Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (May 6, 1901) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum (Jan. 28, 1898) dismissing the suit with costs. The suit related to the right to work coal under the surface of land in two mouzahs (villages) of the Raj of Jheriah called Tisra and Golokdihi, the opposing parties claiming rival rights in such coal under rival titles derived on the one hand from the Rajah of Jheriah, and on the other hand from the holder of the two mouzans, under a former Rajah of Jheriah, as a provision for maintenance. The plaintiff claimed under the latter, the maintenance-holder. Both the lower Courts concurred in holding that the allotment of the land for maintenance did not, under the circumstances which are stated in the judgment of their Lordships, affect the right of the grantor, the Rajah of Jheriah, to the minerals under the surface, or his right to enter upon the land for the purpose of getting the coal thereunder. And they held, consequently, that the appellants, claiming under the maintenance-holder, had acquired no right to the coal in dispute. The judgment of the Subordinate Judge was to the effect that the Rajahs grant to Nanda Kishore Singh, the appellants predecessor, produced in evidence, was not genuine, and that there was no custom, family or otherwise, giving any right to the subsoil under his maintenance grant to Nanda Kishore Singh, who he held was " the possessor of only a life estate for maintenance," and as such had no "right to the coal or other minerals in the mouzahs," and was not the owner of the land. " He is only tenant for life, and as such he cannot work mines or quarries not open at the time of the grant. Lord Coke says A man hath lands in which there is a mine of coals or of the like and maketh a lease of the land (without mentioning any mines) for life or for years, the lessee for such mines as were open at the time of the lease made, may dig and take the profits thereof. Lord Coke says A man hath lands in which there is a mine of coals or of the like and maketh a lease of the land (without mentioning any mines) for life or for years, the lessee for such mines as were open at the time of the lease made, may dig and take the profits thereof. But he cannot dig for any new mine that was not open at the time of the lease made for that should be adjudged waste, and if there be open mines and the owner make a lease of the land with the mines therein this shall extend to the open mines only and not to any hidden mine Bainbridges Law of Mines and Minerals, 4th ed. p. 11. And since the passing of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the law is the same in India see s. 108, clause (o), Act IV. of 1882. Nanda Kishore got a grant of 2 ½ mouzahs in lieu of his maintenance. He was to pay himself the rents of the mouzahs on account of his maintenance. It is not alleged, much less proved, that any mine was open at the time of the grant. It is extremely doubtful whether the existence of coal under the land was known at the time to the grantor or grantee. Under the circumstances I do not think that Nanda Kishore had any right to the coal or minerals in Question." Cohen, K.C., and W. C. Bonnerjee, for the appellants, contended that the lower Courts were wrong in holding that under their maintenance grant the appellants had no right or power over the subsoil. Assuming the terms of the grant were not proved, the grantee was, in the absence of any restriction to his rights, entitled to all the benefits derivable from the surface and subsoil of the lands made over to him for his maintenance. The Subordinate Judge was wrong in applying the English law of mines and minerals to grants made by Hindus to Hindus. The Transfer of Property Act, s. 108 (o), has no retrospective effect and has no application to the case. The rights of the grantee are determinable by Hindu law and custom, and thereunder he was entitled to all benefits derivable both from the surface and subsoil of the lands. The Transfer of Property Act, s. 108 (o), has no retrospective effect and has no application to the case. The rights of the grantee are determinable by Hindu law and custom, and thereunder he was entitled to all benefits derivable both from the surface and subsoil of the lands. Even if he had no title to the subsoil, he was interested in the surface to such an extent as to be entitled to prevent any working of the minerals without his consent. They referred to Durham and Sunderland By. Co. v. Walker. (( 1842) 2 Q. B. 940, 967) Jar dine, K.C., and Phillips, for the respondents, contended that the lower Courts were right in holding that the terms of the maintenance grant were not proved. The appellants could not be presumed to have title thereunder to either the land or the coal. The allotment of the villages for maintenance did not contemplate a grant of the coal as part of the maintenance-holders right, and did not operate to pass any right thereto. The appellants and their predecessor were also rightly held to have no title to the possession of the lands in suit. That maintenance grant, though prior to the immediate deeds of grant to the respondents, was subsequent to the original lease of which they are assignees. Consequently the maintenance grant did not and could not pass a right to possession, but only to the rents reserved to the lessor. The measure of the appellants interest in the lands was simply a right for life to certain rents, and this right did not entitle them to the injunction sought unless they could shew that these rents would be rendered insecure, which had neither been alleged nor proved. The ground of action was the alleged right to the subsoil, which had not been established; and the claim to an injunction had been rested solely on that right. They referred to the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, s. 108 (o). Cohen, K.C., replied. Aug. 4. