JUDGMENT : Banerji, J.:— The facts of this case are fully set forth in the judgment of the Court below. They are briefly these:— The appellant, who is the land-holder, obtained an order from the Rent Court under Act No. XII of 1881, for the ejectment of the respondent. As the latter had growing crops on the land, the land-holder elected to purchase the crops; a dispute having arisen as to the amount payable, an application was made under section 42 of that Act. Whilst this application was pending, the Agra Tenancy Act (No. II of 1901) came into force. The enforcement of that Act, however, did not affect the pending proceedings. The Revenue Court accordingly enquired into the matter, and the Assistant Collector, before whom the case was pending, made a decree awarding to the tenant a certain amount as the price of the crops. He apparently thought that section 76 of the new Act was applicable. The land-holder appealed, and thereupon the Collector remanded the case to the Court of first instance, directing that Court to assess the rent payable by the tenant for the period during which he used the land for the purpose of tending and gathering the crops and to make an award as provided by section 42 of Act No. XII of 1881. After the case had been remanded to the Assistant Collector, the landholder made an application to the Collector, withdrawing his application under section 42, and his offer to purchase the crops. This was apparently after the crops had become useless to the tenant. The application was forwarded to the Tahsildar, who was the officer in whose Court the proceedings were pending. But the land-holder, the appellant here, did not appear before the Tahsildar, and accordingly the application was ignored. That officer, on the 5th of April, made an award under section 42 of Act No. XII of 1881, by which he awarded to the tenant a sum of Rs. 318-13-6. Under the provisions of clause (c), section 42, the amount of the award was recoverable as an arrear of rent by suit under the Act, Accordingly the present suit was brought to recover the amount awarded. As I have already said, Act No. II of 1901 had come into force when the award was made. 318-13-6. Under the provisions of clause (c), section 42, the amount of the award was recoverable as an arrear of rent by suit under the Act, Accordingly the present suit was brought to recover the amount awarded. As I have already said, Act No. II of 1901 had come into force when the award was made. Under section 76, sub-section (2) of that Act, the Court, instead of making an award enforceable by suit as under the old Act, is empowered to pass a decree for the payment of the amount awarded. The appellant accordingly objected to the suit in the Court below on the ground that it was not maintainable, Both the Courts below have over-ruled the objection and decreed the claim. The same objection has been renewed in this appeal. 2. I think the Court below was right in treating the proceedings in the suit as continuation of the proceedings commenced under section 42 of Act No. XII of 1881. Having regard to the provisions of section 76, the award made under section 42 of the old Act, must be deemed to be a decree under section 76 of the new Act. That decree would be enforceable by execution. Therefore the present suit may be properly treated as an application to enforce this decree. This has been allowed in cases to which section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies. Procedure relating to the execution of decrees by the Revenue Court must, having regard to the pro visions of section 193 of Act No. II of 1902, be deemed to be the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Therefore the present suit may properly be regarded as an application for execution, Further it may also be regarded, as I have already said, as a continuation of the proceedings commenced under section 42 of Act No. XII of 1881. In either view the respondent was entitled to recover the amount claimed. If the contention of the learned Vakil for the appellant were correct, the result would be that had the award been made one day before the date on which Act No. 11 of 1901 came into force, the persons in whose favour the award was made would be without any remedy for the purpose of reaping the fruit of the award. This certainly could not have been contemplated by the legislature. I think the Court below was right, and I dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees on the higher scale.