JUDGMENT Bodilly, J. - In this case the Plaintiff, Radhika Mohan Roy, sues the Defendant, Mr. Shelly Bonnerjee, as Administrator pendente lite to recover the sum of Rs. 13,000 and interest that he alleges to be due to him from the estate of his late brother Dakshina Mohan Roy. The Plaintiff is the youngest son of one Babu Mohini Mohan Roy who died some years ago leaving large estates of the value of many lakhs of rupees. He had four sons of whom Dakshina was the eldest and the Plaintiff the youngest and after his death the brothers lived joint but separated in meals. The family dwelling-house was at Bhowanipur but in August 1900 Dakshina removed to and resided at Calcutta until his death which took place on June 6th, 1901. In January 1901 there was a family partition suit and the eldest and youngest brothers remained on friendly terms but were not on good terms with the other two brothers. 2. Dakshina appears to have been of a speculative disposition and he purchased, some time not very long before his death, a large property and then being short of money of his own he borrowed from Radhika the sum of 1 lakh and 12,000 rupees in order to pay for it. The money was, I am told and I see no reason to doubt it, advanced in Government securities and without security and was eventually repaid. In addition to this land speculation, Dakshina also dealt speculatively very largely in Government securities and on the 15th October 1900 he borrowed from the Plaintiff the sum of Rs. 10,000 for himself and Rs. 70,020 for his son-in-law giving promissory notes on account of these amounts. These notes have been produced before me. The loans were paid off and the notes passed again into Dakshina's possession but they do not bear any endorsement of the amounts having been paid. 3. There is no dispute about any of the transactions up to this time and the whole dispute between the parties is as to an alleged loan on May 2nd, 1901, and subsequent advances. 4. 3. There is no dispute about any of the transactions up to this time and the whole dispute between the parties is as to an alleged loan on May 2nd, 1901, and subsequent advances. 4. As I have said, Dakshina died on June 6th, 1901, and after his death two Wilis of the deceased were sought to be set up--one, dated May 2nd, 1901, being suit No. 12 of 1901 was propounded by Radhika, and one of May 31st, 1901 being suit No. 13 was propounded by his two brothers--and suits were instituted. Radhika and Dakshina's widow entered caveats to the Will of May 31st and the brothers and widow entered caveats in respect of the Will of May 2nd. On July 25th, 1901, a Mr. Beeby was appointed Administrator of the property pendente lite and the suit in respect of the Will of May 31st proceeded and was disposed of on March 10th, 1903--the Court finding it was a forgery and on appeal to the Court of Appeal the appeal was dismissed. 5. On May 21st, 1903, Mr. Beeby was appointed Administrator pendente lite in respect of the suit regarding the Will set up by the Plaintiff and he continued so to act till December 8th, 1903, when he was discharged and the Defendant Mr. Shelly Bonnerjee was appointed in his place. This suit was settled on March 22nd, 1904, Radhika receiving from the widow the sum of Rs. 50,000 to withdraw the Will and an order to that effect was made in the action. 6. On January 22nd, 1905, two suits being Nos. 3 and 4 of that year were filed, being suits by persons named as legatees in the Will propounded by the Plaintiff and there was also a suit by the widow asking for Letters of Administration to the estate of her late husband. Mr. Bonnerjee was appointed Administrator pendente lite in those suits also. 7. On January 13th, 1904, the present suit was instituted in the District Court of Alipore and was removed from that Court to this Court on the application of Mr. Bonnerjee on December 19th, 1904. A preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Mr. Bonnerjee was appointed Administrator pendente lite in those suits also. 7. On January 13th, 1904, the present suit was instituted in the District Court of Alipore and was removed from that Court to this Court on the application of Mr. Bonnerjee on December 19th, 1904. A preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Jackson at the end of the Plaintiff's opening but was not at that time pressed as he said he wished the Court to decide the case on the merits, although he in no way abandoned the objection that he then made and the objection is now persisted in by Mr. Chackravarti who appears with Mr. Jackson. The objection is this :-- It is said that Mr. Bonnerjee having been appointed, on December 8th, 1903, in the suit respecting the Will of May 2nd, 1901, and that suit having come to an end by the order of March 22nd, 1904, his appointment ipso facto ceased there being no lis pendens and that at the date of the institution of the present suit in which he is sued as Administrator pendente lite he was not in fact such Administrator and no action will lie against him as such. Mr Bonnerjee has frankly admitted and pleads that he does not take this very technical objection of his own initiative but at the express instance of the widow who is mainly interested in the property. He admits that subsequently to March 22nd, 1904, and until now he has continued to hold and deal with the property in exactly the same way as he did prior to March 22nd, that he has written and signed letters as Administrator pendente lite and that the application to remove this suit from the Alipore Court to this Court was made by him describing himself as Administrator pendente lite. It has been argued before me upon the authority of Taylor v. Taylor 6 P.D. 29 (1881) that although the suit came to an end on March 22nd still until the time during which an appeal from that order could have been brought has elapsed, the suit is still pending and he is still in fact Administrator pendente lite. I do not think that this argument is sound and I do not think that the authority quoted goes as far as is