JUDGMENT : Banerji, J.:— The suit, which has given rise to this appeal, relates to the estate of one Lekhraj, a Hindu, governed by Mitakshara law. The appellant has been found by the Court below to be the daughter of a predeceased son of Lekhraj. The first respondent, Gauri Shankar, is the son of Lekhraj's father's sister; the other respondent are her grandsons, being the sons of another son now deceased. These persons are admittedly bandhus of Lekhraj and claimed his estate as such. The Courts below have decreed their claim. The only question raised in this appeal is whether the respondents have a right to the estate of Lekhraj preferential to that of the appellant, the daughter of his son. 2. The father's sister's son is enumerated in the Mitakshara, Chapter II, Section VI, as the first among the nine descriptions of bandhus mentioned in it. As the first plaintiff, Gauri Shankar, and Mansa Ram, the father of the other plaintiffs, survived Lekhraj, they were entitled to succeed to him as bandhus in the absence of preferential heirs. It is claimed on behalf of the appellant that she is a preferential heir. Being the daughter of the son of Lekhraj, she is the daughter of a gotraja sapinda, and would be a sapinda of the deceased in the sense in which that term is understood in the Mitakshara. As however, she is married and has thus passed into another gotra, she would be a bhinna gotra sapinda and therefore a bandhu. It is contended that as she is nearer in propinquity to the deceased, she, as bandhu, has a superior claim to his estate, according to the text of Manu, “to the nearest sapinda the inheritance next belongs.” The question of the order of succession among bandhus of each class is not free from difficulty. 3. But we are not called upon to decide that question in this case, inasmuch as, according to the view of the law on the subject of succession by females as held in Upper India, none but females expressly named in the Mitakshara can inherit. The question was fully considered by this Court in Gauri Sahai v. Rukko : [1880] I.L.R., 3 All., 64. The question was fully considered by this Court in Gauri Sahai v. Rukko : [1880] I.L.R., 3 All., 64. The learned Judges after referring to almost all the authorities on the subject, came to the conclusion that “looking to the received interpretation of the law and the customary law prevalent in this part of India, none but females expressly named as heirs can inherit.” They accordingly held that the widow of the paternal uncle of a deceased Hindu, not being expressly named, is not entitled to succeed to his estate. This decision was approved by a Full Bench of the whole Court in Jagat Narain v. Sheo Das : [1883] I.L.R., 5 All., 311, which held that the sister of a deceased Hindu, not being, expressly named in the Mitakshara, is not his heir. Following these rulings it was held by EDGE, C.J., and BURKITT, J., in Rama Nand v. Surgiani : [1894] I.L.R., 16 All., 221, that a step-mother cannot for the same reason inherit from her deceased step-son. The Calcutta High Court also in Anandn Bibi v. Nownit Lal : [1882] I.L.R., 9 Cal., 315 expressed the opinion that women are not entitled to inherit under the Benares School unless especially mentioned as heirs, and held that a daughter-in-law not being so mentioned, is not the heir to her father-in-law. The only case in Upper India in which a female not expressly mentioned in the Mitakshara was declared to have the right to inherit is, as far as I am aware, the case of Bansidhar v. Ganeshi : 1900] I.L.R., 22 All., 338, in which BURKITT and HENDERSON, JJ., held that a daughter's daughter is heir to her maternal grandfather. The learned Judges say in their judgment, “we think it is clear on the authorities which have been quoted before us, and the learned Vakil for the appellant at the end of the arguments on the other side was forced to admit, that in the absence of preferential male heirs the plaintiff Ganeshi is heir to her maternal grandfather.” 4. It does not appear from the report what the authorities were Which were cited before the learned Judges, but it is manifest that their attention was not drawn to the decision of this Court to which we have referred. It does not appear from the report what the authorities were Which were cited before the learned Judges, but it is manifest that their attention was not drawn to the decision of this Court to which we have referred. Probably the rulings of the Madras High Court, to which we shall presently refer, were the authorities cited before them. 5. The Mitakshara itself is silent as to the right of inheritance of females not expressly mentioned in it, but the Viramitrodaya by Mitra Misra, which is an authority of great weight in the Benares School and which, as