahaman ILR 6 Cal. 22 (1880), Gullock Chunder Mussant v. Ganga Narain 20 W. R. 111 (1873) and the cases cited therein. But supposing that the amended decree was not appealable, it was certainly open to the judgment-debtor to apply to this Court under sec. 622 of the Code to set aside the order of the original Court upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction to make it. There was, in any view of the matter,--a remedy open to the judgment-debtor and he did not avail himself of it, but rather left the amended decree unquestioned. And in these circumstances, we think that it was not open to him to challenge the validity of the decree in the proceedings for execution of the decree upon the ground that the original Court had no jurisdiction to make the amendment. 4. For these reasons, we set aside the order of the Court of Appeal below and send back the case for the trial of the other questions raised in the case. Costs will abide the result which we assess at 3 gold mohurs.