JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— This appeal must be allowed. The facts which have given rise to the litigation are shortly as follows:— The decree-holders applied to the Court in execution of a decree to have certain lands of the judgment-debtor sold. The Court upon this application caused notices to be issued under section 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure, calling upon the judgment-debtors to state whether the property was ancestral or not. The judgment-debtor paid no heed to this notice. Thereupon inquiry was made of the Collector and the result of his investigation was a finding that the property was not ancestral. Accordingly the Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, carried out the sale holding that the property was not ancestral. The judgment-debtor, after the execution of the decree had been carried out, objected to the sale on the ground that the land was ancestral. Both the lower Courts held that this objection was fatal to the sale and passed an order setting aside the sale. On second appeal to this Court the learned Judge, before whom the appeal came, acceded to the contention of the respondents and dismissed the appeal, holding the case was governed by the decision in the ease of Sukhdeo Rai v. Sheo Ghulam, [1882] I.L.R., 4 All, 382.. It appears that a later decision of a Bench of this Court, the facts of which appear to be substantially on all fours with those of the present case, was not laid before the learned Judge of this Court or before the learned Judges of the Courts below. It is the case of Shirin Bagam v. Agha Ali Khan, [1895] I.L.R., 18 All, 141. It is the case of Shirin Bagam v. Agha Ali Khan, [1895] I.L.R., 18 All, 141. In that case the law was carefully considered in a lengthy judgment of the Court, and it is there held that in an application under section 311 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside a sale in execution of a decree, it is necessary for the applicant to show that not only was there material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale but that substantial injury also had been sustained in consequence of such irregularity, also that in such a case it is not competent for the applicant to raise, nor for the Court to entertain, any plea as to the jurisdiction of the Court executing the decree, as for example, a plea that the property sold was ancestral and ought to have been sold in accordance with the provisions of section 320 of the Code. Now it seems to us to be unnecessary to reconsider the questions which were decided in these cases, in as much as it was conceded by the learned. Advocate for the respondents that if, as a matter of fact, it was determined by the Court below on investigation that the property was not ancestral, he could not succeed on the question raised by him either under section 311 or under section 244. As a matter of fact, as we have pointed out, the learned Subordinate Judge did decide that the property was not ancestral, and thereupon ordered the sale. This concludes the question. We think that some observations which fell from their Lordships of the Privy Council in a case which bears a close analogy to the present case, are worthy of being referred to here because it is apparent in this case that the judgment-debtor, although notice was served upon him to state what the nature of the property was, whether ancestral or non-ances-tarl, abstained from giving any information and allowed the sale to proceed on the basis that it was not ancestral property, he in fact refused to give the Court any assistance whatever. In the case of Arunachellam Chetti v. Arunaehellam Chetti,. [1888] L.R., 15 I.A., 171 : S.C. I.L.R., 12 Mad., 19. In the case of Arunachellam Chetti v. Arunaehellam Chetti,. [1888] L.R., 15 I.A., 171 : S.C. I.L.R., 12 Mad., 19. their Lordships in the course of their judgment referring to the fact that the property which was the subject-matter of a sale had been insufficiently described in the proclamation for sale observe, “the judgment-debtors knowing as they must have known, what the description was in the proclamation, allow the whole matter to proceed until the sale is completed and then ask to have it set aside on account of this, as they say, misdescription. It appears to come within what was laid down by this Board in Olpherts v. Mahabir Parshad Singh, [1882] L.R., 10 I.A., 25 : S.C. I.L.R., 9 Cal., 656. that if there was really a ground of complaint and the judgment-debtors would have been injured by these proceedings in attaching and selling the whole of the property whilst the interest was such as it was, they ought to have come and complained. It would be very difficult indeed to conduct proceedings in execution of decrees by attachment and sale of property if the judgment-debtor could lie by and afterwards take advantage of any misdescription of the property attached and about to be sold, which he knew well, but of which the execution creditor or decree-holder might be perfectly ignorant, that they should take no notice of that, allow the sale to proceed and then come forward and say the whole proceedings were vitiated.” We think that these words of their Lordships are peculiarly applicable to the circumstances of the present case. We therefore hold that under the circumstances neither under section 244 nor section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure was the judgment-debtor entitled to come forward and ask to have the sale set aside. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the learned Judge of this Court and also the decrees in the Courts below, and direct that the objection of the judgment-debtor filed on the 18th of May, 1904, do stand dismissed with costs in all Courts.