Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (Aug. 22, 1902), in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, dismissing the appellants suit. The question of law decided in this appeal was whether certain proceedings taken by the Government of Bengal under Act I. of 1894 (the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) to acquire the appellants premises in Calcutta for the purpose of providing increased accommodation for the conduct of the business of the public debt of the Government of India—which is conducted by the Bank of Bengal on behalf of the Indian Government— were valid in law. The suit was brought to set aside the whole of the proceedings of the Government and the Collector as incompetent. Act I. of 1894 is the last of a series of enactments dealing with the compulsory acquisition of land, beginning with Regulation I. of 1824, and followed by legislation (for each of the Indian Presidencies) for the purpose of enabling the local Governments to acquire lands which they might consider useful for public purposes. This legislation was in 1857 (Act VI. of 1857) expanded and embodied in an Act of general operation, the provisions of which Act—which was repealed by Act X. of 1870—were again expanded and extended in subsequent Acts. Act XXII. of 1863 introduced the principle of compulsory purchase in the case of " private persons or companies " proposing to construct "works of public utility," and amongst such works were included railroads and electric telegraphs, &c, the Government being also authorized by this Act to extend the classes of works or the list of particular works as it might see fit, a declaration signed by a secretary to Government being made (s. 26) " conclusive that the land may be taken under this Act," a principle adopted from earlier Acts. In 1870 further consolidation and extension were effected in the same direction—which was effected by Act X. of 1870—the same process being repeated in the Act at present in force, namely, Act I. of 1894. The Bank of Bengal applied for and a Government officer reported under s. 40 of Act I. of 1894 in favour of the acquisition by Government of the appellants premises. The land acquisition Collector was directed to proceed with the acquisition. The appellant declined that portion of his claim which the Collector allowed, and claimed a reference to the Civil Court under s. 18. The land acquisition Collector was directed to proceed with the acquisition. The appellant declined that portion of his claim which the Collector allowed, and claimed a reference to the Civil Court under s. 18. But prior thereto he intimated to the Collector that he had made certain discoveries as to the preliminary proceedings, and claimed " that the Government are not authorized under the Acquisition Act to acquire the premises in question for the Bank of Bengal," and brought this suit impeaching the entire proceedings as wholly un-authorized from their beginning, and also objected to each step in them in detail as incompetent and irregular. He charged that " the inquiry and award were not bona fide," but only " a colourable compliance with the Act .... an evasion of and fraud upon the Act." He also contended that the Collectors proceedings, so far as they were not conducted within Calcutta, were in any case without jurisdiction and invalid. The respondents submitted that the Act constituted the local Government the sole authority to decide upon the necessity and propriety of the acquisition of land, whether for public purposes or for a company ; that the inquiry prescribed by s. 40 was designed to furnish material on which the Government might judge of such necessity and propriety; and that the decision of the Government on these questions was not subject to the control of the Civil Courts ; and, further, that the declaration under s. 6 of the Act was conclusive as to such questions ; and they contended that the acquisition was in fact as well as in law fully justified. The High Court held that the proceedings were in all respects valid and effectual; that " s. 40 constitutes the Government the sole custodian of the public interests, the sole judge of the two facts mentioned therein—namely, whether the land is required for the construction of some work; and, secondly, whether that work is likely to prove useful to the public. The only other person concerned in the matter is the company which makes the application for the land." And they said " There is no definition of a public purpose in the Act, nor any limitation regarding what is likely to prove useful to the public. For obvious reasons both matters are left to the absolute discretion of the local Government. For obvious reasons both matters are left to the absolute discretion of the local Government. And it seems to us it is not competent to this Court to assume to itself the jurisdiction to impose restrictions on this discretion." They further held—(1.) that the inquiry directed by s. 40 of the Act was duly held, and that the appellant was not entitled to previous notice of it, nor entitled to be heard in the course of it; (2.) that the Government was satisfied that the conditions prescribed by the Act for the acquisition of the land were fulfilled, and that the Government duly assented to the acquisition; (3.) that the declaration was sufficient, and conclusive of the right of the Government to acquire the land; and (4.) that the proceedings were regular, valid, and effectual. Sir R. Reid, K.C., and W. C. Bonnerjee, for the appellant, contended that the proceedings adopted by the Government of Bengal for the compulsory acquisition of the appellants property were not in accordance with law, and therefore void and of no effect. They referred to Act I. of 1894, ss. 6, 9, 11-15, 18, 23, 24, 39-42, 48, 50, and 55. With regard to the declaration under s. 6, they contended that the inquiry antecedent thereto was held in the absence and without the knowledge of the appellant, neither time nor place being appointed, and was not such an inquiry as was required by the Act. Further, the agreement between the Government and the bank under s. 41 was objected to as not duly providing for the terms on which the public should be entitled to use the work. The inquiry made by the Collector and his award were not in conformity with the Act and were not binding on the appellant. He was entitled to be present at the inquiry under s. 40, but had received no notice thereof. Sect. 40, sub-s. 3, as to summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses, shewed