JUDGMENT : Richards, J. This is an application by one Sheodahin Singh seeking for the revision or an order of the learned Sessions Judge sanctioning a prosecution against the applicant under section 193 of the Penal Code, 1860. It appears that in a certain civil proceeding, to which the applicant was no party, he was examined as a witness for the defence. In the course of a protracted cross-examination he was asked whether he knew the name of Sumer Singh's father. He said he did not. He was then asked what his own father's name was, and he said Sarmet Singh and then he said that Sarmet Singh had no other son but him. The alleged false statement is as to how many sons Sarmet Singh had. It is said, he had more sons than the applicant. It is admitted here by the petitioners that the question how many sons Sarmet Singh had, was wholly immaterial to the issues in the civil case, except possibly that it went to the credibility of the witness. The truth or falsehood of that statement was known on the moment, and there was no reason why if a prosecution was maintainable and ought to have been sanctioned, the petitioners should not have proceeded forthwith. They waited “however for eleven months until after they had compromised their litigation. It is not suggested that the petitioners suffered the remotest loss in the litigation or in any other way by reason of the statement made by the applicant. On this statement of facts the Subordinate Judge refused sanction, apparently on the ground of delay and because he had some notion that the petitioners had some indirect motive for proceeding with the prosecution. After hearing the arguments here, I am inclined to think that he was not altogether wrong in the inference he drew. It appears from what has fallen from the learned pleader for the petitioners that the applicant had some contemplated or pending litigation which involved the question of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of his alleged brother, and I suspect that the reason he gave the answer he did was that the answer might be used against him hereafter. It appears from what has fallen from the learned pleader for the petitioners that the applicant had some contemplated or pending litigation which involved the question of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of his alleged brother, and I suspect that the reason he gave the answer he did was that the answer might be used against him hereafter. I may here point out that if this be so, the petitioner or whoever represented them ought never to have asked the question nor have been permitted to have asked the question, because it was neither material to the issue in the case nor did it go to the credit of the witness; it was wholly irrelevant. Neither the Subordinate Judge nor the District Judge seemed to have kept the provisions of sections 191 and 193 of the Penal Code, 1860 before them. There is no question but that it is an important matter that witnesses should be made to understand that serious consequences may follow, if they give false evidence in the course of judicial proceedings. In sanctioning proceedings, however, the Magistrate should remember that the statement must be intentionally false in order to justify a prosecution. It appears to me that there are such numerous cases in which witnesses deliberately give false evidence upon matters directly at issue and about which it is absolutely impossible that the witness can be innocently or unwaringly stating what is not true, that it would be well that as far as possible these prosecutions should be restricted to these clear cases. It appears to me, although it is not necessary actually to decide the point, that the false statement should be one material to the issue. I consider that the materiality or the immateriality of the evidence is well worthy of the consideration of the Magistrate when sanctioning or refusing sanction for a prosecution. The probability of a witness making a false statement with reference to a material fact unintentionally is far less than the probability of his making such a statement with reference to an immaterial fact. 2. The whole attention of both sides and the Judge is called to the evidence of a witness when he is deposing to a material fact, when he is deposing to an immaterial fact the attention paid to his evidence may be extremely small either by himself or by any other person. 2. The whole attention of both sides and the Judge is called to the evidence of a witness when he is deposing to a material fact, when he is deposing to an immaterial fact the attention paid to his evidence may be extremely small either by himself or by any other person. I must say that I agree in principle with the remarks made by Mr. Justice KNOX in the case of Emperor v. Ganga Sahai, [1903] 23 A.W.N., 68. The case of Emperor v. Babu Ram, [1904] I.L.R., 26 All., 509, has also been referred to. In that case the application was for the revision of a conviction, not for the revision of an order sanctioning proceedings. In the course of the judgment the Court actually found that the particular false evidence was in fact directly material. They also state that in the opinion of the Court, evidence the nature of ‘which is to make a witness more or less creditable to the Court is material evidence and there’ fore a fit subject for a prosecution, There is no doubt that when a witness makes a false statement in answer to a question going to his credit, he is liable to a prosecution. But the question in this case, as I have already stated, was neither material to the issue nor did it go to the credit of the witness. In my opinion the most fitting case for a prosecution for perjury is when a witness makes a false statement on a matter directly at issue. I do not for a moment say that a prosecution ought never to be sanctioned when a witness has made a false statement in answer to a question going to his credit, but I think that some allowance ought to be made to a witness seeking to evade some matter relating, for instance, to his past history. It seems to me that when a question is answered falsely, that neither relates to the question at issue nor goes to the credit of the witness that it is very doubtful whether any Judge should come to the conclusion that the witness is intentionally making a false statement. The matter is not immediately before me, but I entertain considerable doubt whether a prosecution founded on such a statement could be legally sustained. The matter is not immediately before me, but I entertain considerable doubt whether a prosecution founded on such a statement could be legally sustained. Under all the circumstances of this case I think that the order of the District Judge sanctioning the prosecution under section 193 against the applicant should be set aside. I set aside the same accordingly and restore the order of the Subordinate Judge.