JUDGMENT : Stanley, J.:— The property which is the subject-matter of this appeal formerly belonged to the late Nawab Muzaffar Husain Khan. He died in or about the year 1875, and after his death, namely, on the 17th of November, 1875, his heirs' entered into an agreement in regard to the possession and enjoyment of his property. In that agreement there was a clause to the effect that as the heirs wished to perpetuate the name of their ancestor and protect his estate, none of them should thereafter have a right to claim partition or separation. It went further and prohibited any future transfer by the parties of their interest. The present litigation has arisen out of an application in the Revenue Court for partition of this property. An objection was raised by the present appellants to the partition on the ground that the applicants for partition, who are the grand-daughters of Nawab Muzaffar Husain Khan, were precluded by the clause in the family agreement to which we have referred from effecting a partition. The Assistant Collector before whom the partition proceedings came, decided against this objection., An appeal was thereupon preferred to the learned District Judge, who upheld the view of the Assistant Collector, deciding that though the original parties to the agreement of 1875 might have been bound inter se by the covenant against partition, their heirs were certainly not so bound. We entirely agree with the learned District Judge and the Assistant Collector in this view. We are not aware of any authority for the proposition that an owner of land can allow his property to descend to his heirs and yet in his life-time by any act of his, restrict his heirs in the enjoyment of the property by partition or otherwise. No such authority has been quoted to us, and it appears to us to be repugnant to public policy and to be inconsistent with all the authorities dealing with restrictions upon the proprietorship of land. The learned counsel for the appellant, indeed, has not been able to support his argument on this point, On this ground of appeal the appeal fails. 2. Another ground, however, has been pressed before us, and that is that no question of proprietary title was raised-before the Assistant Collector, and that therefore the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal which was preferred to it. 2. Another ground, however, has been pressed before us, and that is that no question of proprietary title was raised-before the Assistant Collector, and that therefore the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal which was preferred to it. In the place, we may point out that the appellants were responsible for the appeal to the Civil Court. This, however, would perhaps be no answer to the appeal, in as much as consent will not confer jurisdiction. There is, however, another answer, namely, that a question of proprietary right is raised in the objection which was field before the Assistant Collector. 3. The objectors, though admitting the proprietary title of the opposite parties, allege that they are not entitled to the enjoyment of one of the rights of proprietors, namely, the right of partition. They seek to cut down their full proprietary right by enforcement of the clause in the agreement of 1875, to which we have referred before. The objection, therefore, it appears to us does raise a question of proprietary right within the meaning of section 113 of the Land Revenue Act (Act No. XIX of 1873). For these reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs, including fees on the higher scale. 4. Let the record be immediately returned to the Court of the Assistant Collector.