JUDGMENT : Banerji, J. The question to be determined in this appeal, which arises out of an application for execution, is whether the application was time-barred. The decree is dated 22nd November, 1898 and was one for sale of mortgaged property. It directed the amount of the decree, Rs. 318, to be paid by six annual instalment, each of Rs. 50 principal and Rs. 6 interest. It further provided that in case of default in the payment of any instalment, the decree-holder would have the option to take out execution of the decree, for the recovery of the whole amount of it. The first two installments which became due in November, 1899 and 1900, not having been paid, the decree-holder applied for an order absolute under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, for the recovery of the whole amount due under the decree. An order under that section was made on the first of December, 1900, and on the 23rd of February, 1901, the decree-holder applied for execution in respect of the whole amount due and asked for the sale of the mortgaged property. On the 15th May, 1901, that application was dismissed for default of prosecution. The present application was made on the 1st of July, 1904. This was clearly beyond three years from the date of the last application. The decree-holder, however, alleged that two sums of Rs. 150 and Rs. 50 had been paid, respectively, on the 11th of May, 1901 and 15th of July, 1901, and that these payments saved the operation of limitation. The Court of first instance found in favour of the decree-holder. But the Lower Appellate Court has held that the application for execution is time-barred. 2. That Court is of opinion that the payments alleged to have been made to the decree-holder could not save limitation under the provisions of section 20 of the Limitation Act, as it had not been proved that these amounts were paid on account of interest as such, and that the payments, if made on account of principal, did not appear in the hand-writing of the person who made them. The correctness of this view of the Court below is not questioned in this appeal. The correctness of this view of the Court below is not questioned in this appeal. But the learned Vakil for the appellant contends that as the original decree of the 22nd of November, 1898, allowed the amount of it to be paid by installments, it was open to the decree-holder to receive installments, and he is entitled to apply for execution for such installments as have remained unpaid. This might have been a valid contention had the decree-holder not exercised the option of applying for enforcement of payment of the whole amount of the decree upon default being made in payment of some of the installments. As I have already said he did exercise that option and applied for an order absolute under section 89. Again, when on the 23rd of February, 1901, he applied for execution of the decree in respect of the whole amount of it, he sought in the exercise of his option to put an end to the installments provided for in the decree. Those installments could be adhered to only in the event of the decree-holder not exercising the option which the decree gave him. He having elected to put an end to the instalment arrangement cannot now—fall, back on provisions of the decree relating to payment by installments. His right to execute the decree arose when default was made in the payment of installments, and he exercised that right, Therefore it is no longer open to him to say that he could give effect to the provisions of the decree and receive installments. If he did consent to take the decretal amount by installments, that must be treated as a subsequent agreement between him and the judgment-debtor by which he gave time to the Litter to satisfy the decree. For such an agreement the sanction of the Court is necessary under section 257A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Vakil for the appellant referred to the case, Shankar Prasad v. Jalpa Prasad, [1884] I.L.R., 16 All., 371. That case is distinguishable from the present, as in that case the decree-holder had not exercised his option to enforce that decree, as he did in the present instance. The position therefore is this, the decree-holder became entitled to execute his decree so far back as the year 1900, and he enforced his right and put an end to the instalment. The position therefore is this, the decree-holder became entitled to execute his decree so far back as the year 1900, and he enforced his right and put an end to the instalment. As he did not apply for execution within three years of the date of the last application, his present application is time-barred. If he subsequently consented to take the amount due under the decree by installments, that was an agreement with the meaning of section 257A, and not having been made with the sanction of the Court, which had passed the decree, was void. In either view, therefore, the decree-holder is not entitled to execute the decree, and the order of the Court below is right. I accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees on the higher scale.