that the inquiry was intended to be judicial, and that persons interested should have an opportunity of attending. It followed that the inquiry (if any) was not one authorized by the Act; so also with regard to the inquiry under s. 41 as to value. Sect. 40, sub-s. 3, as to summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses, shewed that the inquiry was intended to be judicial, and that persons interested should have an opportunity of attending. It followed that the inquiry (if any) was not one authorized by the Act; so also with regard to the inquiry under s. 41 as to value. The Collector was a judicial officer, and on the true construction of the Act bound to make a judicial award on evidence duly taken, and not on information furnished by the department behind the appellants back Durga Das Rukhit v. Queen-Empress (( 1900) Ind. L. R. 27 Calc. 820.) and Maharajah Luchmeswar Singh v. Darbhanga Municipality (( 1890) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 90.) were referred to. Cohen, K.C., Haldane, K.C., Asquith, K.C., and Phillips, for the Bank of Bengal, contended that the proceedings had been regularly conducted in accordance with the Act. Thereunder the local Government was sole judge of the necessity or pro priety of the acquisition, whether the purpose was a public purpose, and when the acquisition was for a company whether it was needed or useful. It was not subject to the control of the Civil Courts on those points, nor was its agreement with a company under s. 41 liable to be reviewed by the Court. The declaration in this case under s. 6 was by clause 3 conclusive evidence that the land was needed for a public purpose and of the local Governments title to acquire it. It wasdenied that the appellant was entitled to any notice under s. 40, and that the Collector was a judicial officer under the Act. He was not bound to give notices, summon witnesses, and proceed judicially under s. 41. He acted ministerially, and settled the amount which the Government or company would give. Any one interested might attend and take objection or make suggestion, but he was not bound by the decision. If dissatisfied he could refer the whole matter to the Court for its judicial inquiry and decision, provided he did so within the time allowed by s. 18. Sir R. Reid, K.C., replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ROBERTSON. If dissatisfied he could refer the whole matter to the Court for its judicial inquiry and decision, provided he did so within the time allowed by s. 18. Sir R. Reid, K.C., replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ROBERTSON. The appeal before their Lordships is against the dismissal, by the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, of a suit by the appellant, in which he prayed that a certain declaration by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and all proceedings thereunder, should be declared void and of no force or effect. The questions raised by the appeal are as to the nature of certain procedure prescribed for the compulsory taking of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (which extends to the whole of British India). The facts of the case are not in controversy. The appellant is owner of certain houses and premises adjacent to the office of the Bank of Bengal in Calcutta. The bank, desiring to extend its office, negotiated with the appellant for the acquisition of his property; but, failing to come to terms, it set in motion the machinery of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The bank is a company in the sense of that Act; and it applied for and obtained the declaration (now sought to be set aside) that the appellants land was " needed " in the sense of the Act. The first of the two questions in controversy is whether, before this declaration was issued, an inquiry had been duly held in accordance with the 40th section of the Act. The general scheme of the Act is this There is, first, to be an inquiry by a Government officer into the questions—(1.) whether the proposed acquisition is needed for the construction of some work, and (2.) whether such work is likely to prove useful to the public. If the Government officer reports affirmatively on both points, then (in this case) the Lieutenant-Governor may issue a declaration that the land is required for the purpose stated; and, this being done, the sequel is the ascertainment of value in a second inquiry by the Collector. The decision of the latter official is conclusive of value as against the Government (and, in this case, the bank) ; but the owner of land may, if dissatisfied, appeal to the High Court for its determination of the value. The decision of the latter official is conclusive of value as against the Government (and, in this case, the bank) ; but the owner of land may, if dissatisfied, appeal to the High Court for its determination of the value. The first of the appellants objections is to the procedure under the first inquiry, and his contention is that he ought to have received, and did not receive, notice of that inquiry, and that it was conducted behind his back. The section prescribing the inquiry is as follows — " 40. (1.) Such consent shall not be given unless the local Government be satisfied by an inquiry held as hereinafter provided— " (a) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some work, and " (b) that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. " (2.) Such inquiry shall be held by such officer and at such time and place as the local Government shall appoint. " (3.) Such officer may summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel the production of documents by the same means and, as far as possible, in the same manner as is provided by the Code of Civil Procedure in the case of a Civil Court." Now, upon the face of this enactment, there is no provision requiring or implying the presence or the knowledge of the owner of the land. The theory of the section would seem to be that the Government, through its officer, is to direct its. attention to public interests, and it is significant that neither promoter on the one hand, nor possible objector on the other, is mentioned in the section. This does not imply that the officer is to disregard the existence of adverse rights, and the word " needed " implies this. But the standpoint is that of public interest, and the Government is given control of the inquiry, for this is all that is meant by its being empowered to appoint time and place; and all this derives the more significance from the fact that the Act, both in this stage and in the subsequent inquiry into value, takes the initiative out of the hands of the company and puts it in the hands of the Government. That the nature of the first inquiry is in no sense litigious and that the owners of the land are purposely ignored, as parties, is strongly shewn by the anxious provisions made as regards the second inquiry, for which (s. 9) " public notice is to be given calling for claims for compensation and requiring all persons interested in the land to appear at a time and place specified. The section is as follows — “ 9. (1.) The Collector shall then cause public notice to be given at convenient places on or near the land to be taken, stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land, and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made to him. " (2.) