JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - I do not think that we can properly, or usefully, proceed with this reference. The question whether, in any particular case, the notification sufficiently specifies the estates or shares of estates to be sold must, I think, depend upon the terms of the notification in such case. All I can say is that the estate or share must be specified : that is what the Act says. 2. As regards the other question whether, when there has been an irregularity in publishing or conducting a sale under Act XI of 1859, the inadequacy of price may be inferred to be the result of such irregularity, there can, I should say, be no question in the face of the decisions of the Judicial Committee. The connection must be established by evidence, but I do not see how, upon a reference like the present, we can lay down any rule as to the amount or nature of the evidence. Each case must depend upon its own circumstances. 3. The case will be remitted to the Division Bench for decision. Ghose, J. 4. I agree with my Lord in the observations he has made upon this reference. There is, however, one word that I should desire to say with reference to the two cases mentioned in the second question submitted to the Full Bench. Those cases simply lay down that the specification of the estate or share of the estate, as the case may be, should be such as to inform intending purchasers what may be the precise property that is to be sold. And it was held, with reference to the facts and circumstances of those cases that the specification of the share as given in the sale-notification was not sufficient. Rampini, J. 5. As this second appeal is to be returned to the referring Bench for disposal, I say nothing in respect of the first question propounded for our decision. 6. As I read the decisions in the cases referred to in the second question put to us, they lay down a general rule, viz., that " merely advertising that the 'residue' of an estate is to be sold without giving further particulars and stating what that residue is cannot be considered a sufficient description and they have been so understood by the lower Courts before whom the case from which this second appeal arises came. In so far as they lay down such a general rule, I think they have not been correctly decided. Such a rule is opposed to the terms of sec. 6 of Act XI of 1859, and to the ruling of this Court in Ram Narain Koer v. Mahabir Pershad ILR 13 Cal. 208 (1886). I would therefore answer the second question in the negative. 7. It is unnecessary to answer the third question, as the point it raises will be dealt with by the Bench to which the appeal is returned. Harington, J. 8. I agree in the judgment delivered by my Lord. Brett, J. I agree in the judgment delivered by the Chief Justice.