JUDGMENT : Banerji, J. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the appellant Kunja Mal and by one Babu Lal for possession of a house which had been sold to them under a sale-deed, dated 21st December, 1901, executed by Musammat Lalta Kuar for herself and as guardian of her minor son, Narbada Parshad, and by one Jamna Parshad. It appears that the house belonged to three brothers, Ganga Parshad, Jamna Parshad and Narbada Parshad. Musammat Lalta Kuar was their mother, and she was appointed guardian of the minor, Narbada Parshad, by the Court It has been found by the Court below, and the finding cannot be challenged in second appeal, that Musammat Lalta Kuar in her own right had no interest in the property. She, however, claimed to be the purchaser of the share of Ganga Parshad. It has been found and that finding also must be accepted by us, that the sale by Ganga Parshad to Musammat Lalta Kuar was a fictitious”‘transaction, and did not convey any interest to her, so that the property must be taken to have belonged to the three brothers, Ganga Parshad, Jamna Parshad and Narbada Parshad, at the time of the sale to the plaintiffs. Ganga Parshad's share in the property was attached by a creditor of his, namely, Gauri Shankar. The plaintiffs intervened, but were unsuccessful. The share was sold by auction and was purchased by the respondent, Ram Charan. After this auction sale, the present suit was brought. It was decreed ex parte in favour of Kunja Mal alone, Babu Lal, the other plaintiff, having in the meantime died, and no legal representative of the deceased, other than Kunja Mal, who alleged himself to be his heir, having been brought on the record. Ram Charan applied to have the ex parte decree set aside, and on the 17th of January, 1903, his application was granted, and the Court made an order, setting aside the decree as a whole and directing the case to be restored to the file. The case was then tried as between the plaintiff and all the defendants, some of whom appeared and filed written statements. In the Court of first instance the surviving plaintiff, Kunja Mal, contended that he was the legal representative of the deceased Babu Lal, and that he alone was entitled to maintain the suit. The case was then tried as between the plaintiff and all the defendants, some of whom appeared and filed written statements. In the Court of first instance the surviving plaintiff, Kunja Mal, contended that he was the legal representative of the deceased Babu Lal, and that he alone was entitled to maintain the suit. The Court, however, found that the purchase had been made both by Babu Lal and Kunja Mal with separate funds, and that the extent of Babu Lal's interest in the purchase was one-half. It also found that his legal representative was his “daughter and not the surviving plaintiff, Kunja Mal. It accordingly held that Kunja Mal was entitled to maintain the suit in regard to a half share of the property only. The Court of first instance was further of opinion that the sa]e of the share of Narbada Parshad, minor, by his mother Lalta Kuar, was voidable at his instance, it not being a sale effected in pursuance of the permission granted by the Court under section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act. Consequently, a decree was made in favour of Kunja Mal for one-half of Jamna Parshad's share only. This decree has been affirmed by the lower appellate Court. 2. Kunja Mal now appeals, and the first contention on his behalf is that the setting aside of the ex parte decree could only affect the share purchased at auction by Ram Charan and could not re-open the whole case. As I have already said, the Court in setting aside the ex parte decree set it aside as a whole and ordered the whole case to be restored to the file. That is an order the propriety of which cannot be questioned now. It is not an order which comes within the purview of section 591 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see Tasadduq Husain v. Hayyt-un-issa, [1903] I.L.R., 25 All., 280. 3. The next question raised is whether the appellant, Kunja Mal, could maintain the whole suit. It is contended before us on his behalf that it was the duty of the Court to bring on the record the legal representative of the deceased Babu Lal. 3. The next question raised is whether the appellant, Kunja Mal, could maintain the whole suit. It is contended before us on his behalf that it was the duty of the Court to bring on the record the legal representative of the deceased Babu Lal. As the legal representative herself did not make any application to be brought on the record, and as no person can be joined as plaintiff against his or her own consent, I do not think the Court was competent to make her a party to the suit as plaintiff. As both the Courts below have found that Babu Lal and Kunja Mal bought the property, each a half share of it for himself, the latter could maintain the suit only in respect of his own half share, and he cannot, under the circumstances, claim the other half share which was owned by Babu Lal. No plaintiff is, in my opinion, entitled to bring a suit and obtain a decree for possession of property to which he has no right, unless the suit is one under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, which this suit is not. The present suit was brought both by Kunja Mal and Babu Lal. Upon the death of the latter the right to sue in respect of the whole property survived not to the surviving plaintiff alone, but to him and the daughter of Babu Lal who has been found to be his legal representative. Moreover, Kunja Mal did not claim the share of Babu Lal otherwise than as his legal representative, and it was not his case, as put forward by his learned Vakil, that he had any other right to claim that share. I am accordingly of opinion that as regards the share of Babu Lal the claim has been rightly dismissed. 4. The next point argued in this appeal is that of the validity of the plaintiff's purchase of the share of Narbada Parshad, minor. The sale of that share was made by his mother, who had been appointed his guardian by the Court, and therefore she was not competent to sell the minor's share without the previous permission of the Court. Under the provisions of section 30 of Guardians and Wards Act, a sale without such permission would be voidable at the instance of the minor. Under the provisions of section 30 of Guardians and Wards Act, a sale without such permission would be voidable at the instance of the minor. In this case the Court did grant permission, to the guardian, to sell the property by an order, dated the 10th October, 1901. If that permission had unconditionally authorised the guardian to sell the property, the validity of the sale could not be questioned. But the permission, as I read it, was subject to a condition. What happened was this:— The guardian made an application to the Court stating that the minor had a ? share in the property, that there were incumbrances on the property, and that there was a purchaser who was willing to pay for the whole of it, Rs. 2,200, of which the minor's share amounted to Rs. 733, and she asked for permission to sell the minor's share. On this the Court made an order in the following terms: “Permission is granted provided the applicant files a receipt for the a mount paid over to the mortgagee in this Court and invests the balance in the minor's name in a security approved of by the Court within six weeks' time.” The Court below has found that the plaintiff was fully aware of this order. It has also found that instead of paying the full amount of the price