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Calcutta, dated May 6, 1901, affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum, which dismissed the suit with costs. Cohen, K.C., replied. Aug. 4. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Calcutta, dated May 6, 1901, affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum, which dismissed the suit with costs. The case relates to the right to the minerals under lands in mouzah Golokdihi, pergunnah Jheriah, in the district of Manbhum, and to various questions in connection therewith. Pergunnah Jheriah forms part of the estates of the Rajah of Jheriah. On April 22, 1824, the then Rajah of Jheriah executed a lease, of the kind well known in that part of India as a " jungleburi " lease, in favour of Golok Mudi, the material parts of which are as follows — "To Golok Mudi.—This deed .... is executed to the following effect. In mouzah Tisra .... thre are jungle lands within these boundaries .... and the lands within these boundaries are now settled with you at a rental of Es.12. You shall cut the jungle .... and prepare the lands. When the lands are prepared, rents will be assessed in the presence of five persons, and you shall pay 10 annas on every rupee thereof to the Raj, and you shall get six annas for your labour. On these conditions the lands within these boundaries with the jungle .... are given to you for jote and cultivation/ By 1835 or 1836 the time appears to have arrived for the further arrangement contemplated by the lease just cited, and accordingly a fresh instrument was entered into. When this was done two things had happened first, Golok Mudi had cleared jungle and brought the land cleared into cultivation; secondly, the mouzah had become separated from Tisra and had acquired the appellation of Golokdihi after the name of Golok Mudi, the tenant. The material parts of the new document are as follows — " To Golok Mudi of good behaviour. You have been holding possession of mouzah Golokdihi .... as jungleburi chuck. . . . The material parts of the new document are as follows — " To Golok Mudi of good behaviour. You have been holding possession of mouzah Golokdihi .... as jungleburi chuck. . . . You have now cleared the jungle within these boundaries in mouzah Golokdihi." [Then follow calculations of rent.] " Rs.47.15 are fixed as the rent." As to the effect of these documents certain questions have from time to time been raised, and it may tend to simplify the treatment of this appeal if their Lordships conclusions upon those questions are stated once for all at the earliest possible stage. Their Lordships see no reason to question the decision of the Courts in India that the leases to Golok Mudi included the whole area of Golokdihi. They also agree in thinking that those leases related to the surface and did not carry the subjacent minerals. The result is that Golok Mudi and his successors in title became by the grant entitled to the exclusive possession and use of the whole surface of Golokdihi, while the mineral rights remained in the Rajah. Their Lordships also accept the finding of the Courts in India that the lands in dispute in the present case lie in Golokdihi. The title of Golok Mudi has become vested in the defendants Hridoy Mudi and Gopal Mudi, and the whole group may be conveniently spoken of collectively as the Mudis. At some date which cannot be precisely fixed, but which must have been before, and was probably shortly before, June 3, 1849, Rajah Udit Narayan Singh, who had then succeeded to the Jheriah estate, made a khorposh, or maintenance, grant to Nanda Kishore Singh, a near relative and a member of the Raj family, of certain villages including Golok dihi. The nature of this grant, so far as it can be ascertained, will be considered later. On March 1, 1893, Nanda Kishore executed a mourusi mokurruri pottah in favour of Puma Chunder Daw by which he purported to convey to the latter the whole of his rights to surface and subsoil in mouzah Golokdihi. Later in the same year, on October 11, the Mudis executed a mourusi mokurruri pottah in favour of the respondent Cohen, purporting to grant to the latter the surface and underground rights in Golokdihi, and in particular the right to raise coal and other minerals. Later in the same year, on October 11, the Mudis executed a mourusi mokurruri pottah in favour of the respondent Cohen, purporting to grant to the latter the surface and underground rights in Golokdihi, and in particular the right to raise coal and other minerals. And on April 2, 1896, Rajah Joy Mongul, now become the Rajah of Jheriah, granted to the same Cohen a mourusi mokurruri pottah of the underground rights with the power of cutting and raising coal. The effect of these several transactions, as affecting the right of raising coal from under Golokdihi, was that Purna Chunder Daw acquired all that Nanda Kishore had to dispose of, while Cohen acquired all that the Mudis and all that the Rajah could convey. Cohen proceeded to raise coal under Golokdihi, and Purna Chunder Daw (who is now represented by the appellants as his executors) instituted the present suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum. He sued as defendants the Mudis and Cohen, and joined his own lessor Nanda Kishore as pro forma defendant. The Great Eastern Coal Company as assignees of Cohen were afterwards added as defendants, and later still, for the purposes of this appeal, the liquidators of the last-mentioned company were made parties. The plaint alleged that Nanda Kishore had been absolute owner and in possession of the land in dispute, including the minerals, under his khorposh grant. It was also alleged that Nanda Kishore had acquired a like title by long adverse possession. And the plaintiff claimed to stand in Nanda Kishores place by virtue of the pottah of March 1, 1893. He asked for a declaration of his absolute proprietary right to the land and the minerals, for possession, for damages in respect of the value of the coal removed, for an order to restore the