JUDGMENT : BLAIR, J.:— The appeal now before us arises out of proceedings in which the court of first instance had passed a decree in terms of an award. The arbitration which terminated in the award was one made by the order of the court : The court, as we gather from the judgment meant to specify the date, to wit, the 6th of January, 1904, as the last date for the making and delivery of the award. The award was made on the 6th of January in the sense that it was completed and signed by the arbitrators on the 6th. But it was not handed to the court until the 7th. The court of first instance passed judgment according to the award. The court of first appeal held that the award was invalid not having been delivered on the 6th of January or earlier set aside the decree of the court of first instance, and passed an order of remand with directions to the court of first instance to try the case on the merits. It is contended in this appeal that the filing of the award beyond time was immaterial so long as the award was made and signed and published on the date specified as the last date for that purpose. Our attention has been called to the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure bearing upon this matter. The variation in the language used in these sections raises some difficulty as to the true intent and meaning of the statute, Section 508, which gives the court power to refer a matter to arbitration says that the court “shall fix such time as it thinks reasonable for the delivery of the award.” Section 514 provides that if the “arbitrator cannot complete the award within the period specified in the order, the court may, if it thinks fit, grant a further time, and from lime to time enlarge the period for the delivery of the award.” There apparently the completion and delivery of the award are not-distinguished one from the other, Section 516 provides that “when an award in a suit has been made, the persons who made it shall sign it and cause it to be filed in court.” We have here three steps — the making, the signing and the.filing. 2. 2. Obviously the word made is used in the untechnical sense, because the award cannot be considered as made unless it is authenticated by the signature of the person who made it. Made means that the mind of the arbitrator has been declared and such declaration requires authentication by signature. Section 521 seems to us to be the section which governs the case before us. It provides that no award shall be set aside except on one of the grounds mentioned in the section, one being that the award was made after the issue by the court of an order superseding the arbitration. It is manifest that the word made used here does not mean delivery, because making and delivery indicate different stages. The section further provides that “no award shall be valid unless made within the period allowed by the court.” It seems to us that that is the governing section applicable to this case. The validity of the award depends upon the making of it within the period allowed and it is immaterial on what date it was filed. The same view has been taken by the Madras High Court in Arumugam Chetti v. Arunachalam Chetti, [1898] I.L.R., 22 Mad., 22. and the Bombay High Court in Umersey Premji v. Shamji Kanji, [1888] I.L.R., 13 Bom., 119.. A case in some respects similar was decided by a Bench of this Court, Behari Das v. Kalian Das,. [1886] I.L.R., 8 All., 543.. In that case it was held that the award made in the case was invalid, and the opinion was expressed that “the rule that no award shall be valid unless made within the period fixed by court is equivalent to a rule that the award must be delivered within that period.” From that opinion we feel bound to differ. We think that the Madras and Bombay Courts were right in the conclusion at which they arrived. That conclusion is in accordance with the judgment of the Privy Council in Raja Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar, [1891] I.L.R., 13 All., 300, P.C.. We think that the Madras and Bombay Courts were right in the conclusion at which they arrived. That conclusion is in accordance with the judgment of the Privy Council in Raja Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar, [1891] I.L.R., 13 All., 300, P.C.. In the case reported in I.L.R., 8 All, 543, it was unnecessary for the court to rule upon the question whether an award made within time is invalidated by a late filing of it, because in that case the award had not been made by all the arbitrators within the time limited by the order. The court below was wrong. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the court below, and restore the decree of the court of first instance with costs in all courts.