JUDGMENT : Stanley, J. This is an appeal under section 10 of the Letters Patent against a decree of a learned Judge of this Court allowing an appeal from the decree of the District Judge which affirmed a decree of the Court of first instance. The facts out of which the litigation arose are shortly as follows:— Kishun Lal, the plaintiff's father, borrowed a sum of Rs. 300 odd from one Jainti Prasad and gave a ruqqa or promissory note as security for the loan. Jainti Prasad brought a suit on foot of this note and impleaded not merely the executant of the note but also his minor son, the plaintiff. On behalf of the son a defence was raised that he was no party to the note and that therefore the suit could not properly be decreed as against him. The Court properly acceded, to this defence and dismissed the suit as against him. As there appears to be some misconception as to the meaning and effect of the decree in that suit we shall refer to the proceedings. The Munsif in his judgment, dated the 9th of May, 1894, says that the defendant, Ganeshi Lal, was not liable to pay the plaintiff's claim “when he was not a privy to the pro-note debt contract,” that is., that he being no party to the ruqqa, a decree could, not properly be passed against him. Accordingly the Munsif exempted Ganeshi Lal from plain tiff's claim. In other words he dismissed the suit as against Ganeshi Lal. A decree, however, was passed against the father, and in execution the assignee of that decree caused a portion of., joint family property to be sold. 2. The present suit was thereupon instituted by Ganeshi Lal to have it declared that the decree so obtained could not be properly executed against his interest in the family property in view of the fact that the suit upon the ruqqa had been dismissed against him. Both the Court of first instance and the lower appellate Court held that there was no force in his contention; that Ganeshi Lal was liable as a Hindu son to pay his father's debt unless that debt was tainted with immorality; there was no suggestion in this case that there was any immorality. 3. Both the Court of first instance and the lower appellate Court held that there was no force in his contention; that Ganeshi Lal was liable as a Hindu son to pay his father's debt unless that debt was tainted with immorality; there was no suggestion in this case that there was any immorality. 3. A second appeal was preferred from the decrees of the lower Courts to this Court, and the learned Judge before whom the appeal came for disposal reversed the decrees of the Courts below, holding that in view of the dismissal of the suit upon the ruqqa as against the son, not merely was he personally exempted from liability in respect of the debt but that his interest in the family property could not be sold in execution of the decree passed against his father. The learned Judge says:— “The Court exempted the plaintiff, Ganeshi Lal, from liability from the debt and made no reservation that such exemption should extend only to his person and personal property other than the joint family property. The effect of his being exempted from liability was to dismiss the suit against him, so that the decree which was passed in that suit could not be enforced against him, or any property in which he had any interest. His share in the joint family property therefore could not under that decree be sold.” We are unable to agree with the learned Judge in the conclusion at which he so arrived. In the first place we do not think that it was necessary for the Court below in dismissing the claim against Ganeshi Lal to make any reservation to the effect that such exemption should extend only to his person and personal property. It was quite sufficient for the Court to say that Ganeshi Lal not being a party to the ruqqa could not be made personally liable for it. Then the learned Judge says that the effect of his being exempted from liability was to dismiss the suit against him. That is so, but the reamed Judge goes on to say, that the effect of this was that any decree which might be passed in that suit “-could not be enforced against him on any property in which he had any interest.” We think that this was not the effect of the decree. That is so, but the reamed Judge goes on to say, that the effect of this was that any decree which might be passed in that suit “-could not be enforced against him on any property in which he had any interest.” We think that this was not the effect of the decree. In our judgment it left the son exactly in the position in which he would have been if he had never been impleaded in that suit, that is, it left him liable as a Hindu son to pay any debts of his father not shown to be tainted with immorality. As we have already said, there is no suggestion that the debt, which was contracted by the father, the subject-matter of the litigation, was contracted for immoral purposes. We therefore must allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the learned Judge of this Court and restore the decree of the lower Court. The respondent must pay the costs of this appeal and also the costs of the appeal to the learned Judge of this Court. The costs will include fees on the higher scale.