land to its original state or the cost of doing so, for a permanent injunction against cutting, raising, and appropriating coal, and for relief generally. The pro forma defendant Nanda Kishore in his written statement supported his tenant, the plaintiff. The other defendants denied the title of Nanda Kishore to the possession of the land and to the minerals, and maintained the title on the other side derived from the Mudis and from the Rajah. The suit was dismissed by the first Court, and the High Court affirmed that decision. The other defendants denied the title of Nanda Kishore to the possession of the land and to the minerals, and maintained the title on the other side derived from the Mudis and from the Rajah. The suit was dismissed by the first Court, and the High Court affirmed that decision. At the trial the inquiry was naturally directed mainly to the nature of Nanda Kishores rights. The plaintiff relied primarily upon a document put forward as being the deed which created the khorposh grant in favour of Nanda Kishore, and which it was said conveyed to him absolutely and permanently the whole of the Rajahs rights in Golokdihi. Both Courts in India, however, have found that the genuineness of that document is not established. And their Lordships see no sufficient ground for dissenting from that finding. The case based upon adverse possession failed altogether. Reliance was then placed upon an alleged custom, family or territorial, making khorposh grants absolute and perpetual, but this case is now abandoned. It remained only to say what could be presumed as to the nature of a khorposh grant the existence of which is not disputed, but of the terms of which there is no direct evidence. Both the Courts in India held that the most that could be assumed as to the duration of such a grant was that it was for the life of the grantee. They further held that such a grant, regarding it as one for the life of the grantee, could not be presumed to be more than a grant of rents and profits, and could not be presumed to carry with it a right to open mines and remove minerals, which are a portion of the soil. In these conclusions their Lordships concur, and they consider, as did the Courts in India, that these conclusions are sufficient to dispose of the case so far as it turns upon any title of Nanda Kishore to the minerals. The claim of Nanda Kishore, or of the plaintiff through him, to possession of the surface is precluded by the exclusive right of possession granted to the Mudis by the jungleburi leases and by them to Cohen. But on the argument before their Lordships the case for the appellants was placed upon another alternative ground. The claim of Nanda Kishore, or of the plaintiff through him, to possession of the surface is precluded by the exclusive right of possession granted to the Mudis by the jungleburi leases and by them to Cohen. But on the argument before their Lordships the case for the appellants was placed upon another alternative ground. It was contended that assuming Nanda Kishore as khorposhdar to have had, and the appellants now to have, no proprietary interest in the minerals and no right to work them, still the latter have a sufficient interest in the soil of Golokdihi to entitle them to object to the working of minerals therein or thereunder by any person without their consent. And the question so raised has to be considered. What is asked for is an injunction restraining the raising of coal. In order to determine the validity of this claim it is necessary to realize clearly the position of the appellants claiming under Nanda Kishore. They have no right in the minerals, which belong to the Rajah or those who derive title from him. They have no present right to the surface; that belongs to the Mudis or those entitled under them. The plaintiff, and therefore the appellants, might conceivably have been entitled to damages. If so, the damages would have been measured by the injury inflicted upon their interest in the property by what has been done. But that interest endures only during the life of Nanda Kishore under a grant to the latter of a date not later than 1849. And the right is limited to the receipt of the rents reserved under the lease to the Mudis and such other rights, if any, as may be incident to such a reversion as that which has been acquired. The plaintiff asked for damages based upon the view that he was the owner of the minerals, and he asked for damages based upon the view that he was entitled to possession of the surface, both of which claims failed. He never asked for damages upon the only ground legally tenable. And this is natural, for there is no evidence of any injury to his reversion, or that his security for the rent, which is all he is entitled to, will be in the least degree impaired. He never asked for damages upon the only ground legally tenable. And this is natural, for there is no evidence of any injury to his reversion, or that his security for the rent, which is all he is entitled to, will be in the least degree impaired. The right to an injunction depends in India upon statute and is governed by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877). Sect. 52 of that Act places the grant of an injunction in the discretion of the Court—a discretion to be exercised of course as the discretion of Courts always is. Now in the present case there is no evidence that the respondents have done, or threaten to do, anything which will interfere with the enjoyment of any right vested in the appellants, and the invasion of their right (if any) is of a theoretical and trivial character which would at most give them a claim to nominal damages. Any injunction which could be granted would inflict far more injury on the respondents than any advantage which the appellants could derive from it. Their Lordships are of opinion that in the exercise of a sound discretion no injunction should be granted. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs.