JUDGMENT 1. The question raised in this case is whether the application that was presented by the decree-holder on the 24th November 1903 for execution of his decree is barred by the Law of Limitation. The decree was pronounced on the 5th April 1897. An application was made For execution of this decree on the 6th September 1900, and it appears that certain moneys having been realised by sale of properties belonging to the judgment-debtor, it was found that the decree-holder was entitled to RS. 32-10-3 upon rateable distribution between him and some other decree-holders who had also taken out execution against the same judgment-debtor; and the Court made the following order on the 26th November 1900:--"The decree-holder will get Rs. 32-10-3 from the sale-proceeds of the execution case No. 103 of 1899. The application is dismissed in part satisfaction." Subsequently, an application was presented by the decree-holder for the withdrawal of this money, on the 31st January 1901; and it was presented according to the form prescribed by the rules of this Court to be found in the General Rules and Circular Orders, Civil, Vol. I, p. 163, "Consolidated Account Rules, (Judicial)." Upon such application being presented, an order was made on the 5th February 1901, allowing the decree holder to withdraw the money in question. Subsequently, as we have already indicated, the present application was presented on the 21th November 1903. The question raised before us is whether the application that was made for withdrawal of the money on the 31st January 1901 was an application within the meaning of Art. 179 of Sch. II of the Indian Limitation Act--an application to take some step in aid of execution. This question was considered in several cases in this Court, notably in Hem Chunder Chowdhry v. Brojo Sundory Debee I. L. R. 8 Cal. 89 (1881), Fazal Imam v. Metta Singh I. L. R. 10 Cat 549 (1884), Gunga Pershad Bhoomik v. Debi Sundari Debea I. L. R. 11 Cal. 227 (1885), Ananda mohun Roy v. Hara Sundari I. L. R. 23 Cal. 196 (1895) and in Baij Nautk Prosad v. Ghanshyam Dass 8 C. W. N, 382 (1904). And these cases are against the view contended for by the learned vakil for the decree-holder. 2. 227 (1885), Ananda mohun Roy v. Hara Sundari I. L. R. 23 Cal. 196 (1895) and in Baij Nautk Prosad v. Ghanshyam Dass 8 C. W. N, 382 (1904). And these cases are against the view contended for by the learned vakil for the decree-holder. 2. It will be observed that the application that was made by the decree-holder on the 31st January 1901 was simply for an order ministerial, allowing the decree-holder to withdraw the money, which it bad already been determined he was entitled to have as part satisfaction of his decree, and not for a judicial order for the passing of which the Court which had charge of the execution of the decree, would be called upon to exercise its judicial mind. If the cases to which we have referred have been correctly decided--and we have no reason to doubt that they have been the application that was made by the decree-holder for withdrawal of the money could not be regarded as an application with a view to take some step in aid of execution of the decree. Indeed, the execution of the decree, so far as it was sought to be had upon the application on which the order of 26th September 1900 was made, was completed; nothing further was left to be done, and the Court ordered the application to be dismissed, as upon part satisfaction. We are of opinion that the application that was made on the 31st January 1991 could not properly be regarded as an application to take some step in aid of the execution which terminated with the order of the 26th November 1900. 3. The learned vakil for the Appellant-however, has contended that the application for withdrawal of the money was an application in accordance with the rules of the Court, that these rules have the force of law and that, therefore, it should be regarded as one within the meaning of Art. 179 of the Limitation Act. 4. Whether the rules that have been promulgated by this Court on the subject have the force of law, it is not necessary to determine in the present case. 4. Whether the rules that have been promulgated by this Court on the subject have the force of law, it is not necessary to determine in the present case. It is sufficient for us to say, looking at the rules themselves, that the application for the withdrawal of such money is to be made to the chief ministerial officer of the Court under whose order the money was deposited, and such ministerial officer is directed to examine whether the applicant is entitled to have the money. After such examination he submits it to the accountant, and the latter officer under Rule 41, submits the application to the Judge in charge of the account department, who makes the order accordingly. It is noteworthy that the application in question is not to be submitted for orders to the Court which has charge of the execution of the decree, though no doubt it is to be submitted in the first instance to the chief ministerial officer of that Court. Obviously therefore the Court which has charge of the execution of the decree in question is not called upon to exercise its mind on the subject-matter of the application or to make any order in relation thereto. That being so, we are of opinion that though an application for withdrawal of money standing to the credit of a decree-holder has to be made in accordance with the rule prescribed by this Court, yet it is simply for an order ministerial, and not judicial; and in this view of the matter, there is no reason to differ from the decisions to which we have already referred. 5. Our attention has also been drawn to another case, Sariatoolla Molla v. Raj Kumar Ray I. L. R. 27 cal. 709 (1900), and it has been argued by the learned vakil for the Respondent that the principle underlying that case equally applies to the facts of the present case. That case, we observe, was considered in Bay Nauth Prosad v. Ghanshyam Dass 8 C. W. N. 382 (1904). to which we have already referred, and we need hardly say that the facts of the present case are distinguishable from those of the case referred to. 6. The learned Judge of the Court below, we observe, has expressed the opinion that the case of Baij Nauth Prosad v. Ghanshyam Dass 8 C. W. N. 382 (1901). to which we have already referred, and we need hardly say that the facts of the present case are distinguishable from those of the case referred to. 6. The learned Judge of the Court below, we observe, has expressed the opinion that the case of Baij Nauth Prosad v. Ghanshyam Dass 8 C. W. N. 382 (1901). is a clear authority in support of the contention of the decree holder, but on looking at that case carefully, we are of a different opinion; for it will be found upon examination that the order that was then applied for was not a ministerial but a judicial order, determining the claims of the rival decree-holder, and therefore the application that then came before the Court for consideration was regarded as an application to take some step in aid of execution of the decree. 7. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the order of the Court below cannot be supported; it must be set aside, and this appeal allowed. In the circumstances of the case, we allow no costs.