mentioned in the sale deed, he has withheld Rs. 1,900 for payment to credi-tors, and that it was only the balance which he purported to have paid. In my judgment the permission granted was a conditional permission, the condition being that the property was to be sold for the price stated in the petition for permission, that the mortgage money due to the creditor of the minor should be paid off at once and the receipt granted by him should be filed in Court by” the guardian, and theft any balance which might remain should be invested in securities approved of by the Court. The condition was not carried out. Therefore, in my opinion, the sale was not in accordance with the permission granted by the Court, but was on the contrary a sale in violation of that permission. Under such circumstances the sale was voidable at the instance of the minor. The Court below has found that the plaintiff is a speculator who bought the property by way of speculation. Under such circumstances the sale was voidable at the instance of the minor. The Court below has found that the plaintiff is a speculator who bought the property by way of speculation. He was aware of the condition imposed by the Court upon the guardian's power of Sale. Notwithstanding this knowledge he did not purchase the property in accordance with the permission, which evidently contemplated the immediate discharge of debts and relief of the minor's property from prior incumbrances. Such a purchase cannot be held to be a valid purchase so as to be binding upon the minor who has in no way benefited by it. I think the Court below was right, and I would dismiss the appeal with costs. RICHARDS, J. The appellant appears to me to have acted perfectly bona fide throughout the whole transaction. It may be that he was sufficiently aware of the state of the family and their transactions to prevent him from claiming the benefit of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, but I cannot find anything either in the judgment or the evidence to show that he has acted improperly from the commencement to the end. I regret very much that the effect of our judgment will not be to give him a greater part of the relief he seeks. In this appeal two matters create in my mind great difficulty in arriving at the same conclusion as that of my learned brother. The first question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the minor's share. The second, whether he is entitled to carry on the litigation after the death of his brother. I will take the second point first. The purchase was a purchase by the plaintiff and his brother Babu Lal. As between them and the vendors it was a joint purchase, and I have no doubt whatever that if the sale had been one particularly advantageous to the vendors, they could have sued both Babu Lal and the appellant for the whole of the purchase money, and they would have been entitled to have got a decree jointly against them both for the whole purchase money. It would not have been open to either Babu Lal or the appellant to say that they were only buying each his own half. It would not have been open to either Babu Lal or the appellant to say that they were only buying each his own half. In my judgment an enquiry in the suit between the plaintiffs and the vendors as to the nature of the rights of the purchasers inter se was an extremely inconvenient course. The purchase clearly was not the purchase of half the premises, and I have no hesitation in saying that at any moment if one of the pur-chasers had declined to go on with the purchase, the other would have been entitled to complete the purchase for his own benefit. On the same principle I think the plaintiff-appellant was entitled to carry on the litigation and to obtain a decree for the whole or at least ? of what he had claimed. The rights of the heirs of Babu Lal should have been ascertained by an agreement or by a suit between those heirs and the present appellant. 5. As to the first point, consent was given by the Court to the sale of the minor's property, and therefore there was no contravention of the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act, unless we import into the section of that Act words which would imply that not only must there be consent to the sale but every term of the consent must strictly be complied with. The Court acting on behalf of the minor ctontemplated a sale not only of the minor's property alone but a sale of the whole house in which the minor had a share. The Court must have known that the purchase money was to be the purchase money not only in respect of the minor's share but of the whole property. The Court must have been aware that the debt which it wished to be paid was a debt which affected the whole property. Owing to circumstances, of which the Court certainly was not aware at the time and for which, I think, the appellant cannot be held responsible, litigation arose. The title was called into question, and as the result it was found that good title could not be made of more than ? of the property. Accordingly the vendors, including the minor, have been allowed to remain in possession and in receipt of rents and profits pending this litigation. The title was called into question, and as the result it was found that good title could not be made of more than ? of the property. Accordingly the vendors, including the minor, have been allowed to remain in possession and in receipt of rents and profits pending this litigation. The purchaser had remained in possession of his money except according to the Court about Rs. 300. But it is stated at the bar, and I have no reason to doubt the statement, that a further sum amounting in all to Rs. 933 has been paid. The appellant has expressed his willingness to bring in within a week the whole amount of the minor's interest in the purchase money; and accordingly it seems me that the minor's interest has not suffered by anything that has happened, and can be fully protected. The question remains whether the mere fact that in accordance with the strict terms of the order the whole mortgage debt which affected the whole property was not discharged pending the litigation is sufficient to rescind the contract made on the minor's behalf or to render it voidable at the instance of the minor. Suppose that instead of the minor one adult share-holder in the property had stipulated by a contract for the sale of his share with a proviso that the purchase money should be paid in a particular way within a particular time without declaring in any way that time was of the essence of the contract, could it be said that when difficulty arose about the title, he was entitled to repudiate the contract without ever having offered possession or required payment of the purchase-money. I cannot think that the non-compliance under similar circumstances with the provisions of the order sanctioning the sale can have any greater effect. The main point was that the sale should not take effect without the sanction of the Court. The Court did sanction the sale, and having regard to the effect, as I have already pointed out, that the minor's interests have not been prejudiced and that they were clearly protected by the order of the Court, I would have been in favour of granting the plaintiff a decree for possession of the shares of Jamna Prasad and the minor on the terms of his bringing into Court a sum equivalent to the proportionate price of these two shares. 6. 6. Under section 575 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appeal is dismissed with costs to Ram Charan, respondent, including fees on the higher scale.