JUDGMENT : Banerji, J.:— This appeal arises out of an application for the execution of a decree for sale passed against the appellant under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act on the 23rd of August, 1897, and subsequently made absolute under section 89 on the 13th of December, 1902. The appellant was a minor at the date of the suit and was made a party to it under the guardianship of his mother. He is the legal representative of the original mortgagor. The decree made by the Court of first instance was affirmed by this Court on the nth of January, 1900. An application for an order absolute was made on the 21st of November, 1902. The appellant was described in it as a minor under the guardianship of his mother who apparently had died before that date. The Court issued a notice under section 248 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but it was not served. The Court, however, made an order making the decree under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act absolute. The present application was made for the execution of the decree on the 6th September, 1904. There was a previous application for execution, which was infructuous, but it is not necessary to refer to it in this case. 2. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that he was of age when the order under section 90 of the Transfer of Property Art was made, that he was not properly represented in the proceedings under that section, and that as no notice of those proceedings was served upon him, the order obsolute is not binding on him, and the decree is incapable of execution. The argument by which this contention was supported is this: According to the ruling of the Full Bench in Oudh Beharilall v. Negeshar Prasad : [1889] I.L.R., 13 All., 278, proceedings for an order obsolute are proceedings in execution; consequently the Court was bound to issue a notice under section 248 of the Civil Procedure Code. As such a notice was not served on the appellant, judgment-debtor, all proceedings connected with the application for the order obsolute were ab initio void, and the order itself is therefore void. Reliance is placed on the rulings, Imam-un-nissa v. Liakat Husain : [1881] I.L.R., 3 All., 424; Sahdeo Pandey v. Ghasi Ram : [1893] I.L.R., 91 Cal., 19. As such a notice was not served on the appellant, judgment-debtor, all proceedings connected with the application for the order obsolute were ab initio void, and the order itself is therefore void. Reliance is placed on the rulings, Imam-un-nissa v. Liakat Husain : [1881] I.L.R., 3 All., 424; Sahdeo Pandey v. Ghasi Ram : [1893] I.L.R., 91 Cal., 19. Those were cases in which after the sale of property in execution of a decree the judgment-debtor applied to have the sale set aside on the ground that notice of the application for execution had not been issued under the provisions of section 248 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the sales were set aside, the Court holding that the proceedings in execution were void ad initio. It seems to us to be doubtful whether under the ruling of the Privy Council in Tasaddnk Rasul v. Ahmad Husain : [1893] I.L.R., 21 Cal., 65. [Cf also Malkarjun v. Narhari, I.L.R., 25 Bom., 337, P.C. Ed.], non-compliance with the requirements of section 248 can be regarded as anything more than a mere irregularity. 3. We think, however, that the rulings could have no application to the present case, and the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant is not well-founded. He was a party to the suit in which the decree under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act was passed and was fully represented in it. The validity of that decree is not and cannot be questioned by him. The order under section 89 makes that decree, which was a decree nisi, absolute. So long as the order absolute subsists, it is enforceable, and its operation cannot be impugned. If for any reason the order is defective, the remedy of the appellant is, we think, to get it set aside in accordance with law. But until it is set aside, the decree which it makes absolute is capable of enforcement, and its validity cannot be questioned in execution proceedings. It is conceded by the learned Vakil for the appellant that if a decree is passed in a suit in which the defendant was not properly represented or was not served with a summons, the defendant cannot object to the execution of the decree on any of these grounds, so long as the decree stands good. It is conceded by the learned Vakil for the appellant that if a decree is passed in a suit in which the defendant was not properly represented or was not served with a summons, the defendant cannot object to the execution of the decree on any of these grounds, so long as the decree stands good. We can see no distinction between a case of this kind and the present case. As the order absolute in this case was passed against the appellant and is a subsisting order, the decree-holder is entitled to execute the decree which has been made absolute by that order. The present application for execution having been made within 3 years of the date of the order absolute, no question of limitation arises. In our judgment the appeal has no force. We accordingly dismiss it with costs.