held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Gridhari Lall Roy v. The Bengal Government : [1868] 12 M.I.A., 448, at 466, is properly receivable as an exposition of what may have been left doubtful by the Mitakshara and declaratory of the law of the “Benares School,” negatives in clear term the right of inheritance of such females. The learned author says:— As for the text of Surti, namely, ‘therefore women are devoid of the senses (anindrya) and incompetent to inherit’—and for the text of Manu based upon it, namely, ‘Indeed, the rule is that women are always devoid of the senses and incompetent to inherit;’—These are both to be interpreted to refer to those women whose right of inheritance has not been expressly declared. Hardatta also has explained (these texts) in this very way, in his commentary on the Institutes of Gautama called Mitakshara. But some (commentators)’ say that the term ‘incompetent to inherit, implies censure only by reason of its association with the term, devoid of the senses.’ This is not tenable, because it cannot but be admitted that the portion, namely, ‘ incompetent to inherit,’ is prohibitory and not condemnatory. (Gopal Chandra Sarkar's Translation, on page 174.) The same is the view of the author of the Smriti Chandrika and other Hindu commentators, and of such European text-writers as Sir Thomas Strange, the two Macnaghtens and Mr. Mayne, The only Hindu commentator, who supports the right of inheritance of the daughters of all male sapindas and of the daughter's daughter and sister's daughter is Balam Bhatta (see Sarvadhicari's Tagore Law Lectures, p. 663), but as the learned writer was herself a woman (her real name being Lakshmi Devi), it is but natural that she would advocate the right of all women. The reason she advances for her view, namely, that the male gender everywhere includes the female gender, has long been discarded. Apart, however, from the authority of text-writers, we feel ourselves bound by the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Jagat Narain v. Sheo Das : [1883] I.L.R., 5 All, 311, and must hold in accordance with that decision that females not expressly named in the Mitakshara do not inherit, and as the son's daughter is not so named, she is not the heir to her grandfather. This was expressly ruled by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Koomu Chunder Roy v. Seetaknnth Roy, [1893] W.R., Sp., No. F.B., 75 where it was held that according to the Mitakshara law a daughter's daughter or a son's daughter does, not inherit. In the face of these Full Bench rulings and for the reasons already stated, we do not feel ourselves justified in enlarging the list of female heirs, as was done in Bansidhar v. Ganeshi, [1900] I.L.R., 22 All., 338. 6. The Madras High Court held in Nallanna v. Ponnal, [1890] I.L.R., 14 Mad., 149, that a son's daughter is entitled to inherit to her grandfather as a banditti in the absence of preferential male heirs, and this decision was arrived at on the ground that a sister had been held by that Court to be an heir as bandhu. Following this ruling it was held by same Court in Ramappa Udayan v. Arumngath Udayan, [1893] I.L.R., 17 Mad., 182, that a daughter's daughter succeeds as bandhu. 7. This Court has, however, held in the Full Bench case to which we have already referred, that a sister is not an heir under the Mitakshaia law. The basis of the decision of the Madras Court in the cases mentioned being therefore an untenable basis, so far as these Provinces are concerned, these cases cannot be regarded as authorities in support of the appellant's claim. Further, even if it be conceded that the son's daughter is an heir as bandhu, the appellant in this case would, according to the rulings of the Madras High Court itself, be excluded by the plaintiffs who are made bandhus. See Lakshmanammal v. Tiruvengada, [1882] I.L.R., 5 Mad, 241, and Narasimma v. Mangammal, [1889] I.L.R., 13 Mad., 10. Further, even if it be conceded that the son's daughter is an heir as bandhu, the appellant in this case would, according to the rulings of the Madras High Court itself, be excluded by the plaintiffs who are made bandhus. See Lakshmanammal v. Tiruvengada, [1882] I.L.R., 5 Mad, 241, and Narasimma v. Mangammal, [1889] I.L.R., 13 Mad., 10. In the case last mentioned, SHEPHERD, J., expressed the opinion that “the enumeration of bandhus, although not exhaustive, includes no females,” and the same appears to have been the view of MITTER, J., in Ananda Bibi v. Nownit Lal, [1882] I.L.R., 9 Cal., 315 at 321, Holding the view that we do, we do not deem it necessary to decide this question. 8. For the reasons stated above, the appellant has no title superior to that of the respondents and her appeal must fail. We accordingly dismiss it with costs, including fees on the higher scale.