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land so needed, and shall require all persons interested in the land to appear personally or by agent before the Collector at a time and place therein mentioned (such time not being earlier than fifteen days after the date of publication of the notice), and to state the nature of their respective interests in the land and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interests, and their objections (if any) to the measure ments made under s. 8. The Collector may in any case require such statement to be made in writing and signed by the party or his agent. " (3.) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on the occupier (if any) of such land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein, or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, as reside, or have agents authorized to receive service on their behalf, within the revenue district in which the land is situate. " (4.) In case any person so interested resides elsewhere, and has no such agent, the notice shall be sent to him by post in a letter addressed to him at his last known residence, address, or place of business, and registered under Part III. of the Indian Post Office Act, 1866 " (XIV. of 1866). The conclusion to which their Lordships come is that the appellants objections to the first inquiry are ill-founded. of the Indian Post Office Act, 1866 " (XIV. of 1866). The conclusion to which their Lordships come is that the appellants objections to the first inquiry are ill-founded. What was in fact done was simply that, the bank having applied for the acquisition of the land, the Government of Bengal requested the Board of Revenue to depute their secretary to make the necessary inquiry; that the secretary went to the bank and examined into the facts, and sent in (as the result of his inquiry) the very sufficient report which is set out in the record. In the view of the true nature of the statutory enactment which their Lordships adopt, no exception can be taken to the adequacy of the proceedings at the first inquiry. The remaining question relates to the second inquiry, which is as to the value of the land now assumed to be "needed." Shortly stated, the appellants objection is that the Collector who conducted the inquiry and made the " award " availed himself of information supplied to him without the knowledge of the appellant, and not disclosed at the inquiry. It is not suggested that there was in the proceedings anything corrupt or fraudulent, and the objection is based and depends upon the theory that the inquiry by the Collector was a judicial proceeding, and that the rules of judicial proceedings apply. The argument of the appellant starts from the word award" (which is used to describe the conclusion of the Collector), and has nothing else to support it. When the sections relating to this matter are read together, it will be found that the proceedings resulting in this " award " are administrative and not judicial; that the "award" in which the inquiry results is merely a decision (binding only on the Collector) as to what sum shall be tendered to the owner of the lands; and that, if a judicial ascertainment of value is desired by the owner, he can obtain it by requiring the matter to be referred by the Collector to the Court. The sections directly relevant (besides the 9th already set out) are the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 18th. These sections, and the question as a whole, are very satisfactorily discussed in the judgment under appeal, and their Lordships do not think it necessary to repeat the reasoning. The sections directly relevant (besides the 9th already set out) are the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 18th. These sections, and the question as a whole, are very satisfactorily discussed in the judgment under appeal, and their Lordships do not think it necessary to repeat the reasoning. It is, to say the least, perfectly intelligible that the expert official charged with the duty of fixing value should be possessed of all the information in the hands of the department, and should at the same time avail himself of all that is offered at the inquiry, his ultimate duty being, not to conclude the owner by his so-called award, but to fix the sum which in his best judgment is the value and should be offered. It is not implied in this observation that the Collector would be precluded by anything in the statute from inviting at the inquiry the criticism of the owner on any information he had in his hands if he thought that in the circumstances this would advance knowledge; but this is for his discretion. Their Lordships have no occasion to review the proceedings of the Collector, which are before them solely in relation to a suit which prayed that the declaration of the Government of Bengal (which initiated this inquiry) " and proceedings thereunder .... may be declared void/ It was assumed by the appellant, and not contested by the respondents at their Lord-ships bar, that the objection to the second inquiry was within the scope of the action, even if (as is the case) the objection to the first inquiry fails and the declaration stands. But, while nothing in the second inquiry to which their Lordships attention was called throws any doubt on the conclusion arrived at, they desire in no way to enter on considerations not within the scope of any tribunal other than the Court to which the appellant has required the Collector to refer it. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal ought to be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the Bank of Bengal, who alone appeared in the appeal.