contended. I do not think that this argument is sound and I do not think that the authority quoted goes as far as is contended. It may well be that after the final decree has been passed in a suit in certain matters the Administrator pendente lite may continue to act in some capacities such as concluding his accounts and so forth, but I do not think that he continues to act fully invested with all the powers of an Administrator pendente lite and the true rule is, in my opinion, laid down in the case of Wieland v. Bird L.R. (1894) P.P. 262, where it was held that the functions of the Administrator pendente lite terminate when the dispute ends and that is on the pronouncement of the final decree. Under these circumstances, application was made to me to allow the plaint to be amended by adding an alternative claim against Mr. Bonnerjee as executor and that application I have granted on the ground that having, after the termination of the suit, continued to hold and deal with the estate and property of Dakshina Mohan Roy in the way in which he admits he has done, he has rendered himself liable to be sued as such. It has been contended by Mr. Chakravarti on behalf of the Defendant that inasmuch as the Indian Succession Act does not apply to Hindus and the sections of that Act relating to executors de leur torts have not been incorporated in the Hindu Wills Act, therefore the principles on which persons can become liable as executors de leur torts can never apply to Hindus. I do not think that this contention is correct and in coming to this conclusion there is a certain amount of authority to assist me. The first case is a decision of Mr. Justice Phear, Jogendra Narain v. Temple Ind. Jur, N.S. 235 (1867), and the learned Judge at p. 238 says this :--"According to the state of the law affecting Hindus, as I understand it, if a debtor dies leaving his debt unsatisfied the creditor must look for payment to the person who has received the deceased's property in due course of descent, or in Bengal if the deceased man has left a Will to the executor who has taken assets or to an Administrator who has taken out administration. Now, by what outward signs is the creditor to recognise the person who bears any one of these three characters. Obviously there is but one available to him, viz., the factum of his dealing with the assets of the deceased. And I am of opinion that here, as is in England, the creditor is not obliged to seek out the root of any one's authority whom he finds in possession of the property which the deceased man left at his death. He may sue such a person on the foundation of that possession only, and in the event of his doing so it will be on the Defendant to show not only that he did not in fact become possessed of the property in either one of the characters of the executor or administrator, but also to establish that he has a good title to hold it by some other rights. If this he is unable to do, then the Court will hold him liable as of his own way to discharge the Plaintiff's claim in the same way and to the same extent as if he was actually clothed with one of these characters which I have specified. I conceive this to be a matter of evidence only depending upon those principles alone which were led in England to the recognition of the vicarial liability hidden under the name of Executor de tort" 8. I may say that I certainly agree with every word that the learned Judge here says as to the principles on which the Court should act. This case was taken to the Court of Appeal, and the Court, without assenting to or dissenting from the conclusion of Mr. Justice Phear, affirmed it on other grounds. 9. The next case cited to me was the case of Suddasook Kootary v. Ram Chunder ILR 17 Cal. 620 (1890) in which the case I have above referred to was mentioned, and this Court in referring to the case states that in some cases it may be difficult to avoid the application of the principles on which executor de son tort is founded to Hindus, but they did not find it necessary to give a judgment on the point. The case of Prosunno Chunder Bhuttacherjee v. Kris to Chaitanno Pal ILR 4 Cal. The case of Prosunno Chunder Bhuttacherjee v. Kris to Chaitanno Pal ILR 4 Cal. 342 (1878) has been cited, but the judgment is of a very hesitating character and does not add anything to the decision of Mr. Justice Phear; nor does the case of Janaki v. Dhanu Lal (6) tend to assist me in arriving at a conclusion on the broad general principle. The Indian Succession Act, it is true, does not apply to Hindus and the sections dealing with the principles of a person becoming liable as executor de son tort have not been incorporated in the Hindu Wills Act, but I have to consider whether the mere fact of their not having been so incorporated amounts to an express exclusion of that principle applying to Hindus. In other words, would the application of the principles of English law to Hindus be repugnant to either of those Statutes and I think it would not, and I think it would be much to be regretted if it were so and therefore unless there is something repugnant in Hindu law to prevent the principles applying it should apply. Mr. Justice Phear in his judgment, to which I have already referred, deals exhaustively with the state of the Hindu law on the subject and 1 need not now recapitulate the opinion of the earlier writers that are set forth in that judgment and he comes to the conclusion, with which I entirely agree, that according to Hindu law the person who on the death of another takes his property by inheritance or descent is bound to pay the debts of the deceased to the extent of the assets coming to his hands, and I see nothing repugnant to that state of the law in holding that this will also apply to the case of a stranger who takes possession of the assets of a deceased person and who deals with them in such a way as would render him liable as executor de son tort according to English law. That being so, I hold that the action can properly proceed against Mr. Bonnerjee.