JUDGMENT : Richards, J.:— This is an application by way of revision of the order of Joint Magistrate of Bareilly affirmed by the Sessions Judge on the 12th of May, 1905. The application to the Joint Magistrate was an application to stay certain proceedings against the accused or to make such other order as under the circum stances he should think. The circumstances of the case are little peculiar. It appears that Inam-ulla, the applicant before us, was a zamindar who had certain disputes with some of his tenants. Six documents (bonds) were drawn up by which ten tenants acknowledged themselves liable to Tajammul Husain a servant of Inam-ullah. Five of these documents became the subject-matter of a prosecution under section 467, read with section 114, Penal Code, 1860. 2. It was alleged as the case for the prosecution in that case that Inam-ulla instigated the fabrication of these six documents, and that the name of his servant, Tajammul Husain, was merely used as a device to save himself and divert suspicion. There were a number of other persons charged with the commission of the offence of forgery and abetment of forgery of these documents. At the trial charges in respect of five out of the six documents were framed—three against Inam-ulla and two against one Maqbul Husain. This trial resulted in the conviction of all the persons accused, including Inam-ulla, It is quite clear that throughout the prosecution, the accused, and the Judge treated the offences as being all one simple transaction, as in fact they were. The Court dealt with the whole six documents. The evidence for the prosecution clearly shows that the whole six documents were in fact fabricated at one and the same time. (The accused were sentenced as one for a single offence). 3. The decision of the Sessions Judge convicting the accused came up on appeal to the High Court, and there again it is quite clear from the judgment of the learned Judge that he (without any objection being taken) dealt with the whole case and all the six documents as involving and being one single transaction. He, however, after consideration of the evidence, allowed the appeal of Inam-ulla and acquitted him of the offences with which he had been charged and of which he had been convicted by the Sessions Judge. He, however, after consideration of the evidence, allowed the appeal of Inam-ulla and acquitted him of the offences with which he had been charged and of which he had been convicted by the Sessions Judge. A prosecution has now been instituted against Inam-ulla for a like offence, the only difference being that he is charged in respect of the particular documents which were not included in the charges framed in the previous trial. It was on the institution of this last mentioned prosecution that the application for this discontinuance of the proceedings was made to the Joint Magistrate, and it is the order on this application which the appellant now asks us to revise. 4. Mr. Ross Alston who appears for the applicant, has argued two points. He says in the first instance that under section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant is not liable to be tried again, he having been tried an acquitted in the previous trial. The second part of his argument is that if section 403 does not apply, owing to the technical fact that no charges were framed at the previous trial in respect of the three documents in respect of which he is now being prosecuted, he is nevertheless entirely within the spirit and principle involved and set forth in section 403, and accordingly he asks us that in the exercise of the powers conferred on the High Court under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court should carry out the principle of section 403 and prevent what is in effect a second trial of the applicant for the same offences. Having regard to the fact that the applicant might have been tried in respect of all these documents in the one trial and that charges were not framed in respect of all these documents under section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we consider that applicant is certainly technically liable to be tried a second time and cannot plead in bar of the present prosecution that he has already been acquitted. Section 403, sub-section (2), as pointed out in the course of the argument, provides that “a person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial under section 235, sub-section (1).” On the second point of Mr. Alston's argument we agree with him that the fabrication of all these documents, as alleged by the prosecution, was in fact one single transaction. We are also satisfied that the Judge, the prosecution, and the accused in the previous trial treated the matter as one transaction. If it were necessary, we could refer to a number of passages in the judgment from which this clearly appears. It is sufficient to refer to the order of the Sessions Judge where he sentences Inam-ulla to ten years in respect of the three charges that were then framed. This being so, and it, being conceded that if charges had been framed in respect of all the six documents in the first trial, no second trial could have taken place, we think that no second trial should now take place, notwithstanding that there is no legal bar. The power under section 439 ought no doubt to be exercised by this Court with great care, and certainly with regard to pending trials it is only in most exceptional cases that the power should be exercised. However, in the present case, if we are to exercise our powers at all, we should do so at once, and we accordingly think that under all the circumstances of this case we should now order that no further proceedings shall be taken. 5. We accordingly set aside the order of the Joint Magistrate and the Sessions Judge of which the applicant complains and direct that the prosecution now pending against the applicant shall be discontinued. If the applicant is on bail, his bail shall be discharged.