JUDGMENT 1. This is a rule, calling upon the District Magistrate to show cause why the order of the District Registrar of Faridpur, dated the 23rd February 1905, sanctioning the prosecution of the applicant under sec. 182, I. P. C., should not be set aside. It appears that the applicant made a complaint to the District Registrar against the Sub-Registrar of Palong, against whom and whose office amlas he made certain imputations. The District Registrar held an enquiry and was satisfied as to the falsity of the complaint; and he therefore sanctioned the prosecution of the applicant under sec. 182, I. P. C., by his order of the 23rd February 1905. 2. The present rule was accordingly obtained by the applicant to show cause why the order of the District Magistrate should not be set aside. 3. It has been contended that there was no proper sanction for the prosecution of the applicant; and we are of opinion that this plea must prevail. 4. The learned District Magistrate says that, in his capacity of District Registrar, he made, practically, an application to himself, as Magistrate, and sanctioned the prosecution of the applicant. 5. We think, however, on the authority of the ruling in the cases to which our attention has been called, namely, In the matter of the petition of Banarsi Das I. L. R. 18 All. 213 (1896)., Baperam Sarma v. Gouri Nath Dutt I. L. R. 20 Cal. 474 (1892) and Jogendra Nath Mookerjee v. Sarat Chandra Banerjee 9 C. W. N. 277 (1905)., that this was not a case in which there was any application for sanction to prosecute, nor a case in which sanction was properly given, and that, therefore, the prosecution of the applicant cannot proceed. 6. We have considered whether the order directing the prosecution of the applicant can be sustained under sec. 476, C. Cr. P. It appears that the Registrar, on receiving the complaint, made an enquiry with regard to it and examined certain witnesses on oath. This enquiry seems to have been a departmental enquiry, and not an enquiry under the provisions of the Registration Act, because the offence which the District Registrar was enquiring into was not one under the provisions of the Registration Act. In the circumstances we do not think that the order complained of can be sustained either under sec.476, C. Cr. This enquiry seems to have been a departmental enquiry, and not an enquiry under the provisions of the Registration Act, because the offence which the District Registrar was enquiring into was not one under the provisions of the Registration Act. In the circumstances we do not think that the order complained of can be sustained either under sec.476, C. Cr. P., or as a sanction under sec. 195, C. Cr. P. We therefore set aside the order complained of and thus make the rule absolute.